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ABSTRACT
Institutional investors have been evolving significantly in China since 1997 when
they were formally introduced to China’s market. The influence of institutional
investors on firm policies has been studied extensively (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Koh,
2007; Yuan et al., 2008; Crane et al., 2016; Firth et al., 2016; Dyck et al., 2019). These
studies mainly focus on the level of ownership by institutional investors, however they
do not consider the influence of the controlling shareholders. In China’s firms,
ownership is highly concentrated, and the controlling shareholders usually dominate the
decision-making in firm policies. Therefore, the behaviours of institutional investors
could be influenced by the controlling shareholders and could be related to their ability
to compete with the controlling shareholders. This thesis examines the influence of
large controlling shareholders on institutional investor behaviour and addresses the
question: In China, what is the effect that institutional investors have on firm policies in
the presence of the large controlling shareholders?
Firstly, this thesis investigates the effects of institutional investors on firm overall
corporate governance measured by CEO pay-performance relationship. Secondly, this
thesis examines the influence of institutional investors on firm investment activities,
specifically, the innovation performance. Finally, this thesis provides insights into their
demand for accounting conservatism. Due to the different investment incentives of
domestic institutional investors and foreign institutional investors, their impacts may be
heterogeneous. Therefore, this thesis examines the effects of domestic mutual funds and
qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) separately and more importantly,
compares their effects.
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With respect to the effects of institutional investors on firm overall corporate
governance as measured by CEO pay-performance relationship, this thesis finds that the
presence of domestic mutual funds can strengthen the positive pay-performance
relationship, while QFIIs have no significant effects. These results indicate that
domestic mutual funds could efficiently discipline managers’ behaviours and thereby
improve overall corporate governance, while QFIIs could not exert significant influence
on corporate governance. Moreover, the effects of domestic mutual funds are stronger
when they ownership level is closer to that of the controlling shareholders, and are also
stronger in non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs), firms with a weaker industry
tournament, and firms located in more developed regions.
For firm innovation performance, both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs have
positive effects. Their effects are not only determined by their ownership level, but also
by their ability to contest with the controlling shareholders. It is found that when the
ownership of domestic mutual funds is closer to that of the controlling shareholders, the
contestability of the controlling shareholders is strengthened and this can enhance firm
innovation. However, QFIIs do not have as significant contestability effects on firm
innovation. Furthermore, the effects of contestability by domestic mutual funds are
stronger in non-SOEs, firms without politically connected CEOs, firms facing more
competitive markets and firms with less analyst coverage.
It has been documented that accounting conservatism could mitigate agency
problems between managers and shareholders, so equity investors usually demand
conservative accounting, treating it as a governance device. However, as evidenced,
domestic mutual funds could efficiently monitor managers’ behaviours in direct ways,
therefore they may be less dependent on financial numbers to discipline managers.
7

Moreover, in China the large controlling shareholders usually adopt a lower level of
accounting conservatism. In this context the requirement of institutional investors for
conservative accounting would be weaker. The results show that domestic mutual funds
have negative effects on accounting conservatism, whereas QFIIs have positive effects.
Their effects are also subject to their relative ownership level to the controlling
shareholders. The negative effects of domestic mutual funds and positive effects of
QFIIs on accounting conservatism are stronger when their ownership level is closer to
that of the controlling shareholders. Also, their influence on accounting conservatism is
more significant in non-SOEs, firms with a higher ownership concentration and a lower
level of information asymmetry.
Overall, the monitoring role of domestic mutual funds is more efficient than that of
QFIIs in China. Their effects are not only relevant to their ownership level, but more
importantly are related to their ownership difference to the controlling shareholders.
These results imply that the behaviour of institutional investors is subject to their
identities, the controlling ownership, and the institutional environment.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and research questions
During the past two decades, institutional investors have evolved substantially in
the capital market and are playing an increasingly important role in affecting firm
policies. Academics have paid considerable attention to the role that institutional
investors play in the investee firms and have provided comprehensive empirical
evidence. Compared with individual investors, institutional investors are more
professional and sophisticated in collecting and processing information (Hartzell and
Starks, 2003; Jiang and Yuan, 2018). In addition, institutional investors are holding a
relatively large percentage of shares and their investment portfolios are more diverse.
With these advantages, institutional investors have incentives and capacity to influence
a firm’s policies, such as dividend policy, earnings management, firm valuation,
corporate social responsibility and firm performance (Short et al., 2002; Hartzell and
Starks, 2003; Koh, 2007; Yuan et al., 2008; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012; Aghion et
al., 2013; Crane et al., 2016; Firth et al., 2016; De-la-Hoz and Pombo, 2016; Dyck et al.,
2019).
However, these studies mainly focus on the level of institutional ownership without
considering the presence of the large controlling shareholders. It should be noted that
unlike developed markets, ownership is highly concentrated in emerging markets and
the large controlling shareholders usually play a dominant role in deciding firm policies
for their own benefits. The behaviours of institutional investors, usually the noncontrolling shareholders, may be affected by the large controlling shareholders. Little
attention has been given to the influence of the large controlling shareholders in
emerging markets. The motivation for this thesis is to fill this void by examining
19

whether institutional investors could play an effective monitoring role and make some
difference in emerging markets, and whether and how their effects are influenced by the
controlling shareholders.
This thesis focuses on the Chinese market, which is motivated by its unique
emerging market institutional characteristics including a highly concentrated ownership
structure, fast development, various types of institutional investors, and the large
variation in institutional ownership. First, China has become the second largest
economy in the world after the US, but it is still a representative emerging market.
China has the unique institutional characteristics of emerging markets including the
underdeveloped financial market, highly concentrated ownership structure, weak
investor protection, and low level of law enforcement, which together may shape the
incentives and behaviours of institutional investors. The findings drawn from China’s
market could provide some implications for other emerging markets. More importantly,
there exist large controlling shareholders in China’s listed firms including the
government and families. This is the setting for the investigation of whether the effects
of institutional investors in the investee firms are subject to the ownership level of the
large controlling shareholders. Second, during the last two decades, institutional
investors have been growing quickly in China’s capital market. There are various types
of institutional investors with various owner identities such as mutual funds owned by
local private entities, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) owned by
foreigners, and other institutional investors that are usually owned by the government
including banks, brokers, social securities and pension funds. These owners each have
different investment incentives. The differences are particularly important for domestic
and foreign institutional investors. Domestic institutional investors, such as mutual
funds, are sophisticated and informed about the local firms, so they are able to have an
20

impact on firm performance or firm dividend policies (Yuan et al., 2008; Firth et al.,
2016). However, foreign institutional investors are faced with language and cultural
barriers, which yield more severe information asymmetry (Kang and Kim 2010;
Chakravarty et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2014; Luong et al., 2017). Thus, it is this variety in
institutional investors in China that enables the different types of institutional investor
to be examined. Third, the large variation of institutional ownership facilitates the
investigation of the influence of their ownership relative to the largest controlling
shareholders.
Chapter 2 is the first study of this thesis, which is about the effects of institutional
investors on CEO pay-performance relationship. Recent studies about the effects of
institutional investors are mainly focused on firm policies that benefit institutional
investors directly, such as earnings management (Sakaki et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2016)
and dividend policy (Firth et al., 2016), and it is reported that institutional investors
could have some influence on these policies. However, it is unknown whether
institutional investors could improve overall corporate governance to benefit all the
minority shareholders, particularly in the emerging market of China where investor
protection is weak and the financial market is underdeveloped. In addition, to obtain
private benefits through expropriation, controlling shareholders are less likely to align
the interests of top executives and minority shareholders. With the presence of large
controlling shareholders, institutional investors’ effects on corporate governance may
not be straightforward. Therefore, by employing an important corporate governance
indicator, CEO pay-performance relationship, this thesis first provides insights into the
effects of institutional investors on overall corporate governance particularly in the
presence of large controlling shareholders.
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Chapter 3 is the second study of this thesis. It investigates the effects of control
contestability by institutional investors on firm innovation performance. This
investigation aims to detect the role that institutional investors play in disciplining
managers’ investment behaviours and promoting economic development. In the last
decade, China’s economy has been growing faster and it has aimed to be an innovative
country. Institutional investors are professional in processing information and hold
diverse portfolios; this makes them more likely to evaluate a firm’s performance from a
long-term perspective and be less afraid of risk from firm investment failure. Hence,
institutional investors intend to have some influence on firm innovation. However, in
China, the effects of institutional investors on firm innovation may not be as
straightforward as in developed markets: The underdeveloped financial market hampers
firms’ ability to access external funds (Fan et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2017); and because
of the lack of diversification, the large controlling shareholders are reluctant to invest in
innovative projects bearing any risk (Minetti et al., 2015). Studies on multiple large
shareholders (MLS) have shown that institutional investors may form control
contestability of the controlling shareholders and thereby improve firm innovation. Thus,
the effect of institutional investors on firm innovation may be subject to their ability to
contest with the controlling shareholders. Furthermore, based on the controlling
shareholders’ identity, China’s firms can be divided into two types: state owned
enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). The result of severe
government intervention is that the investment activities are highly subject to
government policies, and this is more severe in SOEs. Against this background, this
thesis uses firm patent numbers as a measure of firm innovative performance, and then
examines the influence of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation.
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Chapter 4 is the third study of this thesis, which examines the effects of institutional
investors on firm accounting conservatism. Firm accounting conservatism could benefit
shareholders by mitigating agency problems (Ahmed and Deullman, 2007; Lara et al.,
2016) and reducing managers’ ability to overstate financial performance (Watts 2003a).
These benefits motivate institutional investors to demand high accounting conservatism
as a corporate governance device. However, institutional investors are able to discipline
managers’ behaviour by taking advantage of their professional knowledge in processing
information. Therefore, whether institutional investors still rely on conservative
accounting to conduct their monitoring on managers is worth investigating. In addition,
the high concentration of ownership makes the interest conflict between the controlling
shareholders and other investors dominate in China’s firms. The controlling
shareholders are usually dominant in firm policy making. Since controlling shareholders
have incentives to lower accounting conservatism for their private benefits, accounting
conservatism could be more beneficial to other investors such as creditors. Therefore,
the demand of institutional investors for accounting conservatism could be influenced
by the large controlling shareholders. This thesis thus is motivated to further look into
the influence of institutional investors on accounting conservatism in the presence of
large controlling shareholders in China.
Based on the statement above, it is essential to investigate the role that institutional
investors play in the large emerging market of China where there exists a high level of
ownership concentration, different types of controlling shareholder, a large variation in
institutional ownership, an underdeveloped financial market, and weak investor
protection. The following section summarises the institutional characteristics in China
and how they could shape the behaviours of institutional investors.
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1.2 Institutional background
1.2.1 Development of institutional investors
Since the establishment of two stock exchanges, Shanghai Stock Exchange and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the early 1990s, the Chinese government has been trying
hard to stabilise the stock market and promote its development. These two stock
exchanges have developed into comprehensive exchanges with trading of A-shares, Bshares, indices, funds, fixed income products and diversified derivative financial
products. It is only about two decades since institutional investors emerged in China and
they have now become important market participants. In 1997, the government issued
the ‘Interim measures for the administration of securities investment funds’, which
aimed to protect the rights of fund stakeholders and formally allowed institutional
investors to trade common shares on the two stock exchanges. This document was
replaced with ‘The measures for the administration of securities investment funds’
(amended 2012) by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 1 . Since then,
domestic mutual funds have grown quickly in terms of number of fund management
companies and total capitalization. Specifically, there were only 10 fund management
companies managing 23 mutual funds at the end of 1999, while by the end of 2018, the
number of fund management companies had increased to 120 managing 5,626 mutual
funds2. Domestic mutual funds are now playing a “pillar role” of institutional investors
in China. The average mutual fund ownership for China’s listed firms is around 4.2%.
In Figure 1.1, it is shown that there is a notable increase in the number of firms which
have domestic mutual funds as shareholders.

1

Please see the link:
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz/jjl/201402/t20140226_244348.html.
2
The mutual funds statistic data are announced by the Asset Management Association of China. Please
see the link: http://www.amac.org.cn/tjsj/xysj/jjgssj/index.shtml.
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Mutual funds are generally sophisticated with professional knowledge and are able
to collect and process firm information (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Boone and White,
2015; Doidge et al., 2015; Ferreira et al., 2017). Many studies have extensively
examined shareholder activism by institutional investors in both developed markets and
emerging markets (Gillan and Starks, 2000; David et al., 2001; Hartzell and Starks,
2003; Yuan et al., 2008; Helwege et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2014; Firth et al., 2016;
Cvijanović et al., 2016; Moreno et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019). These studies evidenced
that domestic mutual funds have strong activism in improving corporate governance and
influencing firm policies, such as reducing the incidence of modified audit opinions
(Chan et al., 2014), enhancing managerial efficiency and the quality of corporate
decision-making (Yuan et al., 2009), increasing forced CEO turnover (Helwege et al.,
2012) and improving corporate social responsibility (Li et al., 2019).
Figure 1.1 Number of firms with mutual funds and QFIIs as shareholders
This figure illustrates the number of firms that have mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders in each year.
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To further promote the development of the stock market, improve the corporate
governance of listed firms, and regulate investment activities, in 2002 the People’s
Bank of China (PBC, the central bank in China) and China Securities and Regulatory
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Commission (CSRC) jointly issued the ‘Measures for the administration of domestic
securities investment of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs)’ (amended in
2006) 3 . In 2003, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) were formally
introduced to the Chinese stock exchanges and since then they have increased
substantially. There were only 49 QFIIs at the end of 2007, while by May 2012 this
number had increased to 138, and further increased to 312 by August 20194. The growth
of QFIIs in China has experienced several stages with strict regulations from the
Chinese government in terms of ownership held in listed firms and their overall
investment quota. In principal, the ownership held by a single QFII in a listed firm is
not allowed to exceed 10%, and the total ownership of all the QFIIs in a listed firm is
not allowed to exceed 30% 5 . By the end of 2018, the total investment quota was
restricted to 150 billion USD, and this had doubled to 300 billion USD in January 20196.
However, this strict regulation was released in September 2019 when the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) announced the scrapping of the QFIIs
investment quota, indicating the free flow of QFII investment 7 . The average QFII
ownership for China’s listed firms is around 1.3%. Meanwhile, as indicated in Figure
1.1 above, the number of investee firms of QFIIs has been increasing since they were
introduced. Existing literature shows that the foreign institutional investors also have
the strong incentives to exert monitoring due to their independence from local

3

Please see the link:
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz/jjl/201012/t20101231_189872.html.
4
The QFIIs statistic data are available on web page of China Securities Regulatory Commission and State
Administration
of
Foreign
Exchange.
Please
refer
to
the
following
links:
http://www.safe.gov.cn/safe/2007/1209/4380.html, http://www.safe.gov.cn/safe/2012/0520/4771.html and
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306205/201511/t20151106_286098.htm.
5
Please see details in Measures for the Administration of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (2012)
at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/jj/hgjw/201310/t20131021_236658.html.
6
Please see: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-02/01/c_137790411.htm.
7
Please see: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/16/c_138396063.htm.
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management and expertise in monitoring firms (Aghion et al., 2013; Luong et al., 2017;
Rong et al., 2017; Bena et al., 2017).
In addition to domestic mutual funds and QFIIs, there are other types of
institutional investors simultaneously and actively investing in the Chinese stock market
including banks, insurance companies, social security funds, brokers, entrust companies,
and financial companies. These institutional investors mainly emerged in the early
2000s. For example, the insurance companies’ investment funds were allowed to enter
the market after the issue of ‘Interim measures for the administration of insurance
companies’ security funds investment’ in 1999 by the China Insurance Regulatory
Commission 8 . In November 2000, the National Council for Social Security Fund
(NACSSEF) was established to manage the social security fund. In 2001, the Ministry
of Finance of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security9 jointly issued the ‘Interim measures for the administration of national social
security fund investment’ 10, which formally allowed the social security fund to enter the
market. The investment of the social security fund is strictly constrained that for one
particular fund manager, it is not allowed to invest more than 10% of the managed
assets in one company 11 . The average aggregated ownership by these institutional
investors is 2.8%. Since these institutional investors are usually controlled by the
government, they are therefore mostly passive investors that hold their ownership due to
business connections with firms. In line with the Commercial Bank law12, since 2003,

8

In 2018, China Insurance Regulatory Commission was merged with China Banking Regulatory
Commission to become China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission.
9
In 2008, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security was merged with the Ministry of Human Resources
to become the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China.
10
Please see the link: http://www.ssf.gov.cn/cwsj/ndbg/201204/t20120425_3978.html .
11
Please see the regulation in ‘Interim measures for the administration of national social security fund
investment’ from the following link:
http://www.scio.gov.cn/32344/32345/33969/34130/xgzc34136/Document/1466812/1466812.htm.
12
Please see the details at the website of
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/1E9378107B6B42FC8585E53381303A8F.html
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banks are not allowed to hold the common shares of listed firms in China, so banks can
only hold shares that are pledged by firms as collateral for bank loans, and these shares
are forced to be disposed in two years.
In summary, there are three main types of institutional investors based on the
identities of owners. The first type is domestic mutual funds that are owned by domestic
non-government institutions, the second type is QFIIs that are owned by foreign
investors, and the third type includes all the other domestic institutional investors such
as brokers, banks, insurance companies, social security funds, entrust and financial
companies. Since these institutional investors have different characteristics including
investment objectives and owner identities, and are faced with different regulations, it is
expected that their influence in the investee firms will differ.
This thesis aims to compare the effects of domestic institutional investors and
foreign institutional investors in China where there exists high ownership concentration.
Domestic mutual funds have incentives and are able to influence firm policies, because
they are familiar with the investee firms, and are also sophisticated investors who have
professional knowledge in collecting and processing information. Compared with
domestic mutual funds, QFIIs are faced with more information asymmetry because they
have different culture and language with that in China (Liu et al., 2014; Luong et al.,
2017). QFIIs thus may not be able to influence firm policies efficiently as domestic
mutual funds. Other institutional investors (such as banks and insurance companies etc.)
have very weak incentives to monitor managers or influence firm policies, given that
they are dependent institutional investors with business ties with the investee firms. For
example, banks are only allowed to hold shares that are pledged by firms as collateral
for bank loans in case of default, and these shares are forced to be disposed within two
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years (Commercial Bank law). Therefore, this thesis will compare the different effects
of domestic mutual funds and QFIIs on corporate activities, and will incorporate the
effects of other institutional investors in a later section in empirical analysis.
1.2.2 Ownership structure in China
In 1978, an economic reform commenced in an attempt to introduce a marketoriented economy to replace the centrally planned economy. As the main part of the
reformation, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were transformed from traditional SOEs
into profitable and modernized enterprises. Before this period, all of China’s firms were
controlled by the central government. Since the reformation commenced, state
ownership has been gradually released and SOEs are becoming joint-stock companies
with private entities and foreign investors holding some ownership. To improve
investment efficiency, in early 1980, the government adopted the “loan for (fiscal) grant”
(bo gai dai) scheme, the process in which the government reduces free funding but
makes loans to enterprises. This scheme hardens the budget constraints faced by SOEs
and further makes SOEs be market-profit oriented.
In the early 1990s, the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange
were established. Since then, SOEs have been further privatised by issuing shares to the
public and being listed on the stock exchanges. According to the regulations of the
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the listed firms on these two stock
exchanges are allowed to issue three types of shares: state shares, legal person shares,
and public common shares. The state shares are converted from state-owned assets,
which are under the control of the State Asset Management Bureau (SAMB). Legal
person shares are held by institutions which were owners of the listed firms before they
are listed on the stock exchange. Both state shares and legal person shares were non29

tradable, except in some special situations until 2005, when split share structure reform
was launched. This reform aimed to transform non-tradable shares into tradable shares,
and most of the firms had finished this reform before 2007. Public common shares
traded on China’s two stock exchanges include A-shares and B-shares, which are
initially issued to Chinese residents and foreign investors, respectively. Another type of
common shares is H-share, which are issued by domestic Chinese companies on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Chinese people on the mainland were not allowed to trade
H-shares before 2014 when the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect was introduced.
Since then, institutional investors on mainland China have been allowed to trade Hshares.
Ownership in China’s firms is highly concentrated and there exist largest
shareholders and controlling shareholders. In most cases, the controlling shareholder
controls the firm directly, so the controlling shareholder is just the largest shareholder.
In some other cases, the controlling shareholders control the firm indirectly through a
pyramid structure. For example, company A holds 60% of the ownership of company B
and company B holds 50% of company C. In this situation, company A is the
controlling shareholder of company C. Company A owns 50% of the control rights of
company C, and 30% of cash flow rights of company C.
In China, as many listed firms are reformed SOEs, but the state is still the ultimate
controlling shareholder. Among the three types of shares introduced above, the state and
legal persons own about one‐third each of capitalization in the domestic market, and the
remaining capitalization is owned by a large number of individuals and institutions.
Although legal persons own a similar proportion of the market capitalization with the
state, it does not mean they are controlling shareholders because the ownership of legal
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persons is an aggregated value. Thus, the most important type of controlling
shareholders in China’s listed firms is the state. The proportion of firms under the
control of the state is around 50%. The other types of controlling shareholders include
families (25%), individuals (13%), co-founders (7%), collectives (3%) and private
institutions (1%). The remaining 1% are widely held firms. The average ownership held
by the controlling shareholders in the sample is 36%, with the maximum value of 89%.
Therefore, controlling shareholders usually have incentives to monitor CEOs and
dominate decision-makings in firm policies (Firth et al., 2006; Cao et al., 2011).
Moreover, they have the incentives to pursue private benefits and expropriate from
other shareholders to enjoy private benefits of control (Faccio and Lang, 2002;
Claessens et al., 2002; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Faccio et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2018).
In addition, the controlling shareholders are concentrated on industries. Statecontrolled firms are primarily concentrated on the electronic power and coal, aerospace
and military, and machinery industries, which are all considered to have political and
strategic importance for the central Chinese government. Other industries such as hightech and catering industries are mainly privately controlled by families, co-founders,
and collectives etc. Foreign institutional investors have a preference for state-controlled
sectors due to the lower requirement for local knowledge, while the portfolios of
domestic mutual funds are distributed more evenly (Liu et al., 2014).
In China, institutional investors are not controlling shareholders given the lower
level of their ownership. Both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs are controlled by nongovernment entities, and other types of the institutional investors are controlled by the
government related entities.
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1.3 Methodology and key findings
The main methodology used in this thesis is empirical analysis. The sample consists
of all the listed firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (SZSE). All the required data are obtained from the Chinese Stock Market
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which is a frequently used data source
for studies on corporate governance in the Chinese market (Fan et al., 2007; Firth et al.,
2016; Zhang et al., 2016). Specifically, institutional ownership data are derived from the
“Institutional Investor” section, firm innovation data are from the “Listed Firm’s Patents”
section and all the required data for calculating firm accounting conservatism are
collected from the “China Listed Firms Research Series” section.
1.3.1 Institutional investors, CEO pay-performance relationship
Chapter 2 tests the effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance
relationship by firstly constructing a linear regression model. The dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of CEO’s total cash compensation including salary, bonus and
other cash compensation. The key independent variables include the ownership of
domestic mutual funds and the ownership of QFIIs. To examine the effects of the
controlling shareholders on institutional investors’ behaviour, two continuous variables
are constructed: one is the ratio of domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling
shareholders’ ownership; the other is the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling
shareholders’ ownership. To illustrate the effects of institutional investors on the CEO
pay-performance relationship, the interactive term between mutual funds’ ownership
and firm performance measured by return on assets ratio (ROA) as well as the
interactive term between QFIIs’ ownership and ROA are included in the model. The
coefficients of these two interactive variables indicate the impact of domestic mutual
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funds and QFIIs respectively on the CEO pay-performance relationship. The estimation
method of the main regression is a firm fixed-effects model to address the concern that
there may be some unobservable firm-level characteristics. Secondly, to test the effects
of state ownership on institutional investors’ monitoring on managers, the main
regression model is re-estimated using subsamples of SOEs and non-SOEs. To test the
potential channels through which institutional investors influence CEO payperformance relationship, the main regression model is further re-estimated in firms
with good or poor corporate governance by employing industry tournament as a proxy
for corporate governance. To test whether the influence of institutional investors is
dependent on the development of the legal system and investor protection, the prime
question is examined in both more developed and less developed regions. Thirdly, a
change regression model, Heckman two-stage method and propensity score matching
(PSM) method are employed to address endogenous issues.
Chapter 2 finds that domestic mutual funds’ ownership has positive effects on CEO
pay-performance relationship and the positive effects are stronger when their ownership
is closer to the controlling shareholders’ ownership. However, QFIIs have no significant
effects on CEO pay-performance relationship. It is also evidenced that the improvement
of corporate governance is an important channel through which domestic mutual funds
positively affect CEO pay-performance relationship.
1.3.2 Institutional investors and firm innovation
Chapter 3 examines the effects of institutional investors’ contestability of the
controlling shareholders on firm innovation performance by employing firm patent data
as the measure of firm innovation. In the empirical regression model, the dependent
variable is firm innovation, represented by the natural logarithm of the number of firm
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patent applications. The key independent variables are contestability by mutual funds
and QFIIs. To measure contestability, this thesis firstly uses the ratio of institutional
investors’ ownership level to that of the controlling shareholders. Secondly, this thesis
uses ownership dispersion as a proxy for contestability by institutional investors. The
ownership dispersion is defined as the difference in ownership level between controlling
shareholders and mutual funds (or QFIIs) divided by the sum of their ownerships. For
the main regression model, the ordinary least square (OLS) method is initially employed
as the estimation method. The coefficients of these contestability measures reflect the
influence of institutional investors on firm innovation performance. To test the
robustness of the main results, this chapter further re-estimated the main regression
model using alternative firm innovation measurements: the Heckman two-stage method,
the propensity score matching (PSM) method, and change regressions are applied to
mitigate endogenous concerns.
Chapter 3 finds that the effects of institutional investors on firm innovation are not
only determined by their ownership level but also subject to their ability to contest with
the controlling shareholders, i.e. contestability of the controlling shareholders. Domestic
mutual funds’ contestability has positive effects on firm innovation, while QFIIs have
no such contestability effects.
1.3.3 Institutional investors and firm accounting conservatism
Chapter 4 examines the effects of institutional investors on firm accounting
conservatism. Following previous studies (Chen et al., 2013; Cullinan et al., 2012), the
method developed by Khan and Watts (2009) is applied to calculate accounting
conservatism, namely C_Score. After the accounting conservatism (C_Score) data are
obtained, a regression model with C_Score as the dependent variable, institutional
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ownership as the independent variable and other control variables is constructed. The
method to measure the influence of the controlling shareholders is the same as that in
Chapter 3. To mitigate the concern that there may be some unobservable firm-level
characteristics, a firm fixed-effects model is applied as the estimation method.
Furthermore, to mitigate endogenous concerns, the PSM method and 2SLS model are
employed.
The study finds a significant negative relationship between domestic mutual funds’
ownership and accounting conservatism, while the QFIIs’ ownership is positively
related to accounting conservatism. The negative effects of domestic mutual funds and
the positive effects of QFIIs are both stronger when their ownership level is closer to
that of the controlling shareholders. Additional evidences suggest that the negative
effects of domestic mutual funds and positive effects of QFIIs are stronger in non-stateowned firms, firms with higher level of ownership concentration and lower level of
information asymmetry.
1.4 Contributions
This thesis contributes to existing literature in several ways. Firstly, it adds to the
extant literature by examining the effects of institutional investors on firm policies in
emerging markets. Previous studies on the effects of institutional investors are mainly
focused on developed countries (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Aghion et al., 2013;
Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012); this thesis provides insights into China, the largest
emerging market. It provides evidence on whether institutional investors can exert
influence on investee firms against the background of high ownership concentration,
weak investor protection and in an emerging market.
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Secondly, this thesis advances the understanding of the effects of institutional
investors in China. The results indicate that in China, the influence of institutional
investors is not only determined by their ownership level, but also is subject to the
difference of their ownership to that of the controlling shareholders. Specifically, this
thesis find that when the ownership level of domestic mutual funds is closer to that of
the controlling shareholders, domestic mutual funds have incentives to contend with the
controlling shareholder in monitoring managers through strengthening the CEO payperformance relationship, and in improving firm innovation performance. At the same
time, their incentives to lower firm accounting conservatism become stronger.
Thirdly, this thesis adds to the corpus of studies investigating the behaviours of
institutional investors by discussing the heterogeneity of domestic institutional investors
and foreign institutional investors. The empirical evidence shows that domestic mutual
funds are professional in processing information and have information advantages. This
enables them to have an effective monitoring role on managerial behaviours by
strengthening the CEO pay-performance relationship and improving firm innovation
investment. Furthermore, due to their ability to monitor managers directly, they are less
dependent on financial numbers and high accounting conservatism. In contrast, due to
cultural and language barriers, foreign institutional investors are faced with more server
information asymmetry, so their direct monitoring role is less effective and thus they
tend to require high accounting conservatism.
Finally, this thesis gives a practical understanding of the role of institutional
investors in investee firms in the context of China.
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1.5 Structure of this thesis
This thesis consists of five chapters: Chapter 1 is introduction, which describes the
motivation for this research, research questions, related institutional background,
methodology, key findings and contributions. Chapters 2 to 4 present the three main
studies. Specifically, chapter 2 examines whether and how institutional investors could
improve corporate governance by using CEO pay-performance relationship as an
indicator. The findings from this chapter answer the question: whether institutional
investors could play an effective monitoring role in improving corporate governance
and strengthening CEO pay-performance. Chapter 3 examines the effects of institutional
investors’ contestability of the controlling shareholders on firm innovation. Aghion et al.
(2013) documented that in the US, institutional investors could improve firm innovation.
This chapter aims to answer this question for the Chinese market that has large
controlling shareholders who are reluctant to invest in innovative projects (Minetti et al.,
2015). Chapter 4 examines the demand of institutional investors for accounting
conservatism.
Chapters 2 to 4 commence with an introduction of the research question, followed
by a background summary and the proposed hypotheses before the empirical analysis is
presented. Following hypotheses, some basic statistics are presented for the key
variables used in the empirical analysis. The hypotheses are examined by employing
regression analyses. Some robustness tests are carried out and endogenous issues are
addressed following the main regression results. Chapter 5 provides some conclusions
drawn from this thesis and summarises suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2 Institutional investors, controlling shareholders and
CEO pay-performance relationship
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the effects of institutional investors on CEO pay-performance
relationship in the emerging market of China. Over the past few decades, the growth of
institutional investors has become a global phenomenon and they play an important role
in mitigating information asymmetry and monitoring managers 13 . This role became
even more prominent after the 2008 global financial crisis when institutional investors
were required to exert their influence on management proposals including those related
to CEO compensation (OECD, 2009).
Since then, a number of studies have revealed explicit evidence on the roles played
by institutional investors in developed markets. They show that institutional investors
are effective monitors and can mitigate information asymmetry 14 . Meanwhile, other
studies have examined the roles of institutional investors in emerging markets and
document that institutional investors can affect firm performance/valuation (Yuan et al.,
2008; Lin and Fu, 2017), the quality of financial reporting (Chan et al., 2014), firm
innovation (Rong et al., 2017) and dividend policy (Firth et al., 2016; Cao et al., 2017).
However, to the best of my knowledge, it is still unclear whether institutional investors
could discipline managers’ behaviors and influence the overall corporate governance in
the interests of all the other minority shareholders. It is expected that this issue might be
more prominent and relevant in emerging markets. On the one hand, the institutional

13

See, for example, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Aggarwal et al. (2005), Shin and Seo (2011), Helwege et
al. (2012), Boone and White (2015), Bena et al. (2017) and Chen and Keung (2018).
14
See, for example, Koh (2007), Ferreira and Matos (2008), Boehmer and Kelley (2009), Fich et al.
(2015), Cornett et al. (2007) and Borochin and Yang (2017).
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environment is still underdeveloped and investor protection legislation is weaker in
emerging markets. Thus, whether the expected functions of institutional investors can be
ensured is unclear, as these concerns directly shape the incentives and behaviors of
institutional investors. On the other hand, ownership concentration is usually a prevalent
aspect in emerging markets, and controlling shareholders usually make the final
decisions regarding firm policies. Institutional investors may have been captured by
controlling shareholders and thus their independence is compromised, so their
monitoring role is no longer as straightforward.
This chapter empirically investigates whether and how institutional investors
monitor CEO compensation in China, the largest emerging market. This investigation is
motivated by several strands of literature. First, a series of studies suggest that
institutional investors can potentially affect corporate compensation schemes (Hartzell
and Starks, 2003; Croci et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2015; Golebiowska and Urbanek,
2016), and these impacts are different due to differing investment horizons, the cost of
monitoring, and the business relationships with their portfolio firms (Chowdhury and
Wang, 2009; Shin and Seo, 2011; Zhu et al., 2017). Since these studies mainly focus on
developed markets, it is really unknown whether it is the case in China with poor
investor protection and prevailing ownership concentration.
Second, it has been argued that the role of shareholders is mainly attributed to their
identities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2008; Lin et al.,
2011), so a more rigorous investigation of institutional investor heterogeneity is
required. In China’s stock markets, there are various kinds of institutional investors with
different ownership identities, such as private institutions, governments, and foreign
institutions. This setting can thus provide a sufficient tension where the different
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monitoring roles exerted by various types of institutional investors can be investigated.
Third, existing studies document that if firms have several shareholders with
substantial ownership, they have the incentive to monitor the controlling shareholders to
reduce the associated expropriation and moral hazard activities (Bennedsen and
Wolfenzon, 2000; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Jiang et al., 2018). However, it is unclear
whether the effectiveness of monitoring by other large shareholders can be attributed to
the identities of controlling shareholders. Chinese listed firms can be divided into stateowned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs, and these controlling shareholders have
different incentives for monitoring CEO compensation (Kato and Long, 2006; Cao et
al., 2011). In the spirit of these studies, this chapter further investigates how institutional
investors respond to controlling shareholder’s ownership.
It has been argued that CEO compensation incentives are not only determined by
observed CEO characteristics, but also determined by unobserved characteristics such
as CEO psychological traits and personality. Coles and Li (2016, 2018) further
document that these unobserved CEO characteristics can better explain the variations of
CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Therefore, to address this concern, a firm-fixed
effects model is employed as estimation method in the empirical analysis. Using a
sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, the following findings are obtained.
First, the presence of domestic mutual funds can strengthen the relationship between
CEO pay and firm accounting performance (measured by ROA), and such positive
effects are stronger when their ownership becomes closer to that of the controlling
shareholders. However, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) wield no
significant effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship. Second, empirical results
show that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds are more pronounced in non40

SOEs than in SOEs, particularly the central government controlled SOEs. Third,
additional analysis reveals that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds are
stronger in firms located in more developed regions or in firms with weaker industry
tournament, which supports the assertion that mutual funds strengthen the CEO payperformance relationship by improving corporate governance. The overall results are
robust when taking the potential endogeneity into consideration and using alternative
measures of executive compensation.
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature on this topic. First, over
the last decade many studies have examined shareholder activism by institutional
investors in developed markets (Smith 1996; Cvijanović et al., 2016; Gillan and Starks,
2000). There are also a large number of studies investigating the influence of
institutional investors in emerging markets (e.g., Yuan et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2016;
Lin and Fu, 2017; Rong et al., 2017). However, these studies on emerging markets only
examine the effects of institutional investors’ activism on firm performance or firm
policies (e.g., dividend policy) that could benefit institutional investors directly (Firth et
al., 2016). As a complement to their studies, this chapter examines how institutional
investors affect corporate governance, in particular the CEO pay-performance
relationship in China. Moreover, studies from developed countries or international
markets document that foreign institutional investors have a positive effect on
enhancing corporate governance (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Luong et al., 2017),
whereas this chapter finds some contrasting evidence that QFIIs exert no significant
effect on corporate governance in China due to its different and unique culture (a
relationship-based economy), different dialects and government intervention in the
economy. This study therefore advances the understanding of the real effects that
domestic and foreign institutional investors have on corporate governance.
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Second, this work builds on literature that examines shareholders’ influence on
corporate governance (Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009). By focusing on the
institutional investors who are usually non-controlling shareholders, this chapter
provides direct evidence that their influence on the CEO pay-performance relationship
depends largely on their relative ownership to controlling shareholders, which is
consistent with arguments made by Firth et al. (2010) and Huang and Zhu (2015). This
chapter finds that the monitoring effects of institutional investors depend on their
ownership, as well as the difference in ownership compared to controlling shareholders.
Third, this study also adds to literature that examines the effect of identity of
shareholders on the CEO pay-performance relationship (Kato and Long, 2006; Conyon
and He, 2011). From the perspective of ownership types, this chapter examines the
effects of institutional investors by distinguishing different types of owners because this
is relevant to their behaviours and provides evidence of how comprehensive
institutional investors work in emerging markets.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops
hypotheses. Section 2.3 introduces the data and method of analysis. Section 2.4 presents
the main empirical results. Section 2.5 reports the results after addressing endogeneity
issues and other robustness tests and finally, section 2.6 draws some conclusions.
2.2 Hypotheses development
2.2.1 Institutional investors and CEO pay-performance in China
In the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the incentives and behaviours of
institutional investors depend largely on their identities. It is thus of great significance
to distinguish the types of institutional investors for investigating their effects in the
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investee firms (Borochin and Yang, 2017). According to the descriptions in the section
1.2.1, this chapter mainly identifies both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs.
It has been well documented that institutional investors serve the monitoring role in
mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders, thus improving the
CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Almazan et al., 2003).
Domestic mutual funds in China are controlled by domestic private institutions whose
main objective is to maximize portfolio returns. Moreover, domestic mutual funds are
becoming large, better-informed and more active shareholders. Therefore, domestic
mutual funds are similar to their counterparts in developed markets and are able to exert
influence on firms’ decisions. It is expected that domestic mutual funds have positive
effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship for the following several reasons.
First, domestic mutual funds do not have business connections with their portfolio
firms, so their monitoring activities are less sensitive to pressure and face less conflict
of interest with their portfolio firms (Yuan et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2014). Thus, domestic
mutual funds have strong incentives to restrain managerial opportunistic behaviours and
impose a strong dependence of CEO pay on firm performance (Cornett et al., 2007).
Moreover, since domestic mutual funds hold a relatively large percentage of shares,
they can also place more exit threat on investee firms by voting with their feet. For this
reason, the board prefers to make decisions that favour mutual funds.
Second, the compensation of mutual funds’ managers is not only related to their
funds’ size but also linked to the incremental value of their funds’ assets (shares), which
directly reflect the performance of the investee firms. So mutual funds’ managers are
concerned about the performance of their investee firms and are likely to impose
disciplinary activities over CEOs.
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Third, professional skills in analyzing information enable investors to influence
firms (Borochin and Yang, 2017; Jiang and Yuan, 2018). Domestic mutual funds are
considered to have expertise and are professional in gathering and processing
information. Their professional information processing helps mitigate information
asymmetry between managers and shareholders, which makes it easier for shareholders
to monitor managers’ behavior (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). There is a suspicion that
transient investors have short investment horizons and consequently are unlikely to
collect and analyze firm information. However, this chapter argues that transient
investors could benefit from private information, as collecting/analyzing private
information enables them to trade ahead of firm-specific news and gain from short-term
price movements or avoid sudden loss (Boone and White, 2015).
Fourth, domestic mutual funds have reputational concerns because they are usually
expected to be monitors in firms. It is generally agreed that a weaker association
between CEO pay and firm performance signals a weak corporate governance and poor
monitoring system towards the stock markets. Therefore, a weaker relationship between
CEO pay and firm performance may lead to the reputational detriment of domestic
mutual funds. To protect their reputation, domestic mutual funds tend to strengthen the
CEO pay and performance relationship, so the following hypothesis is formed:
H1a: Domestic mutual funds have positive effects on the CEO pay-performance
relationship.
With respect to QFIIs which are owned by foreigners, it has been extensively
documented that they are also effective monitors of firm management by providing
more sophisticated knowledge and advanced management skills (Ferreira and Matos,
2008; Huang and Zhu, 2015; Firth et al., 2016; Bena et al., 2017). However, because
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QFIIs are less familiar with the unique institutional environment of China, such as
relationship-based economy, many regional dialects spoken and different accounting
standards (Liu et al., 2014; Zou et al., 2016; Luong et al., 2017), they do not have the
ability to handle issues with their invested firms in comparison with their domestic
counterparty – domestic mutual funds. It is proposed that the expected significant and
beneficial effects of QFIIs on enhancing the positive relationship between CEO pay and
firm performance could be seriously compromised for the reasons set out below.
First, unlike developed countries, information asymmetry is severe in China’s
market due to both insider control and weak requirement for disclosure (Yuan et al.,
2009). In the spirit of Bae et al. (2008) and Ferreira et al. (2017), foreign investors may
be less informed about China’s firms than domestic investors. Coupled with the fact that
the Chinese language is not spoken worldwide (Liu et al., 2014), QFIIs are less efficient
at processing and comprehending information and thus face more severe information
asymmetry when investing in China.
Second, the Chinese economy is highly controlled by the central and local
governments and imbedded within a culture traditionally based on relationships, which
means that the key element to success in business is to build and maintain a relationship
with government (Shen et al., 2019; Li et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014).
Unlike domestic investors, it is harder for foreign investors to cooperate with China’s
regulators or establish valid connections with government representatives, and this may
undermine their expected efficient monitoring. If these two reasons are combined, QFIIs
may have a weaker effect on enhancing the CEO pay-performance relationship. This
chapter has the following hypothesis:
H1b: QFIIs may have weaker effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship.
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Moreover, an evolving literature on multiple large shareholders (MLS) asserts that
other large shareholders can serve efficient monitoring in curbing the expropriation by
controlling shareholders, achieved through forming coalitions with other large
stakeholders or competing for control by attracting minority shareholders. This becomes
stronger when the ownership held by these large shareholders is closer to the ownership
held by the controlling shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Maury and
Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2008, 2009; Mishra, 2011; BenNasr et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2018). In China, ownership of a business is usually
concentrated in the hands of controlling shareholders, and domestic mutual funds are
usually other large shareholders. Thus, the monitoring influence of domestic mutual
funds is also subject to the balance of power between their ownership and that of
controlling shareholders. Following the MLS literature, this chapter conjectures that
when domestic mutual funds present as one of the large shareholders and hold closer
ownership to that of the controlling shareholders, they are more likely to monitor the
CEO pay-performance relationship better. Therefore, this chapter puts forward the
following hypothesis:
H2: The positive effect of domestic mutual funds on the CEO pay-performance
relationship is stronger when the difference in ownership between domestic mutual
funds and the controlling shareholders decreases.
2.2.2 The effect of institutional investors in SOEs and non-SOEs
According to the above discussion, the effect of institutional investors is more
likely to be captured by controlling shareholders, so this chapter also conjectures that
the effects that institutional investors have on the CEO pay-performance relationship are
subject to the types of controlling shareholders. Chinese listed firms can be divided into
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs (Peng et al., 2017). SOEs are controlled
by different levels of government (Kong et al., 2019). Multi-task theory contends that
SOEs function more like the institutions of governments and seek to achieve multiple
objectives such as improving production, maintaining social stability and keeping
employment (Chang and Wong, 2009; Fan et al., 2013). Therefore, CEO pay in SOEs
does not dependent solely on firm performance, which weakens the relationship
between CEO pay and firm performance. Moreover, CEOs in Chinese SOEs have other
incentives to consider such as political promotion which also weakens the relationship
between CEO pay and firm performance. However, non-SOEs are controlled by private
sector entities who strive to maximize firm value and face less government intervention
when making decisions (Chen et al., 2011). This requires a stronger relationship
between CEO pay and firm performance in non-SOEs, which provides sufficient
incentive for CEOs to perform well.
In addition, since 1978, Chinese SOEs have experienced a series of privatization
and corporatization reforms when the government awarded sufficient autonomy to
enterprises and relinquished its control over some SOEs to a large extent. Consequently,
SOEs are becoming market-oriented and aim to maximize profitability, and
compensation of executives in SOEs is becoming more aligned to profits and sales.
However, this is more likely to be the case in those SOEs controlled by the local
governments (Chen et al., 2009; Cao et al., 2011), rather than in those SOEs controlled
by the central government. In particular, central SOEs are still under the absolute
control of the government which has certain political and strategic objectives, such as
maintaining its monopoly over some sensitive industries. So their CEO compensation
incentives are determined by the government, and less likely to be influenced by the
institutional investors. In this sense, it is expected that institutional investors can affect
47

the CEO pay-performance relationship in local SOEs, but have no effect on the CEO
pay-performance relationship in central SOEs. Therefore, the following hypothesis is
formed:
H3: The influence of domestic mutual funds on the CEO pay-performance
relationship is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs, particularly than in central
government controlled SOEs.
2.3 Data and methodology
2.3.1 Data and sample selection
The sample of empirical analysis includes firms listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2005 to 2015. The
sample year starts from 2005 when individual executive compensation began to be
disclosed in annual reports, but only the total compensation received by the top three
executives was reported before 2005. From the total population of firms, this chapter
excludes those flagged with ST and *ST (Special Treatment), firms from the finance
industry and firms with missing information. The final sample consists of 1,960 firms
and 15,613 firm-year observations. All the data are collected from the Chinese Stock
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
2.3.2 Institutional investors and ownership measurements
Empirically, three dimensions are applied to measure institutional investors’
ownership. First, to denote whether a firm has institutional investors as common
shareholders, two dummy variables are created, Mutuald and QFIId, which are equal to
1 if a firm has domestic mutual funds and QFIIs as the common shareholders,
respectively, and 0 otherwise. Second, to denote the level of ownership held by
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institutional investors, two continuous variables are created, Mutual and QFII, which
are defined as the percentage of ownership held by domestic mutual funds and QFIIs,
respectively. Third, to denote the difference in ownership between institutional
investors and controlling shareholders, two continuous variables are created,
Mutualratio and QFIIratio, which are defined as the ratio of ownership held by
domestic mutual funds and QFIIs to the ownership held by the controlling shareholders,
respectively. The higher these two ratios are, the smaller the difference in ownership
between institutional investors and controlling shareholders is.
2.3.3 Model
In the empirical analysis, the following regression equation is used to examine the
effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay and firm performance relationship,
which is reflected by the coefficients of interactive terms:
CEOpayi,t=β0+ β1Mutuali,t+ β2QFIIi,t+ β3ROAi,t-1+ β4Mutuali,t*ROAi,t-1
+β5QFIIi,t*ROAi,t-1+ β6Otherinsi,t+ β7Asseti,t+ β8Leveragei,t+ β9Boardi,t
+ β10Indepi,t + β11Controllingi,t+ β12CEOagei,t
+Dummy(year)+εi,t

(2.1)

where CEOpay represents the compensation of CEOs as measured by the natural
logarithm of CEO’s total cash compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonus and
other cash compensation. Mutual and QFII represent domestic and foreign institutional
ownerships, respectively, which are discussed in section 2.3.2. ROA is return on assets
calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets, which serves to measure firm
performance. To reflect the logical influence of performance on CEO pay, this chapter
uses one-year lagged performance as an independent variable in the regression analysis
49

so that the sample size for the regression analysis should be reduced. β4 and β5 are used
to test the main hypotheses. According to the previous discussions, β4 is expected to be
significantly positive and β5 is expected to be insignificant.
To consider the effects of other variables on CEO pay, a set of control variables is
also included, namely firm total asset level, leverage ratio and board characteristics.
Table 2.1 lists the definitions of all the variables in this model. Otherin is the sum of
ownership of all the other types of institutional investors. Asset is the natural logarithm
of the total assets. Leverage is leverage ratio, defined as total debts over total assets.
Board is the natural logarithm of the number of board directors. Indep is the proportion
of independent directors on the board. Controlling is the number of shares owned by the
controlling shareholder. CEOage is the age of the CEO. Year dummies are also
included to control for time-series effects. According to the studies by Coles and Li
(2016, 2018), unobserved CEO characteristics also have significant effect on CEO payperformance relationship. Thus, the equations are estimated with firm fixed effects to
address this issue.
It is acknowledged that the current literature also uses delta to measure the CEO
pay-performance sensitivity (Coles et al., 2006; Babenko, 2009; Dang et al., 2018).
However, in the sample of Chinese firms, there are only 127 firms granting stock
options to CEOs. Due to the small sample disproportionate the investigated population,
the results using delta to measure the CEO pay-performance sensitivity could not be
meaningful. Moreover, the data obtained from the CSMAR database is limited, so for
this reason, it is unlikely to calculate the value of stock options using the Black-Scholes
model indicated by the delta definition. In addition, it has been argued that Chinese
stock market is influenced by various factors including government manipulation,
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which makes stock price too noisy to measure firm performance (Pan and Mishra, 2018).
Therefore, the delta is not used in this chapter to measure the CEO pay-performance
sensitivity.
Table 2.1 Variable Definition
Variables
Definition
Panel A: Executive compensation and age
CEO pay
The natural logarithm of CEO compensation
CEO age
The age of CEO
Panel B: Institutional ownership
Mutual
The ownership percentage of domestic mutual funds in a firm.
QFII
The ownership percentage of QFIIs in a firm
Otherins
The sum of ownership of other types of institutional investors
(including banks, insurance companies, social security funds,
brokers, trust companies, and financial companies) in a firm.
Mutuald
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has domestic
mutual funds as shareholders and 0 otherwise
QFIId
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has QFII as
shareholders and 0 otherwise
Mutualratio
Ratio of domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the largest
shareholder’s ownership
QFIIratio
Ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the largest shareholder’s
ownership
Panel C: Firm characteristics and corporate governance
Board size (Board)
The natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board
Independent directors (Independent)
Proportion of independent directors on the board
Leverage
Total debts/total assets in book value
Asset
The natural logarithm of total assets
Controlling
Percentage of shares owned by the controlling shareholders
Tobin’s Q
Market value/replacement value
Panel D: Firm performance
Return on assets (ROA)
Net income/total assets
Stock Return (RET)
Firm annual stock return

2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of the sample. The statistics are reported in
separate panels. Specifically, Panel A reports summary statistics for executive
characteristics. Panel B reports summary statistics of firm institutional ownership. Panel
C reports summary statistics for firm characteristics and corporate governance. Panel D
reports summary statistics for firm performance. Panel E reports firm distribution.
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std.Dev. Median Min
25%
75%
Max
Panel A: Executive characteristics
CEO pay
15,613
480,899 299,482 403,000 120,000 233,454 680,000 1,056,000
CEO age
15,613
47.825
5.205
48
40
43
52
56
Panel B: Institutional ownership
Mutual* (%)
9,501
4.189
4.468
2.52
0.02
0.88
6.06
33.416
QFII* (%)
1,548
1.254
1.263
0.88
0.01
0.44
1.63
12.468
Otherins* (%) 10,228
2.87
4.076
1.68
0.025
0.71
3.56
73.03
Mutualratio*
9,501
14.389
20.028
7.183
0.035
2.443
18.187 330.198
(%)
QFIIratio* (%) 1,548
4.101
5.598
2.394
0.012
1.068
4.968
68.430
Mutuald
15,613
0.627
0.484
1
0
0
1
1
QFIId
15,613
0.099
0.299
0
0
0
0
1
Panel C: Firm characteristics and corporate governance
Board Size
15,613
9.057
1.828
9
3
8
9
19
Independent
15,613
3.274
0.664
3
1
3
4
8
Leverage (%) 15,613
48.068
20.200
48.927
5.660
32.946
63.288 99.861
Asset
15,613
15,700
4,890
4,840
2,810
720
1,360
6,560
(million)
Controlling
15,613
36.602
15.503
34.655
2.197
24.210
47.890 89.990
(%)
Q
15,613
1.750
0.834
1.454
0.893
1.060
2.251
3.393
Panel D: Firm performance
ROA (%)
15,613
3.626
5.681
3.300
-27.920 1.220
6.190
20.460
RET (%)
15,613
41.591
92.095
15.03
-86.930 -11.49
70.59
142.87
Panel E: Firm type distributions
SOEs
Non-SOEs
Observations
8,922(57.145%)
6,691(42.855%)
(percentage)
Panel A reports summary statistics for executive characteristics. CEO pay is the cash compensation of
CEO, which has been available since 2005. Panel B reports summary statistics of firm institutional
ownership. * represents the summary result of firms with positive institutional ownership. Specifically,
Mutual*, QFII* and Otherins* represent firms which have mutual funds, QFIIs and other institutional
investors as shareholders. Panel C reports summary statistics for firm characteristics and corporate
governance. Panel D reports summary statistics for firm performance. Panel E reports firm distribution.
All the definitions of the variables are listed in Table 1.1 and the values of variables are in terms of
China’s currency, the RMB.

It is shown that the average CEO pay is 480,899 RMB, which is almost six times
more than that from 1998 to 2000 (Firth et al., 2007). The average ownership of
domestic mutual funds and QFIIs are 4.189% and 1.254%, respectively. These statistic
results for institutional ownership are in line with Firth et al. (2016). The summary of
Mutuald and QFIId shows that in the sample, 62.7% of firms have domestic mutual
52

funds as shareholders and 9.9% of firms have QFIIs as shareholders. This indicates that
institutional ownership is quite common in the Chinese equity market. Based on average
board size (9.057) and the number of independent directors (3.274), the percentage of
independent directors can be obtained, which is 36.15%. The average percentage of
shares held by the controlling shareholders is 36.602%, which reflects a high level of
ownership concentration in Chinese firms. Moreover, the percentage of observations for
non-state-owned firms is 42.855%.
2.4.2 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship
Table 2.3 presents the results of testing the main hypotheses. Specifically, column
(1) shows the results of focusing on whether there are institutional investors as
shareholders. Column (2) shows the results of focusing on institutional investors’
ownership, while column (3) shows the results of focusing on the difference between
institutional investors’ ownership and controlling shareholder’s ownership. In this
chapter, the interactive terms are concerned because they reflect the effects that
institutional investors have on the CEO pay-performance relationship. As shown in
columns (1) and (2), the coefficients of Mutuald*ROA (0.686) and Mutual*ROA (8.454)
are both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the
presence of domestic mutual funds helps to link CEO pay to firm performance, and this
effect becomes stronger when domestic mutual funds hold a larger percentage of shares.
This result is consistent with hypothesis H1a. It is also found that the coefficients of
QFIId*ROA and QFII*ROA are positive but insignificant, which implies that QFIIs do
not have significant effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship. This is
consistent with hypothesis H1b. Column (3) shows that the coefficient of
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Table 2.3 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship

Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
(1)
Mutuald
0.012
(1.06)
QFIId
-0.007
(-0.36)
Mutuald*ROA
0.686***
(3.87)
QFIId*ROA
0.025
(0.10)
Mutual
QFII
Mutual*ROA
QFII*ROA

(2)

(3)

0.310
(1.63)
-0.303
(-0.24)
8.454***
(3.75)
7.777
(0.42)

Mutualratio

0.061
(1.37)
QFIIratio
-0.012
(-0.05)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.556***
(3.38)
QFIIratio*ROA
0.024
(0.01)
ROA
0.857***
0.970***
1.047***
(6.10)
(7.83)
(8.63)
Others
0.110
0.149
0.139
(0.69)
(0.92)
(0.86)
Asset
0.177***
0.186***
0.184***
(9.60)
(10.17)
(10.08)
Leverage
-0.139**
-0.149***
-0.148***
(-2.57)
(-2.78)
(-2.75)
Board
0.139**
0.141**
0.137**
(2.48)
(2.52)
(2.45)
Independent
0.074
0.080
0.074
(0.52)
(0.57)
(0.52)
Controlling
-0.069
-0.062
-0.037
(-0.71)
(-0.64)
(-0.38)
CEOage
0.007***
0.007***
0.007***
(4.16)
(4.21)
(4.19)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
13,028
13,028
13,028
R-squared
0.344
0.346
0.345
This table reports the effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship using the
firm fixed-effect model. Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO compensation. Mutuald (QFIId) is
the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there are mutual funds (QFIIs) as shareholders in a firm and 0
otherwise. Mutual and QFII denote ownership level of mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. Mutualratio
and QFIIratio are the ratios of mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling
shareholder’s ownership, respectively. Definitions of all the other variables are listed in Table 2.1. Year
dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Mutualratio*ROA is 1.556 and significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.38), while the
coefficient of QFIIratio*ROA is insignificant. This suggests that the previously
documented strengthening effects of domestic mutual funds become even stronger when
their ownership is closer to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. This finding is
consistent with hypothesis H2. The results concerning the relationship between control
variables and CEO pay are consistent with previous studies (Firth et al., 2007).

Overall, the existence of domestic mutual funds can improve corporate governance
by strengthening the CEO pay-performance relationship. When the ownership of
domestic mutual funds is closer to the controlling shareholders and they are presenting
as large shareholders, their influence becomes stronger as a result of the strong incentive
to contend with controlling shareholders. However, due to the challenges/obstacles that
are unique to China’s culture (such as relationship-based economy and various
languages spoken within the country), QFIIs cannot improve corporate governance due
to an inability to improve their monitoring performance.

2.4.3 Effects of institutional ownership between SOEs and non-SOEs
This section tests hypothesis H3 by dividing the sample firms into SOEs and nonSOEs. A firm is identified as an SOE if the ultimate controlling shareholder is the
government. Empirically, equation (2.1) is re-estimated using separate subsamples of
SOEs and non-SOEs, and Table 2.4 reports the results. Specifically, columns (1) to (3)
are the results of using a subsample of SOEs, and columns (4) to (6) are the results of
using a subsample of non-SOEs. Again, the interactive terms are the main concerns in
this section. It is observed that the coefficient of Mutuald*ROA is 0.533 for SOEs,
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Table 2.4 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship in SOEs and
non-SOEs
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
SOE subsample
Non-SOE subsample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.032**
-0.021
(2.24)
(-1.13)
QFIId
0.003
-0.030
(0.12)
(-0.76)
Mutuald*ROA
0.533**
0.944***
(2.17)
(3.60)
QFIId*ROA
0.028
0.053
(0.08)
(0.11)
Mutual
0.641***
-0.350
(2.69)
(-1.21)
QFII
0.301
-1.558
(0.22)
(-0.62)
Mutual*ROA
7.481**
11.926***
(2.40)
(3.92)
QFII*ROA
4.434
17.361
(0.20)
(0.56)
Mutualratio
0.139**
-0.067
(2.08)
(-1.15)
QFIIratio
-0.027
-0.044
(-0.09)
(-0.09)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.405*
2.292***
(1.81)
(4.32)
QFIIratio*ROA
1.656
0.107
(0.30)
(0.02)
ROA
1.194***
1.257***
1.335***
0.320
0.463**
0.545***
(6.61)
(7.93)
(8.52)
(1.46)
(2.38)
(2.85)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
7,588
7,588
7,588
5,440
5,440
5,440
R-squared
0.356
0.359
0.357
0.332
0.333
0.333
(1) vs (4)
(2) vs (5)
(3) vs (6)
Chow test
5.205***
5.327***
5.293***
This table shows different effects of institutional investors in SOEs and non-SOEs using the firm fixedeffect model. Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO compensation. Columns (1) to (3) are results
of using SOEs as the sample and columns (4) to (6) are results of using non-SOEs as the sample. Mutuald
(QFIId) is the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there are mutual funds (QFIIs) as shareholders in a
firm and 0 otherwise. Mutual and QFII denotes ownership level of mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively.
Mutualratio and QFIIratio are the ratios of mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership to the
controlling shareholder’s ownership, respectively. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each
regression. Definitions of all the variables are the same as those in Table 1.1. Year dummies are included.
The Chow tests’ F statistics reveal the significance of the difference in the coefficients on Mutuald*ROA,
Mutual*ROA and Mutualratio*ROA for SOEs and non-SOEs. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are
computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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which is significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.17), and 0.944 for non-SOEs, which is
significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.60). The coefficient of Mutual*ROA is 7.481 for
SOEs, which is significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.40), and 11.926 for non-SOEs,
which is significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.92). These results suggest that domestic
mutual funds can strengthen the CEO pay-performance relationship, and this is more
significant in non-SOEs as reflected by the larger magnitude of coefficients for nonSOEs.
The different effects that domestic mutual funds have in SOEs and non-SOEs are
more obvious when the difference in ownership between them and controlling
shareholders is considered. In particular, column (3) shows that the coefficient of
Mutualratio*ROA is 1.405 in SOEs, which is significant at only the 10% level (t-value
is 1.81); while it is 2.292 for non-SOEs in column (6), which is significant at the 1%
level (t-value is 4.32). This suggests that when the ownership of domestic mutual funds
is closer to that of controlling shareholders, the incentives of domestic mutual funds to
contend with controlling shareholders are stronger in non-SOEs. This is reflected by the
more significant and larger coefficient of Mutualratio*ROA for non-SOEs. The Chow
tests (F=5.205, p-value<0.01; F=5.327, p-value<0.01; F=5.293, p-value<0.01) reveal
that the effects of domestic mutual funds on the CEO pay-performance relationship are
stronger in non-SOEs than SOEs.
To further test H3, equation (2.1) is re-estimated separately using subsamples of
central government controlled SOEs and local government controlled SOEs. The results
are reported in Table 2.5. It is observed that in columns (1) to (3), the coefficients of all
the interactive terms between mutual funds’ ownership measure and ROA are
insignificant. This means that mutual funds have no significant effects on the CEO pay57

Table 2.5 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship in central
government controlled SOEs and local government controlled SOEs
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
Central government controlled
Local government controlled SOEs
SOEs subsample
subsample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.056**
0.022
(2.03)
(1.34)
QFIId
-0.038
0.024
(-0.80)
(0.87)
Mutuald*ROA
-0.123
0.785***
(-0.29)
(2.69)
QFIId*ROA
0.233
-0.112
(0.39)
(-0.27)
Mutual
0.577
0.679**
(1.33)
(2.37)
QFII
-3.107
1.590
(-1.07)
(1.04)
Mutual*ROA
4.944
8.396**
(0.78)
(2.30)
QFII*ROA
38.960
-7.371
(0.85)
(-0.29)
Mutualratio
0.200*
0.125
(1.80)
(1.60)
QFIIratio
-1.077*
0.351
(-1.73)
(1.08)
Mutualratio*ROA
0.078
1.821**
(0.05)
(2.07)
QFIIratio*ROA
12.025
-1.923
(0.86)
(-0.31)
ROA
1.406*** 1.198*** 1.316***
1.130***
1.250***
1.323***
(3.93)
(3.68)
(4.13)
(5.53)
(6.89)
(7.35)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
2,122
2,122
2,122
5,466
5,466
5,466
R-squared
0.303
0.308
0.306
0.327
0.330
0.329
This table shows different effects of institutional investors in central government controlled SOEs and
local government controlled SOEs using the firm fixed-effect model. Dependent variable is the natural
log of CEO compensation. Columns (1) to (3) are results of using central government controlled SOEs as
the sample and columns (4) to (6) are results of using local government controlled SOEs as the sample.
Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all the variables are the
same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed
using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.

performance relationship in central government controlled SOEs. However, the results
in columns (4) to (6) reveal that the coefficients of interactive terms between mutual
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funds’ ownership measure and ROA are significantly positive. This suggests that
mutual funds have significant effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship in local
government controlled SOEs. These results validate hypothesis H3. These results are
also consistent with Firth et al. (2010) who argue that domestic mutual funds face
pressure and regulation from local governments, so the effect of domestic mutual funds
is mitigated and they are less likely to contend with governments in SOEs.
2.5 Endogeneity issues and robustness tests
2.5.1 Endogeneity issues
Although a firm fixed effects model has been applied to address the potential
endogeneity issue, it could also be argued that institutional investors prefer investing in
firms with a strong CEO pay-performance relationship, which results in reverse
causality. To address this issue, this section examines changes in the CEO payperformance relationship when institutional investors sell their holding firms ownership.
This selling event is not directly related to a specific firm’s pay-performance
relationship. Empirically, two dummy variables are constructed, Mutualdec and
QFIIdec, which are equal to 1 if the ownership of mutual funds and QFIIs decrease,
respectively, and 0 otherwise. Then, equation (2.1) is re-estimated by replacing Mutual
and QFII with Mutualdec and QFIIdec, respectively. Moreover, this section tests the
changes occurring in pay-performance when there is a change of institutional ownership.
To do so, Mutual and QFII in equation (2.1) are replaced with two new continuous
variables, ΔMutual and ΔQFII, denoting the ownership change of mutual funds and
QFIIs, respectively. The results are reported in Table 2.6. It is observed that the
coefficient of Mutualdec*ROA is significantly negative, indicating that the decline in
mutual funds’ ownership can weaken the pay-performance relationship. In addition, the
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significant positive coefficient of ΔMutual*ROA indicates that the increase (decrease) of
mutual funds’ ownership strengthens (weakens) the pay-performance relationship.

Table 2.6 Effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship addressing
reverse causality
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
Mutualdec
QFIIdec
Mutualdec*ROA
QFIIdec *ROA

(1)
0.015
(1.56)
0.023
(1.16)
-0.292**
(-1.98)
-0.212
(-0.94)

(2)

ΔMutual

-0.300*
(-1.94)
ΔQFII
-0.364
(-0.40)
ΔMutual *ROA
7.921***
(3.69)
ΔQFII*ROA
4.691
(0.34)
ROA
1.309***
1.201***
(9.86)
(10.16)
Control
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
13,028
13,028
R-squared
0.293
0.292
This table shows the effects of institutional investors on pay-performance relationship after addressing the
endogenous issue of reverse causality. Column (1) shows results of examining the changes of payperformance relationship when institutional investors sell their holding firms. Column (2) shows the
results of examining the changes of pay-performance when there is a change of institutional ownership.
Mutualdec and QFIIdec are dummy variables which are equal to 1 if mutual funds and QFIIs sell their
holding firms, respectively, and 0 otherwise. ΔMutual and ΔQFII represent the ownership change of
mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. Definitions of all the other variables are the same as those in Table
2.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.7 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance (Heckman and PSM)
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
Heckman two-stage (second stage)
PSM method
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
-0.023
0.010
(-1.18)
(0.78)
QFIId
0.010
-0.006
(0.40)
(-0.28)
Mutuald*ROA
0.705***
0.548***
(3.96)
(2.72)
QFIId*ROA
0.043
-0.038
(0.16)
(-0.14)
Mutual
0.168
0.354*
(0.82)
(1.77)
QFII
1.245
-0.161
(0.81)
(-0.13)
Mutual*ROA
8.918***
7.400***
(3.96)
(3.18)
QFII*ROA
7.352
4.463
(0.40)
(0.24)
Mutualratio
0.021
0.067
(0.45)
(1.42)
QFIIratio
0.171
0.027
(0.58)
(0.10)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.686***
1.333***
(3.72)
(2.84)
QFIIratio*ROA
0.270
-1.048
(0.06)
(-0.25)
ROA
0.839*** 0.954***
1.024***
1.125***
1.215***
1.312***
(5.97)
(7.67)
(8.42)
(6.14)
(8.12)
(9.08)
LambdaMutual
-1.818**
-0.900*
-1.242**
(-2.04)
(-1.78)
(-2.54)
LambdaQFII
2.625
3.958*
2.411
(1.12)
(1.76)
(1.15)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
13,028
13,028
13,028
11,206
11,206
11,206
R-squared
0.298
0.302
0.301
0.331
0.334
0.332
This table shows the effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship using the
Heckman two-stage method and PSM. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) are results of using the Heckman
two-stage method (second stage), and columns (4) to (6) are results of using PSM. Control variables in
equation (2.1) are included in each regression. LambdaMutual and LambdaQFII are inverse Mills ratios
obtained from the first stage of the Heckman two-stage model. Definitions of all the variables are the
same as those in Table 2.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Second, there is a potential issue of sample selection bias as institutional investors
may prefer particular firms or industries. To address this issue, the Heckman two-stage
61

method is employed. The first stage involves an OLS analysis where institutional
ownership is regressed against the same control variables from the main equation. To
meet the exclusion restrictions, the first stage regression also includes three variables
that are not included in the second-stage regression. The first two variables are the
industry median level of mutual funds and QFIIs. The third variable is a dummy
variable which captures the index inclusion of a firm, following Firth et al. (2016) and
Rong et al. (2017). In particular, this variable is Indexdom which is equal to 1 if a firm
is included in either the Shanghai 180 index or the Shenzhen Component index in a year
and 0 otherwise. Then the inverse Mills ratios (Lambda) are obtained from the first
stage and are included as independent variables in the second stage. The results are
reported in columns (1) to (3) in Table 2.7, which shows a broadly consistent results
with those in Table 2.3.
Third, the PSM method is used to construct a sample in which the treatment sample
and control sample are similar in terms of some observed characteristics. In this
matching process, for each firm-year observation in the treatment sample (i.e.,
observations with either domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders), an
observation in the control sample is identified (i.e., observations without either domestic
mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders) which has the same/nearest propensity score of
firm characteristics including firm asset level, leverage ratio, board size, board
independence, the largest shareholder’s ownership, and CEO age in the same year from
the same industry. The results of using PSM are reported in columns (4) to (6) of Table
2.7, which are quite similar to those reported in Table 2.3, indicating that the main
results are robust after considering the potential endogeneity issues using alternative
estimation methods.
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2.5.2 Corporate governance channel
It has been previously argued in this chapter that mutual funds strengthen CEO payperformance by monitoring CEOs’ behaviours and improving corporate governance.
This section provides empirical evidence to validate that corporate governance is the

Table 2.8 Effects of institutional investors in firms with larger and smaller industry tournament
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
Firms with larger industry tournament
Firms with smaller industry tournament
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.001
0.010
(0.07)
(1.05)
QFIId
-0.016
0.007
(-0.73)
(0.48)
Mutuald*ROA
0.343
0.410**
(1.80)
(2.59)
QFIId*ROA
-0.087
0.064
(-0.34)
(0.31)
Mutual
0.025
0.345**
(0.12)
(2.03)
QFII
-0.278
0.484
(-0.15)
(0.57)
Mutual*ROA
3.292
4.486**
(1.34)
(2.16)
QFII*ROA
2.488
1.026
(0.08)
(0.08)
Mutualratio
-0.001
0.063
(-0.01)
(1.48)
QFIIratio
-0.381
0.054
(-0.82)
(0.29)
Mutualratio*ROA
0.782
0.771*
(1.37)
(1.86)
QFIIratio*ROA
1.488
-0.108
(0.23)
(-0.03)
ROA
0.026
0.082
0.088
0.813***
0.912***
0.970***
(0.23)
(0.80)
(0.87)
(5.73)
(7.70)
(8.46)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
3,543
3,543
3,543
9,485
9,485
9,485
R-squared
0.039
0.040
0.040
0.204
0.209
0.207
This table shows the effects of institutional investors on the pay-performance relationship in firms with
larger or smaller industry tournament using the firm fixed-effect model. Columns (1) to (3) are results of
testing firms with larger industry tournament. Columns (4) to (6) are results of testing firms with smaller
industry tournament. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all
the variables are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in
parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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channel through which mutual funds can affect CEO pay-performance. To measure the
level of corporate governance, the industry tournament incentives are employed,
since it is argued that strong industry tournament provides effective incentives for CEOs
(Coles et al., 2018). In particular, this section uses the compensation gap between CEO
in a firm and the highest paid CEO among firms operating in the same industry to
measure industry tournament. The sample firms are then divided into two groups based
on the median value of industry tournament, and equation (2.1) is re-estimated using
these two subsamples and Table 2.8 reports the results. As can be seen from the results,
the coefficients of interaction terms of mutual funds’ ownership and firm performance
are more significant in firms with less intensive product market competition and in
firms with weaker industry tournament. These results support the argument that mutual
funds affect CEO pay-performance via improving corporate governance.
Moreover, there may be some other potential channels through which mutual funds
have influence on CEO compensation. For instance, Li et al. (2019) document that
mutual funds are likely to require a stronger relationship between CEO pay and firm
corporate social responsibility (CSR) outcomes, and firm CSR outcomes are determined
by mutual fund’s CSR score. Their study indicates that mutual funds’ self-attributes
affect their incentives for monitoring and improving corporate governance, which is a
key channel for mutual funds to affect CEO pay-performance relationship. However,
due to the data unavailability, this potential channel is not able to be tested empirically
at the moment, but this chapter calls for future studies on this important issue.
2.5.3 Effects of regional development
Whether or not the function of institutional investors can be guaranteed depends
mainly on the development of a legal system and investor protection. The laws and
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regulations in more developed regions could be better enforced which would protect
investors’ interests. Moreover, information asymmetry is believed to be more severe in
firms from less developed regions, which makes it difficult for institutional investors to
know what is happening through investee firms and to monitor effectively. Thus, it is
proposed that institutional investors have a greater effect in firms located in more
developed regions. In this section, this conjecture is tested by taking advantage of the
regional variations in China’s economic development. The full sample is divided into
firms located in more and less developed regions based on the Chinese marketization
index (Fan et al., 2011) which measures the marketization levels of 31 provinces.
Provinces ranking in the top 15 are defined as more developed regions and all the others
as less developed.
Empirically, equation (2.1) is estimated using subsamples of firms located in more
and less developed regions separately. The results are reported in Table 2.9. Consistent
with the structure in Table 2.8, columns (1) to (3) are the results of using a subsample of
firms located in more developed regions, and columns (4) to (6) are the results of using
a subsample of firms located in less developed regions. Again, the interactive terms are
the main concerns. Note that the coefficients of Mutuald*ROA, Mutual*ROA and
Mutualratio*ROA are positive and statistically significant for firms from more
developed regions, while they are insignificant for firms from less developed regions.
These findings suggest that the effects of domestic mutual funds on strengthening the
CEO pay-performance relationship are stronger in firms from more developed regions.
It is also noted that all the coefficients of interactive terms related to QFIIs are not
significant in firms from either more or less developed regions, which confirms
previous findings that QFIIs have no significant effect. These results support the
argument that the function of institutional investors can only be ensured when their
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interests/rights are well protected, when the legal system is developed, and when
regulations are properly enforced.

Table 2.9

Effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship across

regions
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
Firms from more developed regions
Firms from less developed regions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.013
0.021
(0.93)
(0.98)
QFIId
0.001
-0.002
(0.05)
(-0.04)
Mutuald*ROA
0.725***
0.626
(3.50)
(1.59)
QFIId*ROA
-0.088
0.235
(-0.27)
(0.42)
Mutual
0.329
0.165
(1.37)
(0.46)
QFII
0.011
-0.951
(0.01)
(-0.46)
Mutual*ROA
9.314***
5.033
(3.46)
(1.08)
QFII*ROA
2.594
23.197
(0.11)
(0.61)
Mutualratio
0.068
0.032
(1.17)
(0.40)
QFIIratio
0.141
-0.717
(0.48)
(-1.13)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.701***
0.588
(2.99)
(0.60)
QFIIratio*ROA
-0.951
-1.920
(-0.19)
(-0.20)
ROA
0.782***
0.907***
0.987***
1.000***
1.161***
1.267***
(4.61)
(5.90)
(6.57)
(3.73)
(4.87)
(5.37)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
9,062
9,062
9,062
2,697
2,697
2,697
R-squared
0.327
0.329
0.328
0.397
0.396
0.395
This table shows the effects of institutional investors across regions using the firm fixed-effect model.
Columns (1) to (3) are results using firms from more developed regions as the sample and columns (4) to
(6) are results using firms from less developed regions as the sample. The slightly lower number of
observations is due to missing information about some firms’ locations. Dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of CEO compensation. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression.
Definitions of all the variable are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The tstatistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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2.5.4 Robustness tests
In this section, a further analysis is conducted to check the robustness of the main
results. First, two alternative measures of CEO compensation are considered: the first
measure is CEO compensation including CEO ownership values; and the second

Table 2.10 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship using

alternative definition of CEO pay
Dependent
variable

The natural log of (CEO pay + value The natural log of average compensation of
of CEO’s shareholding)
the top three executives
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.004
0.028**
(0.16)
(2.34)
QFIId
0.013
0.003
(0.41)
(0.14)
Mutuald*ROA
1.129***
0.398**
(3.52)
(2.10)
QFIId*ROA
-0.648
-0.099
(-1.40)
(-0.37)
Mutual
0.789**
0.478**
(2.16)
(2.18)
QFII
-0.163
0.849
(-0.07)
(0.72)
Mutual*ROA
8.978**
5.813**
(2.05)
(2.06)
QFII*ROA
-36.944
4.896
(-1.11)
(0.29)
Mutualratio
0.175**
0.068
(2.09)
(1.26)
QFIIratio
-0.007
0.130
(-0.01)
(0.48)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.635*
1.206**
(1.66)
(2.10)
QFIIratio*ROA
-10.319
1.814
(-1.35)
(0.40)
ROA
1.035*** 1.306***
1.379***
1.038***
1.064***
1.114***
(4.82)
(6.58)
(7.12)
(6.93)
(8.18)
(8.73)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
13,028
13,028
13,028
13,028
13,028
13,028
R-squared
0.174
0.176
0.175
0.508
0.510
0.509
This table shows the results using different measurement of CEO pay. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) use
the natural logarithm of (CEO pay + value of CEO’s shareholding) to measure CEO compensation.
Columns (4) to (6) use the natural log of average compensation of the top three executives to measure
CEO pay. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all the
variables are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses)
are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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measure is the average compensation of the top three executives. It has been shown in
previous literature that managerial ownership can be used to incentivize managers to
deliver good performance (Harford and Li, 2007), and thus its relationship with firm
performance should also be positive due to the monitoring by institutional investors. In
this section, to test this conjecture, it is examined whether CEO pay, including the value
of their shareholding, is positively related to firm performance with the presence of
institutional investors. Following the method used by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006),
the value of shares held by the CEO is calculated as the total number of common
shares held by CEOs at the end of the fiscal year, multiplying the closing prices of the
common shares at the end of the fiscal year. The results are reported in Table 2.10. The
results of the key variables are quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.3
which confirm the robustness of the main results.
Second, this section considers an alternative measure of firm performance which is
market-based. This is mainly because institutional investors are expected to maximize
the return of their investment portfolios via appreciations in stock price so they might
have incentives to link CEO pay to market-based performance. To provide empirical
evidence for this conjecture, two proxies for firm market performance are employed:
annual stock returns (RET) and Tobin’s Q, and then equation (2.1) is re-estimated.
Table 2.11 reports the results. It is observed in Table 2.11 that both domestic mutual
funds and QFIIs have no significant effects on linking CEO pay to firm market
performance. This suggests that in China, institutional investors are more concerned
about the accounting performance of investee firms than market performance. One
possible explanation could be that since the Chinese stock market is influenced by many
factors such as government manipulation, stock returns are too noisy to measure firm
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Table 2.11 Effects of the institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship using

stock return and Tobin’s Q as the proxy for firm performance
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
RET
(1)
(2)
Mutuald
0.038***
(3.88)
QFIId
-0.006
(-0.42)
Mutuald*Perfmarket
0.010
(0.88)
QFIId* Perfmarket
0.012
(0.61)
Mutual
0.841***
(5.77)
QFII
0.226
(0.28)
Mutual* Perfmarket
0.063
(0.53)
QFII* Perfmarket
0.337
(0.28)
Mutualratio

(3)

(4)
0.007
(0.35)
-0.013
(-0.37)
0.021*
(1.89)
0.006
(0.35)

Tobin’s Q
(5)

(6)

0.808***
(2.95)
1.355
(0.80)
0.047
(0.36)
-0.634
(-0.65)

0.162***
0.167**
(4.50)
(2.46)
QFIIratio
0.035
0.515
(0.21)
(1.30)
Mutualratio* Perfmarket
0.008
0.002
(0.30)
(0.08)
QFIIratio* Perfmarket
-0.020
-0.314
(-0.05)
(-1.26)
Perfmarket
0.052***
0.048*** 0.054***
0.013
0.021*
0.025**
(3.94)
(4.14)
(4.66)
(1.05)
(1.90)
(2.42)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
13,028
13,028
13,028
13,028
13,028
13,028
R-squared
0.332
0.334
0.333
0.331
0.333
0.332
This table shows the results of testing the effects of institutional investors using firm fixed-effect model.
Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO compensation. Perfmarket is firm market performance,
which is proxied with RET (annual stock return) and Tobin’s Q. Columns (1) to (3) are results of using
RET as a proxy for firm market performance. Columns (4) to (6) are results of using Tobin’s Q as a proxy
for firm market performance. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression.
Definitions of all the variable are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The tstatistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

performance accurately. For example, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was
$1,211 billion in 2000 and $12,237 billion in 2017, which means that it increased by
14.57% each year. Meanwhile, the Shanghai Stock Exchange index was 1408 in 2000
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and 3196 in 2017, representing an increase of 4.9% per year. Obviously, market
performance cannot reflect accounting performance. Therefore, the accounting
measures are most likely to reflect firm performance and applied by investors to assess
firm value.

Table 2.12 Regression results with one-year lagged institutional investors’ ownership
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
(1)
Mutualdt-1
0.029**
(2.55)
QFIId t-1
0.024
(1.14)
Mutualdt-1*ROA t-1
0.456**
(2.44)
QFIId t-1*ROA t-1
-0.104
(-0.43)
Mutual t-1
QFII t-1
Mutual t-1*ROA t-1
QFII t-1*ROA t-1

(2)

(3)

0.756***
(4.85)
0.901
(0.81)
2.988*
(1.68)
0.901
(0.81)

Mutualratio t-1

0.227***
(5.21)
QFIIratio t-1
0.702*
(1.70)
Mutualratio t-1*ROA t-1
1.136**
(2.40)
QFIIratio t-1*ROA t-1
-0.308
(-0.05)
ROA t-1
1.065***
1.427***
2.599***
(7.06)
(16.75)
(25.53)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
13,028
13,028
13,028
R-squared
0.285
0.293
0.304
This table shows the results of testing one-year lagged institutional ownership. Definitions of all the
variables are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses)
are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Moreover, to further test the robustness between institutional ownership and CEO
pay-performance relationship, re-estimates equation (2.1) is re-estimated by using oneyear lagged institutional ownership and control variables. Table 2.12 presents the results.
It is shown that all the coefficients of one-year lagged mutual funds’ ownership
measurements and firm performance are positive and significant, while all the
coefficients of QFIIs’ ownership measurements and firm performance are insignificant.
These results indicate that mutual funds’ ownership in the last year can yield to a
stronger positive relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in the current
year, while the ownership of QFIIs have no such effects. The results further validate the
causality issue between mutual funds’ ownership and CEO pay-performance
relationship.
2.6 Conclusion
Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2005 to 2015, this chapter examines
the effects of institutional investors on the relationship between CEO pay and firm
performance. The empirical results indicate that domestic mutual funds play an
important monitoring role in linking CEO pay to firm performance. Moreover, this
monitoring effect is stronger when mutual fund ownership is larger and closer to
controlling shareholder’s ownership. However, QFIIs do not have such an effect on the
CEO pay-performance relationship. These results are robust to alternative estimation
methods in addressing endogeneity issues and using alternative measures for the key
variables.
Moreover, the effects of domestic mutual funds are more pronounced in non-SOEs
and local government controlled SOEs than in central government controlled SOEs.
This chapter also provides strong evidence that mutual funds affect CEO pay71

performance by improving corporate governance. In particular, the positive effect of
mutual funds is more significant in those firms with weaker industry tournament.
Meanwhile, the monitoring role of domestic mutual funds is stronger in firms from
more developed regions due to better investor protection and less information
asymmetry.
Overall, institutional investors reveal heterogeneous influences on monitoring firm
management in China, which advances the understanding of the importance to identify
the types of institutional investors when investigating their influence. The results show
that in China with many dialects and a relationship-based economy, foreign investors
face severe information asymmetry problems and are less efficient in monitoring,
suggesting that further regulatory efforts are required to protect foreign investors’ rights
and reinforce their function in improving corporate governance in China. As a more
important implication, this chapter suggests that considering the influence of controlling
shareholders can shed more light on understanding the effect of involving institutional
investors in corporate governance practices in China.
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Chapter 3 Institutional investors, contestability and firm
innovation
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides insights into the effects of institutional investors on firm
innovation performance. Firm innovation is crucial for firm development and
contribution to economic growth. However, innovation involves a long-term investment
with a high probability of failure, hence it is important to understand the determinants of
firm innovation. Since institutional investors continue to evolve and play an
increasingly important role in corporate governance, a number of studies have
investigated the effect that institutional investors have on firm innovation activity,
whilst presenting different views. Some studies contend that institutional investors
increase short-termism because they are mainly concerned with short-term performance
and thus undermine innovative effort. Whereas other studies argue that institutional
investors tend to encourage/force managers to innovate by reducing their myopic
behaviour or protecting them from the reputational consequences of innovation failure.
As a result, institutional investors have positive effects on firm innovation (Kochhar and
David, 1996; Aghion et al., 2013; Bena et al., 2017; Luong et al., 2017; Rong et al.,
2017).
However, these studies on the impact of institutional investors on firm innovation
are mainly focused on the level of institutional ownership (Aghion et al., 2013; Rong et
al., 2017), while ignoring the influence of the controlling shareholders on institutional
investors’ monitoring behaviours which is of greater significance especially in emerging
markets. On the one hand, in emerging markets, the concentration of ownership is a
common phenomenon and the controlling shareholders usually make the ultimate
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decisions on firm policies (La Porta et al., 1998; Jiang and Kim, 2015). It is therefore
possible that institutional investors are captured by the controlling shareholders, which
compromises their independence and leads to their monitoring role less straightforward.
On the other hand, the institutional environment is underdeveloped and investor
protection is weaker in emerging markets, so it is difficult for non-controlling
shareholders to have a voice in investee firms (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Thus, whether
the expected functions of institutional investors can be ensured or whether the interest
of institutional investors can be effectively preserved is unclear, because these concerns
directly shape the incentives and behaviours of institutional investors. Moreover, it is
important for firms to access funds when there is a need to invest in new technology.
However, financial markets are underdeveloped in emerging economies, and this
hampers a firm’s ability to access external finance for innovation investment (Fan et al.,
2011; Jiang et al., 2017). Thus, it is meaningful to investigate the effects of institutional
ownership on firm innovation in emerging markets by considering the influence of the
controlling shareholders.
This chapter provides insights into these issues and answers the question: What is
the effect of institutional investors on firm innovation, particularly with the presence of
controlling shareholders in the emerging market of China? This investigation is
motivated by recent studies that attempted to examine the effects of institutional
investors on firm innovation (Aghion et al., 2013; Bena et al., 2017; Luong et al., 2017).
By using US listed firms as a sample, Aghion et al. (2013) document that domestic
institutional investors in the US can enhance firm innovation. As a complement to this
study, Bena et al. (2017) and Luong et al. (2017) provide further evidence that foreign
institutional investors, especially those from developed countries, have a positive effect
on innovations of non-US firms. By putting them together, it is clear that institutional
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investors from developed countries can effectively boost firm innovation. The study in
this chapter complements theirs by considering the controlling shareholders’ influence
and showing the different roles that domestic and foreign institutional investors play in
affecting firm innovation in China.
This investigation is also motivated by existing studies on the influence of multiple
large shareholders. Some studies argue that when there are multiple large shareholders
in a firm, they have incentives to compete for the controlling position by uniting other
minority shareholders and serve a monitoring role (Pagano and Röell, 1998; Bennedsen
and Wolfenzon, 2000; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Attig et al., 2008; Laeven and Levine,
2008). Other studies show that large shareholders, other than the controlling
shareholders, may find it valuable to collude with the controlling shareholders to extract
benefits by trading on private information rather than exercising effective monitoring
(Kahn and Winton, 1998). In the spirit of these studies, institutional investors’ effects
are relevant to whether they are one of the large shareholders in a firm. With the
presence of controlling shareholders, the effects of institutional investors may be subject
to their ability to challenge the controlling shareholders, i.e., their contestability of the
controlling shareholders. However, any examination in this regard is rarely to be found
in the literature. Thus, this chapter will fill the void to provide insights into the effects
of institutional investors on firm innovation in terms of their contestability that is
represented by their ownership difference with that of controlling shareholders.
It is important to obtain a much deeper understanding about the effects of
institutional investors on firm innovation in the Chinese context. First, China’s economy
is growing faster and has become the second largest economy in the world after the US,
which plays a crucial role in the world economy. One important engine driving this
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sustainable growth is the improvement in innovation capacity. China has aimed to
become an innovative country since 2006, which was emphasized at the 18th National
Congress meeting in 2012. Innovation has therefore become the theme of economic
development and is the driving force behind China’s transformation, which has
contributed to the recovery and growth of the world economy, especially after the global
financial crisis.
Second, China is still an emerging market with an institutional environment that
differs from developed markets, such as underdeveloped financial market, government
intervention, concentrated ownership, and weaker investor protection. The theory
established based on developed markets may not be able to directly explain the
behaviours of institutional investors in China. Therefore, it is essential to understand the
roles that institutional investors play in promoting firm innovation, particularly facing
with the presence of the controlling shareholders. The findings drawn from this research
will help to provide some implications for other emerging markets.
Third, over recent decades, various types of institutional investors have emerged
and are growing rapidly, such as domestic mutual funds, Qualified Foreign Institutional
Investors (QFIIs), brokers, banks, social security funds and others. They are expected to
have different effects on corporate policies and governance (Liu et al., 2014), and
thereby firm innovation. The investment incentives of various types of institutional
investors provide sufficient tension to examine/compare their influences on firm
innovation. Moreover, ownership concentration is a prevalent feature in Chinese listed
firms, and governments and families are usually the controlling shareholders. This
existence of ownership concentration also enables this chapter to investigate whether
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the influence of institutional investors is subject to the incentive that controlling
shareholders have for innovation.
Furthermore, China’s unique culture (such as a relationship-based economy,
different accounting standards and uncommon languages) aggravates the information
asymmetry faced by foreign institutional investors (Chakravarty et al., 1998). In this
situation, whether or not foreign institutional investors can have the same influence as
domestic institutional investors becomes unclear, so whether or not foreign institutional
investors can still enhance firm innovation effectively, as expected, is still worth
investigating.
This chapter draws several notable findings. First, domestic mutual funds’
contestability can significantly enhance firm innovation, while QFIIs do not have such
an effect, after controlling for the ownership level of institutional investors. These
results are robust after correction for endogeneity issues using the Heckman two-stage
model, propensity score matching (PSM) method and the change regressions. These
results are also robust when using several different proxies for firm innovation. Second,
the positive effects of contestability by domestic mutual funds on firm innovation
becomes stronger in firms where the controlling shareholder is a non-government entity,
facing more competitive market, with non-politically connected CEOs, and with less
analyst coverage. These results show strong support that the effects of institutional
ownership on firm innovation become stronger when they are able to compete with the
controlling shareholders and monitor CEOs, which are consistent with the career
concern view.
This chapter contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, it enriches the
research on the effects that institutional investors have on firm innovation. Existing
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studies either focus on domestic institutional investors in the developed market (Aghion
et al., 2013) or foreign institutional investors in an international context (Bena et al.,
2017; Luong et al., 2017), whereas this chapter focuses on domestic and foreign
institutional investors in the largest emerging market of China and directly compares
their influence on firm innovation by considering some unique institutional factors in
emerging markets.
Second, this chapter also relates to Rong et al. (2017). Although they examined a
similar issue in China, they mainly focused on the level of ownership held by these
institutional investors, whereas this chapter carries out further analysis by differentiating
between domestic and foreign institutional investors, and more importantly looking at
their contestability of the controlling shareholders by examining the difference between
the ownership of institutional investors and the controlling shareholders. In this way,
this chapter provides new insights into the relationship between institutional investors
and firm innovation by considering the influence of the controlling shareholders in
China where ownership is usually concentrated.
Third, this chapter adds to the literature about the effect that foreign institutional
investors have on firm innovation in emerging markets. Previous studies find that
foreign institutional investors can stimulate firm innovation by providing new
knowledge/technology and reducing managerial career risk (Bena et al., 2017; Luong et
al., 2017). However, this chapter provides empirical evidence from a new perspective
by considering the Chinese institutional context. This chapter finds that in the presence
of the controlling shareholders, QFIIs are more likely to be captured by the controlling
shareholders so that their influence on firm innovation does not increase significantly
when their ownership is close to the controlling shareholders, which is probably due to
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that foreign institutional investors are less informed about the culture of investee
countries so it would be difficult for them to compete with the controlling shareholders.
Fourth, Bena et al. (2017) and Luong et al. (2017) use a cross-country analysis to
examine the effect that foreign institutional investors have on firm innovation. A crosscountry analysis intends to generate rules that are able to apply in a number of countries.
However, it could also raise some concerns due to the large variation of institutional
environments across countries such as the legal systems, taxation regimes, political
economies, and security laws. The observed variations of institutional ownership and
firm innovation relationship could be the result of these institutional factors at the
country level. For example, foreign institutional investors who invest in different
countries are subject to different accounting standards and regulations. Thus, the rules
generated from a cross-country analysis may be short of applicability in a single
emerging market. With this in mind, this chapter applies a single country analysis by
focusing on the Chinese economy, which can overcome some of the criticisms of crosscountry studies, while holding constant the institutional factors that may be correlated
with institutional ownership and firm innovation.
Finally, this chapter contributes to existing literature with regards to the effects of
multiple large shareholders (MLS). Previous studies note that the presence of MLS
indicates an efficient monitoring effects in curbing the expropriation achieved by
forming a coalition with other large stakes or competing for control by attracting
minority shareholders (Attig et al., 2009; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Lehmann
and Weigand, 2000; Mishra, 2011). However, this chapter finds some useful evidence
to show that the monitoring function of MLS depends on the identity of the large
shareholders and the controlling shareholders, because domestic and foreign
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institutional investors have different effects on firm innovation when they face pressure
from the controlling shareholders.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 introduces background
information and develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the sample and variables
used in the empirical model. Section 3.4 presents the empirical results and addresses
endogeneity issues. Section 3.5 makes some additional analysis and reports results of
testing potential channel and section 3.6 draws some conclusions.
3.2 Background and hypotheses
3.2.1 Firm innovation in China
Firm innovation is of great importance for long-term economic growth in a country.
The Chinese economy has developed rapidly since the economic reform in the late
1970s and is now the second largest economy in the world. Firm innovation contributes
a lot to China’s rapid economic development. The Chinese government has enacted a
series of laws and regulations to stimulate firm innovation activities. In October 2007,
China’s Property Law was inaugurated to protect the rights of property owners. In
China, there are three types of patents including invention patents, utility patents, and
design patents. Invention patents are to protect the new technical solution for a product,
a process or an improvement. Utility patents are granted to protect the new and practical
solutions related to a product’s shape or structure. Design patents are granted to protect
the shape patterns, or the combinations of colour and shape, or patterns that are
aesthetically pleasing and industrially applicable. The statistics of firm patents shows
that the capacity of Chinese firm innovation has improved significantly over the past
decades. For instance, from 1985 to 2011, the accumulative number of patent
applications from China and foreign countries was 8,665,828, of which 2,849,906
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(32.89%) were invention patents, whereas the annual patent applications in 2015 were
2,798,500, of which 1,101,864 (39.37%) were invention patents. The number of annual
patent applications further increased to 3,697,845 in 2017 and invention patents were
1,381,594 (37.36%) 15.

Figure 3.1 Firm innovation among sample firms

This figure illustrates the trend of firm innovation among sample firms. Panel A shows the average
number of patent applications, patents granted and patents in force in each year. Panel B shows the
number of firms which have non-zero patent applications each year.

Average number of patents

A. The average number of patent applications, patents granted and patents in force
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

Year
Patent applications

Patents granted

Patents in force

B. Number of firms with non-zero patent applications

Number of firms with patent
applications

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

Year

15

Please see detailed summary of the number of patents application, granted and in force each year from
the patent statistics yearbooks which are published by State Intellectual Property Official of the People’s
Republic of China. Please see the following link: http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tjxx/gjzscqjtjnb/index.htm.
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Figure 3.1 shows the innovation output by the sample firms in each year between
2003 and 2017. Panel A shows the average number of patent applications, patents
granted and patents in force across the sample period. Panel B shows the number of
firms which have non-zero patent applications across the sample period. In Panel A, it
shows that the total number of patent applications, patents granted and patents in force
by all sample firms have been increasing steadily since 2003, especially after 2015, the
increase trend became more significant. This indicates a significant increase of input
and output of innovation activities in China. In Panel B, it is also found that the number
of firms that have patent applications increases during the sample period, indicating that
more and more firms in China have put efforts and emphasis on innovation.
3.2.2 Institutional investors and firm innovation
It has been documented that institutional investors have a positive influence on firm
innovation (Aghion et al., 2013; Bena et al., 2017; Luong et al., 2017; Rong et al., 2017).
On the one hand, innovation is long-term investment with complicated procedure and
requires a high level of professional knowledge and management skills. Thus, CEOs
may avoid updating knowledge and hardworking (quiet life view, Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2003), and hence they are reluctant to take action in firm innovation. On
the other hand, innovation is risky investment that has high possibility of failure. CEOs’
career concerns may also reduce their incentives to innovate, as they are afraid of being
sacked due to the early-stage failure of innovation (career concern view, Manso, 2011;
Ederer and Manso, 2013). The existence of institutional investors could resolve these
issues. It is acknowledged that institutional investors are sophisticated with professional
knowledge and are able to collect and process firm information, which can effectively
reduce the information asymmetry, improve corporate governance and exert efficient
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monitoring over managers’ behaviours (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Hartzell and Starks,
2003; Khan et al., 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Boone and White, 2015; Doidge et
al., 2015). By gathering more proprietary firm information, institutional investors are
also likely to identify the stochastic reasons of innovation failure, thus are able to
insulate CEOs from punishment due to innovation failure and motivate them to innovate
(Aghion et al., 2013; Luong et al., 2017). Additionally, compared with individual
investors, institutional investors usually hold diversified portfolios, so they are more
tolerant of innovation failure and tend to encourage investment in innovative projects.
However, these existing studies almost exclusively focus on the level of
institutional ownership and ignore the influence from other shareholders, such as the
controlling shareholders when ownership is concentrated. It has been well documented
that ownership concentration is a common feature of Chinese listed firms, and a large
proportion of shares are held by the controlling shareholders who usually dominate firm
policies (Jiang and Kim, 2015). Institutional investors in China are usually noncontrolling shareholders, thus their positive effects on firm innovation might be
determined by their contestability of the controlling shareholders.
The contestability of the controlling shareholders by non-controlling shareholders
and their influence on firm value and policy have been examined by an established
literature of multiple large shareholders (MLS). This literature contends that noncontrolling shareholders are still powerful and influential in firm policy making via
competing for control by forming coalitions with other large shareholders. Thus, the
existence of MLS indicates control contestability and plays a governance/monitoring
role in a firm (Pagano and Röell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Attig et al.,
2008; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009; Mishra, 2011; Jiang et al., 2018).
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According to this strand of literature, it is proposed that institutional investors, who
usually hold a relatively large ownership compared with other individual investors in
China, have powerful contestability and are likely to compete with the controlling
shareholders, which facilitate their influence on firm innovation policy more effectively.
However, this contestability effect is heterogeneous across institutional investor types.
It is proposed that domestic mutual funds are able to exert strong contestability to
enhance firm innovation. This conjecture is mainly motivated by existing findings that
domestic mutual funds are active monitors and have significant influence on firm
policies (Chen et al., 2007; Yuan et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2016). In the spirit of Dvořák
(2005) and Bae et al. (2008), it could be argued that in China, domestic mutual funds
are better informed about investee firms and have the information advantage, because
they are familiar with the Chinese accounting standards, local language/dialects, and
local regulations (Chakravarty et al., 1998). Moreover, domestic mutual funds are
independent from the local governments and have no conflicts of interest with the
investee firms. Therefore, domestic mutual funds are more likely to exert their influence
on promoting firm innovation via competing with the controlling shareholders.
However, QFIIs face more challenges and disadvantages when making investments
in listed firms in China which may constrain their abilities and incentives in exerting
their influence on firm innovation policy. First, as described in Section 1.2.1, foreign
institutional investors face strict regulations and restrictions on their investment in listed
firms due to the institutional setting. Therefore, QFII ownership in listed firms is lower
and QFIIs are less likely to compete for control as they can obtain very little benefits
from the high cost monitoring (Jiang and Kim, 2015). Second, QFIIs are owned by
foreigners, who may have a different culture, language and the legal system of their own
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countries from those in China (Liu et al., 2014), which create severe information
asymmetry between QFIIs and their investee firms, and thus make it more difficult and
costly for QFIIs to clean firm information. Third, Chinese economy is imbedded with
severe government intervention and relationship is regarded as a key factor to the
business success. Due to the institutional differences and short-term investment history,
QFIIs would find it difficult to build good relationships with the governments, and
therefore difficultly and costly to contend with the controlling shareholders. Moreover,
QFIIs are able to move their capital from China to another market when they anticipate
a high risk, which further discourage them to engage in high cost monitoring. Therefore,
it is expected that QFIIs in China have weaker incentives to form contestability to have
influential effect on firm innovation policy.
Overall, based on the above discussions, the following hypothesis is set as follows:
H: Domestic mutual funds have strong contestability of the controlling
shareholders to enhance firm innovation, while such an effect does not exist for QFIIs.
3.3 Data and methodology
3.3.1 Data and sample selection
The initial sample consists of all the A-share firms listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2003 to 2017. The
reason for sample period starting from 2003 is that the ownership of institutional
investors in firms’ annual reports was not reported until 2003. The sample excludes
firms flagged with ST and *ST16, firms with missing observations, and firms from the
financial industry because their financial reports need special requirements which may
16

ST stands for Special Treatment and refers to the listed firms that have had negative net profits for two
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have has negative net profits for three consecutive
years and thus are probably to be delisted from the stock exchanges.
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bias the results. The sample finally consists of 2,534 firms and 25,404 firm-year
observations. All the data are extracted from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database, which is the data source for a large body of published
research (e.g., Fan et al., 2007; Firth et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016).
3.3.2 Firm innovation measurement
To be consistent with a large body of existing research (e.g., Aghion et al., 2013;
Hsu et al., 2015; Luong et al., 2017), the patent number is used as an indicator of firm
innovation. The patent data are obtained from the “Listed Firms’ Patents” dataset in
CSMAR. This dataset provides the total number of patent applications by each firm in
each year, as well as the number of patents granted in the following four years (for those
patent applications in year t, the number of patents granted in year t+1 to year t+4). It
also provides the total number of patents in force by the end of each year for each firm.
Using this information, this chapter constructs three proxies for firm innovation from
three perspectives: (1) The number of patent applications in each year, which measures
the quantity of innovative activities. (2) The number of patents that are eventually
granted (those applied in the application year), which measures the quality of these
innovative activities. (3) The number of patents in force in each year, which measures a
firm’s stock of innovative activities. In the regression analyses, this chapter transforms
these measures into the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patent applications,
one plus the number of patents eventually granted, and one plus the number of patents
in force, respectively. In addition to these three proxies, this chapter also uses ratio of
number of patents granted to the number of patent applications as an alternative proxy
for firm innovation performance.
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3.3.3 Institutional investors contestability measurements
To measure the institutional investors’ contestability of the controlling shareholders,
the method in the existing studies of MLS are employed in this chapter (Laeven and
Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2018). The first measure is the ratio of
institutional investors’ ownership to the controlling shareholders’ ownership and two
continuous variables are constructed: the first variable is Mutualratio, defined as the
ratio of ownership held by domestic mutual funds to the controlling shareholder’s
ownership; the second variable is QFIIratio, defined as ratio of the ownership held by
QFIIs to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. The higher values of these two ratios
indicate the higher relative power of the institutional investors in relation to the
controlling shareholders.
The second measure of contestability by institutional investors is the ownership
dispersion and two variables are created: the first one is Mutualdisp, defined as the
difference of ownerships between the controlling shareholders and domestic mutual
funds divided by the sum of their ownerships; the second one is QFIIdisp, defined as
the difference of ownerships between the controlling shareholders and QFIIs divided by
the sum of their ownerships. The higher this ratio, the lower is the contestability of the
control by institutional investors.
It is noted that there are some firms having more than one institutional investor with
at least 1% of ownership. To calculate the above-mentioned variables, the institutional
investor with the largest ownership are chosen, following the literature of multiple large
shareholders (Laeven and Levine, 2008). It is also possible that institutional investors
could form a coalition and act as a block, as indicated in the study of Firth et al. (2016),
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so the aggregate ownership of the institutional investors is also used to calculate the
above-mentioned variables and repeats the analysis.
3.3.4 Model
To examine the effects of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation
empirically, the following linear model is established:
Patenti,t+1=β0+ β1Mutualcontesti,t+ β2QFIIcontesti,t+ β3Mutuali,t
+ β4QFIIi,t+ β5Asseti,t+ β6Boardi,t+ β7Indepi,t+ β8Otherinsi,t
+ β9Leveragei,t+ β10ROAi,t+ β11Tangibilityi,t+β12CEOgenderi,t
+β13CEOagei,t+Dummy(year)+Dummy(industry)+εi,t

(3.1)

where Patent represents firm innovation, which are proxied by the variables discussed
in section 3.3.2 in the regressions. Considering the causal effect that factors have on
firm innovation, this chapter uses one-year leading firm patent numbers as the
dependent variable in the empirical estimation. The employment of one-year leading
dependent variable could also avoid the endogenous issue to some extent due to the
interactive correlation

between institutional ownership and firm innovation.

Mutualcontest and QFIIcontest represent the contestability by domestic mutual funds
and QFIIs, respectively. Empirically, this chapter runs two regressions separately. The
first regression uses Mutualratio and QFIIratio to replace Mutualcontest and
QFIIcontest, respectively. According to the hypothesis (H), β1 is expected to be
significantly positive and β2 is expected to be insignificant. The second regression uses
Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp to replace Mutualcontest and QFIIcontest, respectively.
According to the hypothesis (H), β1 is expected to be significantly negative and β2 is
expected to be insignificant. To mitigate the concern that these contestability proxies
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may just capture the level of institutional investors’ ownership or the controlling
shareholders’ ownership, the ownership levels of domestic mutual funds (Mutual) and
QFIIs (QFII) are also included for control in the regressions.

Table 3.1 Definitions of variables

Variables
Definitions
Panel A: Firm innovation
Patent applications
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents applied
Patents granted
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents granted
Patents in force
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents in force
Panel B: Institutional ownership
Mutual
The percentage of shares owned by domestic mutual funds in a firm.
QFII
The percentage of shares owned by QFIIs in a firm
Mutualratio
The ratio of mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s
ownership
QFIIratio
The ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s
ownership
Mutualdisp
(The controlling shareholder’s ownership-mutual funds’ ownership) /
(The controlling shareholder’s ownership + mutual funds’ ownership)
QFIIdisp
(The controlling shareholder’s ownership-QFIIs’ ownership) / (The
controlling shareholder’s ownership + QFIIs’ ownership)
Panel C: Other variables
SOE
A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is ultimately
controlled by the government and 0 otherwise
Otherins
The percentage of shares owned by other institutional investors (banks,
insurance companies, social security funds, brokers, entrust
companies, and financial companies) in a firm.
Asset
The natural logarithm of total assets
Board size (Board)
The natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board
Independent directors
(Indep)
Proportion of independent directors on the board
Leverage
Total debts/total assets in book value
ROA
Net income/total assets
Tangibility
The ratio of firm fixed assets to total assets
CEOgender
The gender of CEOs, which equals to 1 if the CEO is male, and 0 if
female
CEOage
The age of CEOs
PC
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the Chairman or CEO of the firm is
politically connected and 0 otherwise. Politically connected is defined
as if the Chairman or CEO was a former or is a current official of the
government, a member of the National People’s Congress (NPC) or a
member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC).
Analyst
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts tracking the
firm each year.
HHI
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, defined as the sum of the squared
market share of each firm within the industry
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To consider the effects of other factors on firm innovation, this chapter includes a
set of control variables by following existing studies (Fang et al., 2014; Bena et al.,
2017; Luong et al., 2017; Rong et al., 2017). Definitions of the control variables are
listed in Table 3.1. Specifically, Asset represents is the natural logarithm of firm total
assets. Board is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board and Indep
is the percentage of independent directors. Otherins denotes the sum of ownership held
by all the other institutional investors (such as banks, insurance companies, pension
funds, brokers, entrust companies, social securities and financial companies). Leverage
is the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA is return on assets, defined as the ratio of
net income to firm total assets. Tangibility is asset tangibility, measured as the value of
firm asset liquidation scaled by the total book assets, following Almeida and Campello
(2007). CEOgender is the gender of CEO of each firm in each year, which equals to 1 if
the CEO is male and 0 if female. CEOage is the age of CEO of each firm in each year.
Year dummies and industry dummies variables are included to control for year and
industry fixed effects.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of variables used in the empirical analyses.
Panel A shows the summary of patent information for both the full sample and
subsample with non-zero values of patent or institutional ownership. For those
observations with non-zero values of patent, the average number of patent applications,
patents eventually granted and total patents in force are 54.41, 36.63 and 128.70,
respectively. For firms which have domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders, the
average number of patents applications, patents granted and total patents in force are
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35.81, 23.12 and 92.27, respectively. These average patent numbers are higher than
27.65, 17.42 and 74.04 of the full sample, indicating that patents are increased when
there are institutional investors in a firm.
Panel B shows the summary of institutional ownership for full sample and sample
of firms that have institutional ownership. Among firms having domestic mutual funds
as shareholders, the average ownership held by domestic mutual funds is 3.81% with
the highest level being 43.80%. Among firms having QFIIs as shareholders, the average
QFIIs’ ownership is 1.26% with the highest level being 15.08%. These statistical
numbers are quite similar to Firth et al. (2016) and Jiang et al. (2017), and facilitate the
examination of their various influences given large variations of the ownership
difference. The average ratio of domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling
shareholder’s ownership, and the average ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling
shareholder’s ownership are 13.22% and 4.20%, respectively. The mean values of
Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp are 79.95% and 92.46%, respectively. These results indicate
high concentration of ownership in Chinese firms and the need to explore the influence
of institutional ownership by considering the effect of controlling shareholders. Panel C
lists the control variables used in the empirical analysis. The average board size is 8.95,
with 3.23 (36.09%) serving as independent directors. The average ownership of the
controlling shareholder is 36.17%, suggesting high ownership concentration. Panel D
shows the distribution of the sample firms, of which there are 11,139 firm-year
observations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 14,265 for non-state-owned
enterprises (non-SOEs). The percentage of firms with managerial political connection in
SOEs and non-SOEs are 23.33% and 34.49%, respectively.
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Table 3.2 Summary statistics

Variable
Obs.
Mean Std.Dev.
25%
Median
75%
Max
Panel A: Firm innovation
A.1: Full sample
Patent applications 25,404
27.65
253.70
0
1
13
20,107
Patents granted
25,404
17.42
135.00
0
0
9
11,844
Patents in force
25,404
74.04
559.50
0
4
39
43,619
A.2: Observations with non-zero values of patent applications/patents granted/patents in force
Patents applied
12,911
54.41
353.84
5
12
32
20,107
Patents granted
12,081
36.63
194.97
4
10
24
11,844
Patents in force
14,615
128.70
732.90
10
30
85
43,619
A.3: Observations with non-zero values of mutual funds or QFIIs’ ownership
Patents applied
15,291
35.81
301.53
0
2
17
20,107
Patents granted
15,291
23.12
168.68
0
1
12
11,844
Patents in force
15,291
92.27
656.20
0
8
50
43.619
Panel B: Institutional ownership
B.1: Full sample
Mutual (%)
25,404
2.23
3.68
0
0.45
2.93
43.80
QFII (%)
25,404
0.11
0.54
0
0
0
15.08
Mutualratio (%)
25,404
7.73
15.49
0
1.21
8.77
330.20
QFIIratio (%)
25,404
0.35
2.09
0
0
0
73.08
Mutualdisp (%)
25,404
88.28
19.95
83.87
97.62
1
1
QFIIdisp (%)
25,404
99.36
3.37
1
1
1
1
Otherins (%)
25,404
3.47
8.44
0
0.88
3.12
85.64
B.2: Observations with non-zero values of mutual funds/QFIIs’ ownership
Mutual (%)
14,855
3.81
4.14
0.81
2.30
5.42
43.80
QFII (%)
2,142
1.26
1.41
0.41
0.82
1.60
15.08
Mutualratio (%)
14,855
13.22
18.38
2.25
6.68
16.66
330.20
QFIIratio (%)
2,142
4.20
5.98
1.02
2.31
4.95
73.08
Mutualdisp (%)
14,855
79.95
21.15
71.45
87.48
95.61
99.99
QFIIdisp (%)
2,142
92.46
9.10
90.56
95.49
97.99
99.98
Panel C: Other firm characteristics
Assets (Million)
25,404
9,500
52,800
1,150
2,400
5,490
2,410,000
Leverage (%)
25,404
45.44
21.99
28.52
45.43
61.44
108.61
ROA (%)
25,404
3.57
6.03
1.28
3.51
6.36
19.69
Tangibility (%)
25,404
24.58
17.63
10.75
21.18
35.15
74.96
Board Size
25,404
8.95
1.86
8
9
9
19
Independent
directors
25,404
3.23
0.66
3
3
3
8
Controlling (%)
25,404
36.17
15.50
23.97
33.88
47.28
89.99
CEOgender
25,404
0.94
0.23
1
1
1
1
CEOage
25,404
47.79
6.40
43
48
52
64
Panel D: Firm distributions according to ownership and political connections
SOEs (11,139)
Non-SOEs (14,265)
Political
Non-political
Political connected
Non-political
connected
connected
connected
Observations
2,599
8,540
4,920
9,345
(Percentage)
(23.33%)
(76.67%)
(34.49%)
(65.51%)
This table reports the summary statistics of all the variables for the full sample from 2003 to 2017. Panel
A is summary statistics for patent data. Panel B reports the summary statistics for institutional ownership.
Panel C is summary statistics for variables representing firm characteristics and corporate governance.
Panel D is summary for firm distributions between state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-ownedenterprises (non-SOEs), and between firms with and without political connections. All the definitions of
these variables are listed in Table 3.1. The value of variables is in terms of China’s currency, the RMB.
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3.4.2 Effects of institutional investors contestability on firm innovation
This section reports the empirical results of estimating equation (3.1) to test the
main hypothesis. The results are shown in Table 3.3 using the patent applications as the
dependent variable. Note that columns (1) to (3) are the results using the ratio of
institutional ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership as contestability
measures and columns (4) to (6) are the results using the dispersion proxies.
Specifically, column (1) and column (2) report the results on domestic mutual funds and
QFIIs separately, and the ratio variables are of the main interests. It is shown that the
coefficient of Mutualratio is positive and statistically significant at 1% level (coefficient
is 0.314 and t-value is 2.82), while the coefficient of QFIIratio is insignificant. These
results indicate that when domestic mutual funds hold a relative closer ownership to the
controlling shareholder, they are more able to exert their influence on improving firm
innovation, while QFIIs’ incentive to promote firm innovation does not show such an
incremental pattern when their ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholder.
To make further comparison between domestic mutual funds and QFIIs, column (3)
reports the results by putting mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership together in
one regression model. The results of variables that is more concerned are consistent
with those separately reported in column (1) and column (2).
Moreover, the regressions are repeated by replacing ownership ratios with
ownership dispersion, Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp, to test the contestability by domestic
mutual funds and QFIIs. The results are reported in columns (4) to (6). Specifically,
column (4) and column (5) report the results on domestic mutual funds and QFIIs
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Table 3.3 The effects of institutional investors on patent applications

(1)
Dependent variables
Mutualratio

(2)

0.314***
(2.82)

QFIIratio

1.640
(1.52)

Mutualdisp

(3)
(4)
Patent applications
0.279***
(4.50)
1.180
(1.06)
-0.354***
(-3.55)

QFIIdisp
Mutual

(5)

-0.842
(-1.15)
0.085***
(2.74)

0.083***
(3.90)
QFII
0.082*
0.090**
(1.93)
(2.08)
Asset
0.244***
0.253***
0.240***
(9.07)
(25.11)
(22.51)
Indep
0.190
0.193
0.191
(0.52)
(1.02)
(1.00)
Board
0.060
0.063
0.058
(0.46)
(1.09)
(1.01)
Otherins
0.001
0.001
0.001
(0.36)
(0.76)
(0.61)
Leverage
-0.587***
-0.606*** -0.590***
(-5.61)
(-12.48)
(-12.06)
ROA
1.436***
1.622***
1.374***
(5.39)
(10.01)
(8.36)
Tangibility
-0.794***
-0.798*** -0.796***
(-5.74)
(-13.74)
(-13.72)
CEOGender
0.101
0.113***
0.107***
(1.27)
(3.01)
(2.87)
CEOAge
-0.005*
-0.005*** -0.005***
(-1.67)
(-3.56)
(-3.48)
Constant
-4.893***
-5.029*** -4.794***
(-7.99)
(-20.49)
(-18.94)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
22,705
22,705
22,705
R-squared
0.368
0.368
0.370
This table presents the effects of institutional ownership on firm

0.054*
(1.67)

0.246***
(9.14)
0.193
(0.53)
0.059
(0.46)
0.001
(0.34)
-0.593***
(-5.67)
1.391***
(5.24)
-0.791***
(-5.72)
0.100
(1.27)
-0.005*
(-1.66)
-4.573***
(-7.35)
Yes
Yes
22,705
0.368
innovation.

0.091*
(1.95)
0.252***
(25.09)
0.192
(1.01)
0.063
(1.09)
0.001
(0.74)
-0.606***
(-12.47)
1.618***
(9.99)
-0.800***
(-13.76)
0.112***
(3.00)
-0.005***
(-3.55)
-4.184***
(-5.42)
Yes
Yes
22,705
0.368
Dependent

(6)

-0.324***
(-5.81)
-0.283
(-0.38)
0.053**
(2.38)
0.112**
(2.37)
0.242***
(22.67)
0.193
(1.02)
0.058
(1.00)
0.001
(0.55)
-0.595***
(-12.15)
1.329***
(8.08)
-0.795***
(-13.70)
0.107***
(2.85)
-0.005***
(-3.44)
-4.219***
(-5.41)
Yes
Yes
22,705
0.370
variable is the

natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. Specifically, column (1) to (3) presents
the results of testing the ratio of institutional ownership to the controlling shareholders’ ownership on
firm innovation. Column (4) to (6) presents the results of testing the dispersion proxies. Mutualratio
represents the ratio of domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership.
QFIIratio represents the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. Mutualdisp
represents dispersion proxy for domestic mutual funds’ contestability, defined as the difference in the
controlling ownership and domestic mutual funds’ ownership over their sum. QFIIdisp represents
dispersion proxy for QFIIs’ contestability, defined as the difference in the controlling ownership and
QFIIs’ ownership over their sum. Mutual is domestic mutual funds’ ownership. QFII refers to QFIIs’
ownership. All the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry
dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered
at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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separately. It is observed that the coefficient of Mutualdsip is negative and statistically
significant at 1% level (coefficient is -0.354, t-value is -3.55), indicating that closer
ownership between domestic mutual funds and controlling shareholder (higher
contestability by domestic mutual funds) enables domestic mutual funds to exert further
efforts to increase firm innovation. By contrast, the coefficients of QFIIdisp are
insignificant, suggesting that the contestability by QFIIs does not have such a
significant effect. To make comparison between domestic mutual funds and QFIIs,
column (6) reports the results of putting domestic mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’
ownership in one regression model. Again, the negative and significant coefficient of
Mutualdisp still holds, while the coefficient is insignificant for QFIIs.
The overall results in Table 3.3 are supportive to the main hypothesis that domestic
mutual funds are sophisticated investors and are able to contest with the controlling
shareholders and discipline managers to promote firm innovation when they hold closer
ownership to that of controlling shareholders. By contrast, foreign institutional investors
usually have a different culture from China where the economy is relationship-based
and there exist various dialects. Therefore, QFIIs have no significant contestability
effects. Furthermore, in each regression, the ownership levels of domestic mutual funds
and QFIIs are also included as control variables. The results show that the ownership of
both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs has a positive effect on firm innovation, which is
consistent with Rong et al. (2017) using the Chinese setting. The results for other
control variables are consistent with previous studies (Kochhar and David, 1996; Tian
and Wang, 2014). Overall, these results show that the effects of institutional investors
are subject to their identities as well as their contestability of the controlling
shareholders.
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The results in Table 3.3 are about the effect of institutional investors’ contestability
on the quantity of innovative activities, namely the patent applications by each firm in
each year. This section further examines the effect of institutional investors’
contestability on the quality of innovative activities (measured by the number of patents
granted) and the stock of innovation (measured by the number of patents in force).
Empirically, equation (3.1) is re-estimated by replacing the dependent variables with the
natural logarithm of one plus one-year leading number of patents granted, and the
natural logarithm of one plus one-year leading number of patents in force. The results
are reported in the first four columns in Table 3.4. Specifically, column (1) and column
(2) report the results of using patents granted as the dependent variable, and column (3)
and column (4) report the results of using patents in force as the dependent variable.
These results show that the estimated coefficients of the key variables are in line with
those reported in Table 3.3, suggesting that the contestability by domestic mutual funds
also affects the quality and quantity of firm innovation. Their effects are subject to not
only their identities and their ownership level, but also their ownership difference from
the controlling shareholder’s ownership.
In addition to the prior examination using patents granted as a quality measurement,
the ratio of patents granted to patent applications is further employed as another proxy
for patent quality. The results are reported in column (5) and column (6) in Table 3.4.
Moreover, a Poisson count number model is also conducted by using the raw patent
application number as the dependent variable, and the results are reported in columns (7)
and (8) in Table 3.4. Again, the results indicate that regardless of firm innovation
measurements, domestic mutual funds are able to promote firm innovation by
competing with the controlling shareholders and forming contestability. In contrast,
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QFIIs’ incentives to compete with the controlling shareholders are much weaker so that
their contestability has no significant effects.

Table 3.4 The effects of institutional investors on patents granted and patent in force

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Patents granted/
Raw number of
Patent applications
patents applied
0.194***
0.283***
0.030*
0.314***
(3.27)
(4.08)
(1.77)
(3.60)
QFIIratio
0.800
1.015
-0.269
-0.768
(0.71)
(0.74)
(-1.03)
(-0.87)
Mutualdisp
-0.244***
-0.345***
-0.034**
-0.354***
(-4.53)
(-5.46)
(-2.26)
(-4.34)
QFIIdisp
0.070
-0.257
0.128
0.384
(0.10)
(-0.28)
(0.71)
(0.47)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year
fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
effects
Industry
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
fixed effects
Observations
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
R-squared
0.314
0.314
0.466
0.467
0.230
0.242
This table presents the results using alternative measurements of firm innovation. Specifically, column (1)
Dependent
variable
Mutualratio

(1)
(2)
Patents granted

(3)
(4)
Patents in force

and column (2) use the natural logarithm of one plus one-year leading number of patents granted as the
dependent variable. Column (3) and column (4) use the natural logarithm of one plus one-year leading
number of patents in force as the dependent variable. Column (5) and column (6) use the ratio of patents
granted to patents applied as the dependent variable. Column (7) and column (8) use the original number
of patent applications as the dependent variables and the results are obtained using Poisson count number
model. Control variables in equation (3.1) are included in each regression. All the variables’ definitions
are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are included. The t-statistics are
reported in parentheses in column (1) to (6). The z-statistics are reported in parentheses in column (7) and
column (8). The z-statistics and t-statistics are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

3.4.3 Endogeneity concern
In the previous models, one-year leading dependent variable is used to avoid
potential reverse causality. However, there is still one endogeneity concern that
institutional investors may select firms based on their predicted innovation performance,
and thus the results using OLS model could be biased. Although endogeneity is less
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likely to be ruled out completely, this section tries to establish the causality and mitigate
this concern to a large extent by using Heckman two-stage method, propensity score
matching (PSM) method and change regressions.
First, the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure is applied to correct for the
potential endogeneity issue of selection bias because institutional investors might invest
in particular firms. Since it is argued above that domestic investors and foreign
investors have different incentives that affect firm innovation, their preferences for
investee firms differ (Liu et al., 2014). Therefore, instrumental variables for domestic
mutual funds and QFIIs should be different to run the first stage of the Heckman
method. Following Firth et al. (2016) and Rong et al. (2017), an index-inclusion dummy
variable (Indexdom) is constructed as the instrumental variable for domestic mutual
funds. This dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm is included in either the Shanghai
180 Index or the Shenzhen Component Index 17 , and 0 otherwise. This instrumental
variable is employed because domestic mutual funds might tend to mimic market
indexes, and are thus more likely to invest in firms that are included in the market
indexes. However, the firm innovation policy is not an inclusive criterion for these
indexes and is therefore not related to index membership. It is expected that the
ownership of domestic mutual funds is positively related to the index-inclusion dummy.
With regards to QFIIs, this chapter follows Luong et al. (2017) and uses an international
index inclusion, the MSCI China A inclusion index 18 as an instrumental variable. A
dummy variable (MSCI) is constructed, which equals to 1 if a firm is included in the
17

Shanghai 180 Index is an index of representative 180 stocks that are traded in Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE). Shenzhen Component Index inclusions was adjusted from 40 to 500 representative
stocks traded in Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in May of 2015. The inclusion of these two indexes
depends on a firm’s market capitalization, stock trading liquidity and market position in its industry
sector.
18
MSCI China A inclusion index measures large and mid-cap representation across China securities listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). This index is designed
for international investors and to track the progressive partial inclusion of A shares in the MSCI Emerging
Markets Index over time.
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MSCI China A inclusion index, and 0 otherwise. The first stage of Heckman two-stage
procedure includes two OLS estimations where both domestic and foreign institutional
investor ownership measurements are regressed on their respective instrumental
variables and the same control variables from equation (3.1). This also meets the
exclusion restrictions of conducting Heckman two-stage method, as these two
instrumental variables are not included in the second-stage regressions. From the first
stage, the inverse mills ratios (Lambda) are obtained and they are included as
independent variables in the second stage regression of firm innovation. Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 3.5 report the first-stage results, which show that the estimated
coefficients of Indexdom and MSCI are both positive and statistically significant. These
results indicate that the instrumental variables are efficient and valid. The results from
the second stage are reported in columns (3) and (4). It is found that both coefficients of
LambdaMutual and LambdaQFII are significant, which indicates that the selection bias and
an endogeneity issue might exist in the previous analysis. After addressing the selection
bias issue, the results of the concerned variables are still consistent with those reported
in Table 3.3.
Moreover, the documented relationship between institutional ownership and firm
innovation could be driven by some unobserved firm characteristics or jointly
determined. To address this issue, a matching sample using PSM method is constructed.
In this matching process, for each firm-year observation in the treatment sample (i.e.,
those observations with either domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders), an
observation in the control sample (i.e., those observations with neither domestic mutual
funds nor QFIIs as shareholder) can be identified with the same/nearest propensity score
of firm characteristic including firm size, board size, independent board proportion,
other institutional ownership, leverage, ROA, tangibility, CEO gender and CEO age. In
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this way, it can be ensured that treatment firms and control firms are similar and only
differ in institutional investor ownership. Then, equation (3.1) is re-estimated using this
matched sample and the results are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.5. The
matching sample has 20,688 observations. Since the independent variable is a one-year
leading value, the number of observations used in each regression reduces to 18,355.
Again, it is found that the coefficients of the key variables are broadly consistent with
those in Table 3.3.
The endogeneity issue is further addressed in this section by examining the change
of the relative ownership by institutional investors to the controlling shareholders on
patent applications. Empirically, four variables are constructed to denote the change of
the relative institutional ownership: (1) ΔMutualratio, which is the change of the ratio of
domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling shareholders’ ownership; (2)
ΔQFIIratio, which is the change of the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling
shareholders’ ownership; (3) ΔMutualdisp, which is the change of ownership dispersion
for domestic mutual funds; (4) ΔQFIIdisp, which is the change of ownership dispersion
for QFIIs. Equation (3.1) is then re-estimated by using ΔMutualratio and ΔQFIIratio,
ΔMutualdisp and ΔQFIIdisp in the model. The results are presented in columns (7) and
(8) of Table 3.5. It is observed that the coefficient of ΔMutualratio is significantly
positive and the coefficient of ΔMutualdisp is significantly negative, which indicates
that the increase of the relative ownership of domestic mutual funds to the controlling
shareholders can further improve firm innovation. The insignificant results of
ΔQFIIratio and ΔQFIIdisp are also consistent with the previous arguments. The results
further support the main hypothesis.
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Table 3.5 Results of addressing potential endogenous issues

(1)
(2)
First stage of
Heckman
Dependent
variable
Indexdom
MSCI
Mutualratio
QFIIratio
Mutualdisp
QFIIdisp

Domestic
investor
measures
0.740***
(2.69)

Foreign
investor
measures

(3)
(4)
Second stage of
Heckman

(5)
(6)
PSM method

Patent applications

Patent applications

0.097***
(6.91)
0.281***
(4.54)
1.492
(1.61)

0.282***
(4.52)
1.131
(1.03)
-0.327***
(-5.90)
-0.452
(-0.62)

-0.285***
(-4.96)
-0.238
(-0.36)

ΔMutualratio

0.089**
(2.08)
-0.546
(-1.63)

ΔQFIIratio
ΔMutualdisp

-0.073**
(-1.97)
0.289
(1.60)

ΔQFIIdisp
LambdaMutual
LambdaQFII

(7)
(8)
Change of
institutional
ownership
Patent applications

0.533*** 0.535***
(12.35)
(10.70)
-4.474*** -4.424***
(-6.79)
(-5.68)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
effects
Industry
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
fixed effects
Observations
25,404
25,404
22,705
22,705
18,355
18,355
22,702
22,702
R-squared
0.117
0.033
0.376
0.377
0.364
0.360
0.362
0.366
This table presents the results of addressing endogenous issues using Heckman two-stage method, PSM
method and considering the change of institutional ownership. Indexdom is a dummy variable equals to 1
if the firm is included in either the Shanghai 180 Index or the Shenzhen Component Index, and 0
otherwise. MSCI is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm is included in MSCI China A inclusion
index, and 0 otherwise. ΔMutualratio represents the change of the ratio of mutual funds’ ownership to the
controlling shareholders’ ownership. ΔQFIIratio represents the change of the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to
the controlling shareholders’ ownership. ΔMutualdisp represents the change of ownership dispersion for
domestic mutual funds. ΔQFIIdisp represents the change of ownership dispersion for QFIIs. LambdaMutual
and LambdaQFII are inverse mills ratios obtained from the first stage of Heckman two-stage model. All the
other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are
included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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3.5 Additional analysis and potential channel
3.5.1 The effects of institutional investors: SOEs vs non-SOEs
The main argument is that institutional investors affect firm innovation via
monitoring managers and this influence is increasing with the increasing of their
contestability of the controlling shareholders. In China, there are two major types of
firms controlled by two distinct types of controlling shareholders. One type is stateowned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the governments, and the other type is nonSOEs controlled by non-government entities such as families, individuals and private
institutions. In the sample, almost half of the firms (43.85%) are SOEs, and the
remaining are non-SOEs.
It is proposed that the effects of contestability by institutional investors on firm
innovation are weaker in SOEs than that in non-SOEs for the following reasons: First,
under the current Chinese political system, the appointment of CEOs in SOEs is under
direct control of the government, and the selection of CEOs is usually decided by
administrative authorities (Fan et al., 2013; Cao et al., 2019). Candidates are from a
pool of SOE managers or government officials (Rong et al., 2017). In this sense in
SOEs, CEOs’ career concerns are closely related to the government assessments and
how well they can implement the government policies to satisfy the multiple objectives.
Thus, CEOs in SOEs are more likely to make decisions following government
instructions rather than maximising shareholder value, and as a result, institutional
investors could exert limited influence on CEOs’ behaviours. Second, SOEs are usually
used by the governments to intervene in the market and satisfy political objectives, such
as maintaining social stability, keeping employment rate and paying taxes (Pan et al.,
2019). So their business activities are largely dependent on and determined by the
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governments, and less likely to be influenced by the other shareholders such as
institutional investors. Moreover, domestic mutual funds are faced with political
pressure and regulations from local governments in SOEs (Firth et al., 2010; Huang and
Zhu, 2015), so their incentives to contend with the controlling shareholder (the
government) would be weaker. Therefore, this chapter expects that the influence of
contestability by domestic mutual funds would be less significant in SOEs. Empirically,
this chapter tests the heterogeneity of the controlling shareholders’ identities by dividing
the sample firms into SOEs and non-SOEs. The following model is also established for
estimation:
Patenti,t+1=β0+ β1Mutualcontesti,t+ β2QFIIcontesti,t+ β3Mutualcontesti,t*SOEi,t
+ β4QFIIcontesti,t*SOEi,t+β5SOEi,t+ β6Mutuali,t+ β7QFIIi,t
+ β8Asseti,t+ β9Boardi,t+ β10Indepi,t+ β11Otherinsi,t+ β12Leveragei,t
+ β13ROAi,t+ β14Tangibilityi,t+β15CEOgenderi,t+β16CEOagei,t
+Dummy(year)+Dummy(industry)+εi,t

(3.2)

where SOE is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a firm is an SOE and 0 if a firm is
a non-SOE. The interactive terms between SOE dummy and contestability measures are
included to test the effects of state-controlling shareholders. All the other variables are
defined the same as those in equation (3.1).
The results of estimating equation (3.2) are reported in Table 3.6 where the
coefficients of the interactive terms are the main concerns. Columns (1) to (3) report the
results of contestability using the ratio proxies, and columns (4) to (6) report the results
of contestability using the dispersion proxies. Consistent with the structure of the results
in Table 3.3, equation (3.2) is estimated by entering contestability proxies separately
103

first and then combing them together. As shown in Table 3.6, the coefficients of
Mutualratio*SOE are significantly negative (t-value is -1.97 in column (1) and -2.09 in
column (3)), and the coefficients of Mutualdisp*SOE are significantly positive (t-value
is 2.59 in column (4) and 2.57 in column (6)). These results are consistent with the
expectation, indicating that the incentives of domestic mutual funds to compete with the
controlling shareholders become weaker in SOEs than in non-SOEs. These results are
also supportive to the main hypothesis that institutional investors affect firm innovation
via forming contestability to monitor CEOs’ behaviours.

Table 3.6 The effects of institutional investors on firm innovation: SOEs vs non-SOEs

(1)
Dependent variable
Mutualratio

(2)

0.387***
(4.75)

QFIIratio

1.988
(1.12)

Mutualdisp

(3)

(4)
Patent applications
0.357***
(4.37)
1.878
(1.48)
-0.433***
(-6.30)

QFIIdisp
Mutualratio*SOE
QFIIratio*SOE
Mutualdisp*SOE

-0.212**
(-1.97)
-1.661
(-0.98)

(5)

(6)

-1.261
(-1.10)

-0.404***
(-5.85)
-0.838
(-1.07)

-0.228**
(-2.09)
-1.038
(-0.98)
0.238***
(2.59)

0.240**
(2.57)
QFIIdisp*SOE
1.365
0.972
(1.27)
(1.50)
SOE
-0.150*** -0.204*** -0.149*** -0.374***
-1.566
-1.346**
(-7.09)
(-4.04)
(-7.02)
(-4.40)
(-1.46)
(-2.11)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
R-squared
0.370
0.359
0.372
0.370
0.359
0.372
This table presents the effects of state ownership on institutional investors’ effects. Dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. SOE is a dummy variable which
equals to 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled by the government and 0 otherwise. All the other variables’
definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are included. The tstatistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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3.5.2 Career concern view vs. quiet life view
The previous results show that domestic mutual funds’ contestability can promote
firm innovation, which is consistent with the idea that domestic mutual funds can
alleviate the CEOs’ concerns of being fired due to early-stage failure of innovation
(career concern view, Ederer and Manso, 2013) or exert monitoring over managerial
behaviours to motivate CEOs to innovate (quiet life view, Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2003). In particular, according to the career concern view, since innovative activities
usually involve a large probability of failure, the managers expose themselves to a high
risk of being fired for innovation-related reasons. The managers concern their career
stability as the first priority, thus they do not like to invest in innovative activities.
Institutional investors can mitigate managers’ career concerns better as they may help to
identify stochastic reasons of innovation failure and insulate the failure from the
managers’ responsibility. According to the quiet life view, managers prefer a quiet life
rather than undertaking an innovation action that may negatively impact their careers.
Institutional investors can monitor the managers not to be “lazy” for enjoying a quiet
life. This section conducts a further analysis to differentiate between career concern
view and quiet life view, and then provides direct evidence to show which view
dominates in the Chinese setting and can better explain the effects of domestic mutual
funds contestability on firm innovation.
Following the empirical design by Aghion et al. (2013), product market
competition is employed to test these two views. The empirical model includes the
interaction between institutional investors’ contestability and product market
competition. The basic idea is that managers are already disciplined to avoid the threat
of takeover or bankruptcy when product market competition is intense, thus have more
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incentives to innovate. In particular, consistent with the career concern view, the
influence of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation should be stronger
in firms facing higher level of competition, while consistent with the quiet life view, the
influence of institutional investor contestability on firm innovation should be stronger in
firms facing lower level of competition.

Table 3.7 The effects of institutional investors based on product market competition

(1)
Dependent variable:
Mutualratio

(2)

0.455***
(6.21)

QFIIratio

1.126
(0.66)

Mutualdisp

(3)
(4)
Patent applications
0.415***
(3.15)
1.268
(0.68)
-0.493***
(-7.82)

QFIIdisp
Mutualratio*HHI
QFIIratio*HHI
Mutualdisp*HHI

-3.046***
(-4.38)
-9.863
(-0.79)

(5)

(6)

-0.722
(-0.60)

-0.461***
(-4.09)
-0.342
(-0.27)

-2.894**
(-2.36)
-9.209
(-0.69)
3.118***
(5.78)

3.046***
(3.23)
QFIIdisp*HHI
5.184
3.505
(0.71)
(0.44)
HHI
0.285
-0.143
0.294
-2.713***
-5.329
-6.143
(1.43)
(-0.48)
(0.93)
(-5.10)
(-0.73)
(-0.77)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
R-squared
0.368
0.356
0.370
0.369
0.356
0.371
This table presents the effects of product market competition on institutional investors’ effects.
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. HHI is
Herfindahl index. All the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and
industry dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error
clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Product market competition is measured by Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI),
which is defined as the sum of the squared market share of each firm within the industry.
So a higher value of HHI indicates a lower level of product market competition.
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Empirically, this chapter re-estimates equation (3.2) by replacing SOE with HHI. The
estimation results are reported in Table 3.7. Consistent with the structure of Table 3.6,
columns (1) to (3) report the results of contestability using ratio proxies and columns (4)
to (6) report the results of contestability using dispersion proxies. It is shown that the
coefficients of Mutualratio*HHI are significantly negative in both column (1) and
column (3), and the coefficients of Mutualdisp*HHI are significantly positive in both
column (4) and column (6). These results suggest that the effects of domestic mutual
funds are even stronger in firms facing higher level of product market competition.
These results indicate that market competition and institutional investor contestability
are complementary in affecting firm innovation, and therefore are consistent with the
career concern view.
By exploiting the Chinese setting, another set of analysis is able to be conducted to
examine that the quiet life view does not explain the role of institutional investors in
China. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) posit that in the quiet life model, institutional
investors are able to reduce the managerial entrenchment by monitoring managers. Thus,
in this section, it is examined whether the effects of domestic mutual funds’
contestability on firm innovation could be more significant when CEOs are more
entrenched and less concerned about their careers. In particular, CEOs’ political
connections are employed as a measurement for CEO entrenchment. There is a large
number of studies showing that political connections can provide unique resources to
the operation of the firms (e.g., Faccio, 2006; Claessens et al., 2008), which makes
managers more entrenched in their positions and thus less concerned about their careers
(Cao et al., 2017). In this sense, politically connected CEOs might have less incentive to
conduct innovative activities to enhance firm performance, and thus are able to enjoy a
quiet life. Following these studies, the CEOs’ political connection is identified if the
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CEO was a former or is a current: (1) government official, (2) a member of the standing
committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), and/or (3) a member of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The information of each
CEO background is obtained from the Corporate Governance dataset in the CSMAR
database. This dataset provides detailed working experience of each executive for each
firm, so their politically related working experience can be manually collected to
identify their political connections. Empirically, a dummy variable is constructed: PC,
which equals to 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise, and equation (3.2)
is re-estimated by replacing SOE with PC.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.8, and the coefficients of the
interactive terms are the main concerns. It is observed that the coefficients of
Mutualratio*PC are significantly negative in column (1) and column (3), and the
coefficients of Mutualdisp*PC are significantly positive in column (4) and column (6).
These results suggest that the effects of domestic mutual funds’ contestability on firm
innovation are less significant when CEOs are politically connected, indicating that
institutional investors are unable to monitor politically connected CEOs (who are
entrenched) or force them to innovate. These results provide some additional evidence
that quiet life view cannot explain the mechanism that how institutional investors affect
firm innovation in China.
Overall, the empirical results show that the effects of domestic mutual funds’
contestability on firm innovation are stronger in firms facing intense product market
competition, and also less significant in firms where managers are more entrenched and
are less concerned about their careers. These results suggest that career concern view is
applied to explain the effects of institutional investors on firm innovation.
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Table 3.8 The effects of political connection

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Dependent variable: The natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one
Mutualratio
0.442***
0.370**
(3.01)
(2.44)
QFIIratio
1.545
1.827
(0.74)
(0.82)
Mutualdisp
-0.472***
-0.410***
(-3.66)
(-3.07)
QFIIdisp
-0.804
-0.807
(-0.58)
(-0.58)
Mutualratio*PC
-0.311**
-0.263*
(-2.17)
(-1.75)
QFIIratio*PC
-0.480
-0.575
(-0.28)
(-0.32)
Mutualdisp*PC
0.277**
0.237*
(2.24)
(1.81)
QFIIdisp*PC
0.319
0.349
(0.33)
(0.31)
PC
0.337***
0.521*** 0.343***
0.068
0.224
-0.237
(9.82)
(16.33)
(10.02)
(0.58)
(0.24)
(-0.22)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
R-squared
0.311
0.266
0.313
0.311
0.255
0.313
This table presents the effects political connection on institutional investors’ effects. Dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. PC is a dummy variable if there is
political connection in a firm and 0 otherwise. All the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table
3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed
using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.

3.5.3 Corporate governance channel
In the hypothesis development, it is noted that institutional investors can utilise the
firm proprietary information to improve the corporate governance which facilitates their
monitoring over the managerial behaviours. Then, this section aims to provide empirical
evidence to test this argument. It has been shown that analysts are both processers and
producers of information (Healy and Palepu, 2001), so institutional investors are likely
to demand for analyst service (Boone and White, 2015) to increase the availability of
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firm information to further lower the information asymmetry and make more efficient
monitoring. In this sense, analysts can improve corporate governance.
Then, to test whether institutional investors’ contestability can enhance firm
innovation via improving corporate governance, the analyst coverage is used to measure
the level of corporate governance. The analyst information is obtained from the Analyst
Forecast dataset in CSMAR. If corporate governance is a channel, it is expected that the
effects of domestic mutual funds’ contestability on firm innovation would be weaker in
firms with more analyst coverage. Empirically, a new variable is created, Analyst,
calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the raw value of analyst coverage.
Equation (3.2) is re-estimated by replacing SOE with Analyst.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.9. The interactive terms are the main
concern. It is obtained that the coefficients of Matualratio*Analyst in columns (1) and
(3)

are

negative

and

significant

at

5%

level,

and

the

coefficients

of

Mutualcontest*Analyst in columns (4) and (6) are positive and significant at 1% level.
These results indicate that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds’ competition
with the controlling shareholders are weaker in firms with more analyst coverage. These
results suggest that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds are more significant in
firms where corporate governance is weaker. The results support the argument that as
important monitors, institutional investors could efficiently improve corporate
governance level, and managers thereby are better monitored to invest more on
innovative projects.
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Table 3.9 Results of testing corporate governance channel

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Dependent variable: The natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one
Mutualratio
0.581***
0.550***
(2.82)
(2.68)
QFIIratio
3.442
3.220
(1.41)
(1.26)
Mutualdisp
-0.635***
-0.608***
(-3.94)
(-3.77)
QFIIdisp
-2.041
-1.694
(-1.27)
(-1.03)
Mutualratio*Analyst
-0.156**
-0.156**
(-2.38)
(-2.38)
QFIIratio*Analyst
-0.554
-0.487
(-0.85)
(-0.72)
Mutualdisp*Analyst
0.162***
0.163***
(2.95)
(2.96)
QFIIdisp*Analyst
0.369
0.303
(0.86)
(0.68)
Analyst
0.074***
0.075*** 0.073***
-0.083*
-0.294
-0.387
(5.23)
(5.71)
(5.17)
(-1.68)
(-0.69)
(-0.87)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
22,705
R-squared
0.307
0.306
0.316
0.308
0.306
0.308
This table presents the results of testing corporate governance channel. Dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. Analyst represents analyst coverage each year
calculated by the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts tracking the firm each year. All the
other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are
included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

3.6 Conclusion
The Chinese economy has developed rapidly since the late 1970s and the
improvement of firm innovation is crucial for economy development. The increasingly
important role that institutional investors play in capital markets motivates the
investigation of their effect on firm innovation in the emerging market of China. In
particular, the co-existence of both significant institutional ownership and controlling
shareholders provides an interesting setting to draw meaningful inference about the
effectiveness of institutional investors’ functions.
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This chapter uses patent data as a measure of firm innovation and then compares
the effect that domestic mutual funds and QFIIs have on firm innovation. This chapter
also uses the ratio of institutional ownership to the controlling shareholders’ ownership
and their difference to measure institutional investors’ contestability of the controlling
shareholders. Using a large sample of Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2017, it is
found that domestic mutual funds’ contestability can significantly enhance firm
innovation, indicating that in the presence of controlling shareholders, domestic mutual
funds still can efficiently improve firm innovation by forming contestability and
competing with the controlling shareholders. However, the contestability by QFIIs does
not have significant effect on firm innovation, because they are faced with strict
regulations of their investment in listed firms, unique cultures such as relationshipbased and government intervened economy. These strong challenges discourage QFIIs
to compete with the controlling shareholders. These results are robust when addressing
endogeneity issues using the Heckman two-stage model, PSM method and change
regressions. The results are also robust when using several different proxies for firm
innovation.
Moreover, the effects of contestability on firm innovation are also subject to the
controlling shareholder’s identities, and it is found that the effect of domestic mutual
funds’ contestability is weaker in SOEs than in non-SOEs. Further analysis shows that
the effect of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation is achieved
through improving corporate governance and alleviating managerial career concerns
which are consistent with the career concerns view. In particular, this chapter finds that
the effect of domestic mutual funds’ contestability becomes weaker when firms face
less competitive market, when CEOs have political connections and firms with more
analyst coverage.
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Overall, the main results support the view that institutional investors have positive
effects on firm innovation, but their effects are subject to the identity of institutional
investors as well as their contestability of the controlling shareholders in China. The
results of significant influence by the domestic mutual funds indicate the success of the
promoting institutional ownership to some extent in China’s equity market. However,
the insignificant influence by the foreign institutional investors calls for further reform
on foreign institutional ownership and release of restrictions over their investment
activities in China.
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Chapter 4 Institutional investors, controlling shareholders and
accounting conservatism
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the influence of institutional investors on accounting
conservatism in China. Accounting conservatism is the asymmetrical verification
requirement for gains and losses (Basu, 1997). Conservative accounting requires
economic losses to be recognized on a timely basis, which can mitigate managers’ selfinterest behaviours, such as risky investments and overstating financial performance
(Watts, 2003a; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011; Lara et al.,
2016). It has been reported that shareholders treat accounting conservatism as an
effective governance device to mitigate the agency issue with managers (Ball, 2001;
Watts, 2003a; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012; Lin, 2016). This particularly applies to
institutional investors who are deemed to be sophisticated and to have a substantial
equity stake (Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). However, this evidence is derived from
the US setting where the agency problem between managers and shareholders
dominates; this inference becomes unclear in emerging markets where the agency
problem between majority and minority shareholders is prominent. In emerging markets,
ownership is usually concentrated with controlling shareholders, who thus have strong
incentives to monitor/discipline managers. Such incentives, to a large extent, can
mitigate the interest conflicts between managers and shareholders, leaving the agency
problem between controlling shareholders and other investors as the major agency issue
(Fan and Wong, 2002). In such emerging markets, controlling shareholders are usually
the ultimate decision makers in firm policies. Existing studies have documented that
controlling shareholders tend to accept a low level of accounting conservatism than is
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expected by minority shareholders. In particular, controlling shareholders would further
downgrade their acceptable level of accounting conservatism for their self-interest
purposes (Fan and Wong, 2002; LaFond, 2005; Cullinan et al., 2012). It is also
documented that accounting conservatism is more beneficial to minority shareholders
and creditors in emerging markets, as accounting conservatism provides timely signals
of default risk, which will prevent controlling shareholder expropriation and mitigate
creditor concerns (Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010; Haw et al., 2014).
Given the exsitence of controlling shareholders in emerging markets, it is thus
worthwhile to investigate whether institutional investors, who are usually noncontrolling shareholders with a relatively large percentage of shares, still have
incentives to require accounting conservatism.
In addition, it has been agreed that institutional investors are sophisticated and
professional in collecting and processing information. Thus, institutional investors have
the ability to directly discipline managers and influence corporate governance (Hartzell
and Starks, 2003; Ming et al., 2018; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2000;
Ingley et al., 2004). Therefore, insitutional investors may be less dependent on financial
numbers to exert monitoring on managers and therefore have less demand for
accounting conservatism. Furthermore, unlike domestic institutional investors, foreign
institutional investors are faced with cultural barriers (Chakravarty et al., 1998; Liu et
al., 2014; Luong et al., 2017), which mitigate their direct monitoring effects. Thus, the
influence of institutional investors on accounting conservatism becomes more unclear
and their demand for accounting conservatism may be subject to their identities.
This chapter aims to provide insights into the effects of institutional investors on
firm accounting conservatism in the emerging market of China. This presents a well115

suited laboratory setting for analysis in the following aspects: First, China is the largest
emerging market with characteristics that are different from developed markets, such as
concentrated ownership, weak law enforcement and weak investor protection.
Particularly, the major types of controlling shareholder in China are the government and
families that have different economic objectives. Institutional investors are usually noncontrolling shareholders, so that their effects are more likely to be influenced by the
controlling shareholders. The significant variation of controlling shareholder types
enables testing of the influence of institutional investors in the presence of different
types of controlling shareholders.
Second, accounting conservatism has been emphasized in China’s regulations
(Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, amended in 2006). However, it is
argued that the adoption of accounting conservatism is subject to the strength of legal
enforcement (Ahmed and Duellman, 2011). If the law enforcement is weak, the benefits
of conservatism may not hold, which discourages institutional investors’ demand for
accounting conservatism. The underdeveloped legal system and weak law enforcement
in China enables this study to draw inferences of the real effects of institutional
ownership on accounting conservatism in emerging markets. Moreover, there are
various types of institutional investors in the market, such as domestic mutual funds
owned by local private entities, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) owned
by foreigners, and other state-owned institutional investors (such as banks and social
security funds). These institutional investors have different investment objectives, so
they may have different incentives for the level of conservatism they demand. This
setting provides sufficient tension to investigate the effects of different types of
institutional investors on firm accounting conservatism.
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Empirically, this study uses China’s listed firms from 2003 to 2015 as a sample to
investigate the different influences of domestic and foreign institutional investors on
firm accounting conservatism. Findings are as follows: First, domestic mutual funds’
ownership could lower the level of accounting conservatism, while QFIIs’ ownership
could increase the level of accounting conservatism. Second, the level of accounting
conservatism could be further lowered when domestic mutual funds’ ownership level is
close to that of the controlling shareholders, while further increased when QFIIs’
ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholders. Third, the negative effects of
domestic mutual funds on accounting conservatism are weaker in SOEs, firms with
lower level of ownership concentration, and firms with less analyst coverage.
Furthermore, domestic mutual funds’ ownership has negative effects on firms’ stock
price crash risk. The results are robust using an alternative proxy for accounting
conservatism, and after addressing endogeneity issues using the firm fixed effects
model, propensity score matching (PSM) method and the Heckman two-stage technique.
This chapter contributes to existing literature in the following ways: First, this
chapter is related to the literature about the influence of institutional investors on firm
accounting conservatism. Existing studies about the effects of institutional investors on
accounting conservatism are mostly focused on developed markets (Ramalingegowda
and Yu, 2012; Cheng et al., 2015; Lin, 2016), while this chapter provides insights into
an emerging market, China. The results show that domestic mutual funds have negative
effects on accounting conservatism in China which is different from the case in the US
(Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012).
Second, this chapter extends studies of the role of institutional investors in the
Chinese market. Given the high ownership concentration in China, the incentives for
117

institutional investors to affect firm policies are influenced by the controlling
shareholders’ ownership. It is found that the effects of institutional investors on firm
accounting conservatism are not only determined by their ownership level, but more
importantly determined by the difference in ownership level between them and the
controlling shareholders.
More generally, this chapter enriches studies about the effects of equity investors
on firm accounting conservatism (Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003a) by looking at an important
type of equity investor, institutional investors. It is found that institutional investors’
demands for accounting conservatism are subject to their identities. In particular, local
investors are able to monitor managers’ behaviours directly, so they rely less on
financial numbers for monitoring and thus require a lower level of accounting
conservatism, while foreign institutional investors require a higher level of accounting
conservatism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces
background and develops hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the sample, model and
variables measurement. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results. Section 4.5 presents
results of additional analysis and further evidence and section 4.5 draws some
conclusions.
4.2 Background and hypotheses
4.2.1 Firm accounting conservatism in China
Accounting conservatism is the asymmetric verification threshold for recognizing
good news as gains versus recognizing bad news as losses: the verification threshold for
recognizing good news as gains is higher than recognizing bad news as losses (Basu,
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1997). Conservatism has been applied to China’s firms since July 1985, when the
Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China enacted the Accounting
Regulations for the Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. In the
following three decades, accounting regulations have been evolving and the
conservatism principle has been playing an important role in China’s firms. At the end
of 1992, the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China issued Accounting
Standards for Business Enterprises (1992), which for the first time explicitly required
firms to follow the conservatism principle. Issued in February 2006, Accounting
Standards for Business Enterprises (amended in 2006) treats conservatism as a tool to
reduce information asymmetry, which further emphasizes the importance of the
conservatism principle. Currently, the benefits of accounting conservatism have been
widely documented in terms of improving firm value by reducing information
asymmetry, mitigating agency costs (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Watts, 2003a) and
constraining earnings overstatement (Kwon et al., 2001).
4.2.2 Effects of institutional investors on accounting conservatism
Conservative accounting plays a restraining role over self-dealing behaviours of
managers such as risky investment and overstatement of earnings (Ball, 2001; Watts,
2003a). Accounting conservatism therefore helps reduce agency problems between
managers and shareholders, and this favours the interests of equity holders (Ahmed et
al., 2002; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Lara et al.,
2009; Balakrishnan et al., 2016; Francis et al., 2013). Thus, shareholders intentionally
require a high level of conservative accounting (Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012).
However, the incentives of institutional investors to demand for accounting
conservatism are heterogeneous according to their identities.
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Domestic mutual funds have been recognized as sophisticated investors and are
well informed about the investee firms. They are able to monitor managers’ behaviours
directly, by strengthening the managerial pay-performance relationship or through site
visits (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Hartzell and Starks, 2003;
Ingley et al., 2004; Jiang and Yuan, 2018; Ming et al., 2018). Therefore, domestic
mutual funds may be less dependent on the accounting numbers in conducting
monitoring on managers, and thereby have weaker incentives to demand accounting
conservatism. Thus, mutual funds’ ownership could lower the level of accounting
conservatism.
However, unlike domestic mutual funds, QFIIs are geographically far from the
investee firms, so it is difficult for them to observe and monitor managers’ behaviours
directly. More importantly in China, QFIIs are faced with more severe information
asymmetry due to cultural barriers such as the relationship-based economy and the
existence of various dialects (Chakravarty et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2014; Luong et al.,
2017). Consequently, their direct monitoring over managers’ behaviours becomes even
less straightforward. Therefore, compared with domestic mutual funds, accounting
conservatism, as a governance device, is more effective and important for QFIIs, so
QFIIs tend to monitor managers via accounting numbers, rather than over managers’
behaviours directly. Thus, the first hypothesis is formed as follows:
H1: Domestic mutual funds could lower the level of accounting conservatism, while
QFIIs could increase the level of accounting conservatism.
Furthermore, firm ownership in China is usually concentrated and the controlling
shareholders usually dominate the decisions on information disclosure. To facilitate
their expropriation of other investors, controlling shareholders are reluctant to adopt
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conservative accounting to increase the information transparency (Fan and Wong, 2002;
Cullinan et al., 2012; LaFond, 2005). In such circumstances, accounting conservatism
could be beneficial for diversified minority shareholders as well as outside creditors by
providing timely default alerts (Zhang, 2008; Haw et al., 2014; Nikolaev, 2010).
In China, since the institutional investors are usually non-controlling shareholders,
this chapter argues that their effect on adoption of accounting conservatism is
influenced by the controlling shareholders. This argument is mainly motivated by the
existing studies that examine the influence of multiple large shareholders (MLS). These
studies find that large non-controlling shareholders can monitor the controlling
shareholders’ self-interest behaviours by forming control contestability of the
controlling shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Jiang et al., 2018; Laeven
and Levine, 2007). In the spirit of these studies, it is proposed that the effects of
institutional investors may not only be relevant to their absolute ownership level, but
also subject to the relative ownership level, namely the difference between their
ownership and that of the controlling shareholders. As domestic mutual funds have less
incentive to adopt conservative accounting, it is expected that this effect will be even
stronger when their ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholders. However,
unlike domestic mutual funds, QFIIs are likely to require conservative accounting in
order to exert monitoring. When the ownership of QFIIs is getting closer to that of
controlling shareholders, they are more likely to require a higher level of conservative
accounting. Thus, the second hypothesis is formed:
H2: The negative effects of domestic mutual funds and the positive effects of QFIIs
on accounting conservatism become stronger when their ownership is closer to that of
the controlling shareholders.
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4.3 Data and methodology
4.3.1 Data and sample selection
The sample comprises all the A-share firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2003 to 2015. The sample period
starts from 2003 because the ownership of institutional investors in firms’ annual
reports was not reported until 2003. Following the common procedure, the final sample
for empirical analysis is obtained after excluding firm-year observations flagged with
ST or *ST 19 , from financial industry or with missing information. The final sample
includes 2,757 firms and 17,890 firm-year observations. All the data are obtained from
the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Specifically,
the stock price and stock return are gathered from the “Stock Market Trading” dataset.
Financial and governance information is collected from the “Financial Statement”
dataset and the “Listed Firm Governance” dataset.
4.3.2 Accounting conservatism measurement
For the empirical analysis, this chapter employs the firm-year conservatism
measure, C_Score, developed by Khan and Watts (2009) as the proxy for accounting
conservatism. This method has been used by Chen et al. (2013) in the context of China.
To calculate C_Score, the following annual cross-sectional model is estimated first:
Ei,t/Pi,t-1=(λ0+λ1Sizei,t+λ2Levi,t+λ3MBi,t)+DRi,t(ĸ0+ĸ1Sizei,t+ĸ2Levi,t+ĸ3MBi,t)
+Ri,t(µ0+µ1Sizei,t+µ2Levi,t+µ3MBi,t)
+DRi,t*Ri,t(ʋ0+ʋ1Sizei,t+ʋ2Levi,t+ʋ3MBi,t)+εi,t

(4.1)

19

ST stands for Special Treatment and refers to the listed firms that have had negative net profits for two
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have has negative net profits for three consecutive
years and thus are probably to be delisted from the stock exchanges.
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where E is earnings per share, P is year-end stock price per share, R is yearly buy-andhold return, and DR is a dummy variable that equals 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise.
Size is the natural logarithm of market value of equity, Lev is defined as the sum of total
debt divided by market value of equity, MB is market-to-book ratio. Equation (4.1) is
estimated annually. Annual cross-sectional estimation of model (4.1) results in ʋ0 to ʋ3
being constant across firms but vary over time. The good news timeliness measure is
µ0+µ1Sizei,t+µ2Levi,t+µ3MBi,t, The measure of incremental timeliness for bad news over
good news, or conservatism is ʋ0+ʋ1Sizei,t+ʋ2Levi,t+ʋ3MBi,t, and the total bad news
timeliness is (µ0+µ1Sizei,t+µ2Levi,t+µ3MBi,t)+(ʋ0+ʋ1Sizei,t+ʋ2Levi,t+ʋ3MBi,t). Then,
C_Score can be calculated for each firm-year as:
C_Score=ʋ0+ʋ1Sizei,t+ʋ2Levi,t+ʋ3MBi,t

(4.2)

The firm-level constant coefficients: ʋ0, ʋ1, ʋ2 and ʋ3 that are obtained from
estimation of equation (4.1) are substituted into equation (4.2). Then C_Score varies
across firms through cross-sectional variation in the firm-year characteristics (Size, Lev
and MB).
4.3.3 Institutional investors and ownership measurement
To test the effects of institutional ownership on accounting conservatism (H1), two
variables are constructed: The first variable is Mutual, which is defined as the
percentage of common shares held by domestic mutual funds, and the second variable is
QFII, which is defined as the percentage of common shares held by QFIIs.
To test the ownership difference between institutional investors and the controlling
shareholders on accounting conservatism (H2), this chapter considers three measures to
denote the ownership differences following the existing studies (Laeven and Levine,
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2007; Attig et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2018). Firstly, two variables are constructed to
represent the difference between the institutional investors’ ownership level and that of
the controlling shareholders: The first variable is Mutualdiff, which is defined as the
controlling shareholders’ ownership level minus that of the domestic mutual funds. The
second variable is QFIIdiff, which is defined as the controlling shareholders’ ownership
level minus the QFIIs’ ownership. Secondly, this chapter considers the ratio of
institutional investors’ ownership to that of the controlling shareholder, and constructs
two variables: The first variable is Mutualratio, which is the ratio of domestic mutual
funds’ ownership level to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. The second variable
is QFIIratio, which is the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership level to the controlling
shareholder’s ownership. Thirdly, this chapter considers an ownership dispersion
measure, and constructs two variables: The first variable is Mutualdisp, which is
defined as (the controlling shareholder’s ownership - mutual funds’ ownership) / (the
controlling shareholder’s ownership + mutual funds’ ownership). The second variable is
QFIIdisp, which is defined as (the controlling shareholder’s ownership - QFIIs’
ownership) / (the controlling shareholder’s ownership + QFIIs’ ownership).
4.3.4 Model specification
To test the effects of institutional investors on firm accounting conservatism, this
chapter develops the following regression model:
C_Scorei,t=α0+α1Mutuali,t+ α2QFIIi,t+ α3Asseti,t+ α4ROAi,t+ α5Boardi,t+α6Indepi,t
+ α7Leveragei,t+ α8SOEi,t+ α9Otherinsi,t+ Dummy(year)+εi,t

(4.3)

where C_Score is the measure of accounting conservatism as defined in section 4.3.2.
Mutual is the percentage of shares held by domestic mutual funds. QFII represents the
124

percentage of shares held by QFIIs. These two ownership level measures are put in one
regression, which enables direct comparison between domestic mutual funds and QFIIs.
α1 and α2 are used to test Hypothesis H1. According to H1, α1 is expected to be
significantly negative and α2 is expected to be significantly positive.

Table 4.1 Variable definition
Variables
Definitions
Panel A: Firm accounting conservatism
C_Score
The same as that defined in the study of Khan and Watts (2009)
Panel B: Institutional ownership
The percentage of shares owned by domestic mutual funds in a
Mutual
firm.
QFII
The percentage of shares owned by QFIIs in a firm
The difference between mutual funds’ ownership and the
Mutualdiff
controlling shareholder’s ownership
The difference between QFIIs’ ownership and the controlling
QFIIdiff
shareholder’s ownership
The ratio of mutual funds’ ownership to the largest shareholder’s
Mutualratio
ownership
The ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the largest shareholder’s
QFIIratio
ownership
(The largest shareholder’s ownership-mutual funds’ ownership) /
Mutualdisp
(The largest shareholder’s ownership + mutual funds’ ownership)
(The largest shareholder’s ownership-QFIIs’ ownership) / (The
QFIIdisp
largest shareholder’s ownership + QFIIs’ ownership)
Panel C: Other variables
A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is ultimately
SOE
controlled by the government and 0 otherwise
The sum of the percentage of shares owned by other institutional
investors (banks, insurance companies, social security funds,
Otherins
brokers, entrust companies, and financial companies) in a firm.
Board size (Board)
Nature logarithm of the number of directors on the board
Independent directors
(Independent)
Proportion of independent directors on the board
lev
Total debts/total assets in market value
Size
Nature logarithm of total assets in market value
Analyst
The number of stock analysts
Asset
Natural logarithm of firm total assets.
Leverage
The ratio of total debt to total assets
ROA
Net income/total assets
A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is included into
Shanghai 180 Index or Shenzhen Component Index and 0
Indexdom
otherwise.
A dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm is included in MSCI
MSCI
China A inclusion index, and 0 otherwise
NCSKEW
A skewness-based measure of crash risk
Controlling
The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder
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In addition, this chapter also includes several control variables in the model. The
variable definitions are listed in Table 4.1. Specifically: Asset is the natural logarithm of
firm total assets; ROA is return on assets, defined as the ratio of net income to firm total
assets; Board is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board; Indep is
the percentage of independent directors; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets;
SOE is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm is controlled by the
government and 0 otherwise; Otherins denotes the sum of ownership by all the other
institutional investors (including banks, insurance companies, pension funds, brokers,
entrust companies, social securities, and financial companies). Year dummy variables
are included to control for the year fixed effects. To address the issue that institutional
ownership and the level of accounting conservatism can be determined jointly by some
unobserved firm-specific variables, this chapter estimates equations with firm fixed
effects model.
To test Hypothesis H2, equation (4.3) is re-estimated by replacing the ownership of
institutional investors with the ownership differences between institutional investors and
the controlling shareholder defined in section 4.3.3. Empirically, three difference-based
regressions are carried out. In the first regression, Mutual and QFII are replaced by
Mutualdiff and QFIIdiff respectively. In the second regression, Mutual and QFII are
replaced by Mutualratio and QFIIratio respectively. In the third regression, Mutual and
QFII are replaced by Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp respectively. Importantly, to mitigate the
concern that these ownership difference measures may just capture the level of
controlling shareholder’s ownership, this chapter also includes two new control
variables in each regression: Mutuald and QFIId, which indicate the presence of mutual
funds and QFIIs respectively. Specifically, Mutuald is a dummy variable which equals
to 1 if there are mutual funds as shareholders in a firm, and 0 otherwise. QFIId is a
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dummy variable which equals to 1 if there are QFIIs as shareholders in a firm, and 0
otherwise. The reason that these two dummy variables are included as control variables
rather than the ownership level of mutual funds (Mutual) and QFIIs (QFII), is because
of the collinearity issue caused by the fact that the sum of Mutual and Mutualdiff equals
the sum of QFII and QFIIdiff. All the other control variables have the same definitions
with those in equation (4.3).
4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical
analyses. Panel A shows the statistics for accounting conservatism. Note that the
average level of conservatism (C_Score) is 0.049, which is comparable to 0.062
reported by Li (2015) for China’s firms. Panel B shows the statistics for institutional
ownership. It is noted that among the firms that have domestic mutual funds as
shareholders, the average mutual fund ownership is 4.028%. Among the firms that have
QFIIs as shareholders, the average QFII ownership is 1.387%. These numbers are quite
consistent with existing studies (Firth et al., 2016). The statistics for ownership
difference measures show that: the mean values of Mutualdiff and QFIIdiff are 34.061%
and 39.542%, respectively; the mean values of Mutualratio and QFIIratio are 13.902%
and 4.273%, respectively; and the mean values of Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp are 79.169%
and 87.293%, respectively. These statistics suggest that institutional investors are
mostly non-controlling shareholders and the large variation of ownership difference
measures enables the investigation of the impact of ownership differences on
accounting conservatism. Panel C shows the statistics for corporate governance and
firm characteristics. Note that the average board size, number of independent directors
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and leverage ratio are 9.078, 3.288 and 45.165%, respectively. The average controlling
shareholder’s ownership is 37.417%, which suggests that there is a high ownership
concentration in China’s firms. Panel D shows the distribution of the sample firms, of
which 51.33% are SOEs and 48.67% are non-SOEs.

Table 4.2 Summary statistics
Variable

Obs.

Firm
Mean Std.Dev. 25%
Median 75%
Max
number
Panel A: Accounting conservatism
C_score
17,890
2,757
0.049 0.252
0
0.039
0.090
0.650
Panel B: Institutional ownership
B.1: Full sample
Mutual (%)
17,890
2,757
2.935 4.074
0
1.140
4.293
43.800
QFII (%)
17,890
2,757
0.151 1.112
0
0
0
60.320
Otherins (%)
17,890
2,757
2.145 3.764
0.160
0.999
2.730
73.030
Mutualdiff (%)
17,890
2,757
34.482 16.537
21.905
32.910
46.170
89.990
QFIIdiff (%)
17,890
2,757
37.266 15.710
24.780
35.625
48.760
89.990
Mutualratio (%)
17,890
2,757
10.127 17.709
0
3.166
12.547
330.198
QFIIratio(%)
17,890
2,757
0.465 2.862
0
0
0
9.765
Mutuldisp(%)
17,890
2,757
84.825 20.856
77.704
93.861
100
100
QFIIdisp(%)
17,890
2,757
92.011 10.880
88.298
96.615
100
100
B.2: Observations of non-zero values of mutual funds/QFIIs’ ownership
Mutual (%)
13,033
2,588
4.028 4.286
0.850
2.465
5.840
43.800
QFII (%)
1,948
882
1.387 3.107
0.390
0.800
1.570
60.320
Others (%)
13,873
2,683
2.773 4.071
0.680
1.610
3.400
73.030
Mutualdiff (%)
13,033
2,588
34.061 16.989
21.059
32.710
46.240
88.900
QFIIdiff (%)
1,948
882
39.542 16.454
26.445
39.130
51.576
88.300
Mutualratio (%)
13,033
2,588
13.902 19.443
0
3.166
12.547
330.198
QFIIratio (%)
1,948
882
4.273 7.681
0.960
2.157
4.668
100
Mutualdisp (%)
13,033
2,588
79.169 21.893
70.020
87.000
95.497
99.989
QFIIdisp (%)
1,948
882
87.293 13.511
82.002
91.704
97.126
99.932
Panel C: Corporate governance and firm characteristics
Board Size
17,890
2,757
9.078 1.894
8
9
9
19
Independent
17,890
2,757
3.288 0.683
3
3
4
8
Directors
Leverage (%)
17,890
2,757
45.165 20.932
28.865
45.769
61.570
89.740
Asset (million)
17,890
2,757
11,600 61,300
1,370
2,810
6,720
2,410,000
ROA (%)
17,890
2,757
4.151 5.341
1.589
3.921
6.796
19.268
Controlling (%)
17,890
2,757
37.417 15.697
24.940
35.760
48.910
89.990
Panel D: Firm type distributions
SOEs
Non-SOEs
Observations
9183(51.33%)
8707(48.67%)
This table reports the summary statistics of all the variables for the full sample from 2003 to 2005. Panel
A is summary statistics for accounting conservatism (C_Score). Panel B reports the summary statistics for
institutional ownership. Panel C is summary statistics for variables representing corporate governance and
firm characteristics. Panel D is summary for firm distributions between state-owned-enterprises (SOEs)
and non-state-owned-enterprises (non-SOEs). All the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table
4.1. The value of variables is in terms of China’s currency, the RMB.
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4.4.2 Institutional investors and accounting conservatism
The results of estimating equation (4.3) are reported in Table 4.3, and validate the
first hypothesis (H1). The dependent variable is accounting conservatism (C_Score).
Table 4.3 reports the results of institutional investors’ effects on firm accounting
conservatism with and without considering the additional effects of control variables.

Table 4.3 Effects of institutional ownership on accounting conservatism
Dependent variable: C_Score
(2)
(3)
-0.081**
-0.151**
(-1.98)
(-2.52)
QFII
0.332**
1.356***
(2.38)
(3.51)
Asset
0.002
0.008
(1.35)
(1.32)
ROA
0.017
0.137***
(0.50)
(2.61)
Board
-0.018*
-0.038
(-1.79)
(-1.57)
Independent
-0.023
-0.009
(-0.70)
(-0.14)
Leverage
-0.165***
-0.201***
(-16.29)
(-9.99)
SOE
0.009***
-0.024
(2.64)
(-1.43)
Otherins
0.004
-0.060
(0.11)
(-0.92)
Constant
0.149***
0.078
(3.73)
(0.58)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry fixed effects
No
Yes
No
Firm fixed effects
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
17,890
17,890
17,890
R-squared
0.309
0.330
0.347
This table reports the results of institutional investors’ ownership on firm accounting conservatism.
Mutual

(1)
-0.138**
(-2.31)
1.437***
(3.56)

Dependent variable is C_score. Specifically, column (1) shows results of using firm-fixed effects model
without including other control variables except for year dummies. Column (2) shows results of using
ordinary least square (OLS) model after including a set of control variables as well as year and industry
fixed effects. Column (3) shows results of using firm-fixed effects model after including a set of control
variables. Mutual refers to domestic mutual funds’ ownership. QFII refers to QFIIs’ ownership. All the
other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in
parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Specifically, column (1) reports the results of using a firm-fixed effects model without
controlling other variables except for year dummies. Column (2) reports the results of
an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression after including a set of control variables in
equation (4.3) as well as industry fixed effects. Column (3) reports the results of using
firm-fixed effects model after including all the control variables in equation (4.3). The
overall results indicate that the estimated coefficients of the key variables are consistent,
so this chapter mainly focuses on the third column for an interpretation.
In column (3), it is observed that the estimated coefficient of Mutual (-0.151) is
negative and significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.52). By contrast, the estimated
coefficient of QFII (1.356) is positive and significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.51).
These results suggest that accounting conservatism is a decreasing function of domestic
mutual fund ownership, while it is a positive function of QFII ownership. The results
support hypothesis H1 that domestic mutual funds have negative effects on firm
accounting conservatism, while foreign institutional investors have positive effects on
conservatism.
The results of testing the effects of ownership difference between institutional
investors and the controlling shareholders (H2) are reported in Table 4.4. Column (1)
shows the results using ownership difference proxies, column (2) shows the results
using ownership ratio proxies and column (3) shows the results using ownership
dispersion proxies. In column (1), it is found that the estimated coefficient of Mutualdiff
is positive and significant at the 1% level (coefficient is 0.181, and t-value is 2.91).
However, the estimated coefficient of QFIIdiff is negative and significant at the 1%
level (coefficient is -0.246, and t-value is -3.26). Column (2) shows that the coefficient
of Mutualratio is -0.029 and is significant at the 10% level (t-value is -1.80), while the
130

Table 4.4 Effects of ownership difference between institutional investors and controlling
shareholders on accounting conservatism
Dependent variable: C_Score
Mutualdiff
QFIIdiff

(1)
0.181***
(2.91)
-0.246***
(-3.26)

Mutualratio
QFIIratio

(2)

(3)

-0.029*
(-1.80)
0.251**
(2.22)

Mutualdisp

0.169***
(2.75)
QFIIdisp
-0.297**
(-2.45)
Mutuald
0.001
-0.002
-0.001
(0.15)
(-0.35)
(-0.25)
QFIId
0.014*
0.007
0.007
(1.79)
(0.80)
(0.82)
Asset
0.009
0.008
0.008
(1.43)
(1.32)
(1.33)
ROA
0.154***
0.131**
0.130**
(2.89)
(2.50)
(2.50)
Board
-0.039
-0.038
-0.038
(-1.59)
(-1.54)
(-1.54)
Independent
-0.011
-0.008
-0.008
(-0.17)
(-0.13)
(-0.13)
Leverage
-0.199***
-0.203***
-0.203***
(-9.86)
(-10.07)
(-10.04)
SOE
-0.024
-0.025
-0.024
(-1.41)
(-1.45)
(-1.45)
Otherins
-0.071
-0.061
-0.059
(-1.07)
(-0.93)
(-0.90)
Constant
0.090
0.075
0.202
(0.66)
(0.55)
(1.35)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
17,890
17,890
17,890
R-squared
0.346
0.346
0.346
This table reports the results of effects of ownership difference to that of the controlling shareholders on
firm accounting conservatism. Mutualdiff represents the difference between domestic mutual funds’
ownership and the controlling shareholder’s ownership. QFIIdiff represents the difference between QFIIs’
ownership and the controlling shareholder’s ownership. Mutualratio represents the ratio of mutual funds’
ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. QFIIratio represents the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership
to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. Mutualdisp represents the difference of ownership between
mutual funds and the controlling shareholder, and then scaled by their sum. QFIIdisp represents the
difference of ownership between QFIIs and the controlling shareholder, and then scaled by their sum. All
the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics
(in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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coefficient of QFIIratio is 0.251 and significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.22). In
column (3), the coefficient of Mutuldisp is 0.169 and significant at the 1% level, while
the coefficient of QFIIdisp is -0.297 and significant at the 5% level. These results
indicate that domestic mutual funds have greater incentive toward lower conservatism
when their ownership is close to that of the controlling shareholders, while QFIIs tend
to increase conservatism when their ownership is close to that of the controlling
shareholders. The results support hypothesis H2.
Overall, the results are in line with the previous argument. Domestic mutual funds
and QFIIs have contrary influence on firm accounting conservatism. The reason is that
unlike domestic mutual funds, QFIIs are faced with more cultural challenges in
observing managers’ actions directly, so QFIIs are more dependent on conservative
financial numbers to monitor/ discipline managerial behaviour. Consequently, QFIIs
have more demand for conservative accounting. These results are consistent with
previous research about the difference in influence of domestic and foreign investors
(Ferreira et al., 2017; Kang and Kim, 2010).
4.4.3 Alternative measure of accounting conservatism
To test the robustness of the results, this study also employs the accruals and cash
flows (ACF) based accounting conservatism measure, suggested by Ball and
Shivakumar (2005). This measurement has also been used in the study by Lara et al.
(2009). Ball and Shivakumar (2005) propose the following model:
Accri,t=β0+β1DCFOi,t+β2CFOi,t+β3CFOi,t*DCFOi,t+µi,t

(4.4)

where Accr denotes annual total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary items
minus cash flow from operations. CFO is operating cash flow. DCFO is a dummy
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variable that equals to 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise. Accr and CFO are both
scaled by average total assets. In this model, β3 represents ACF-based accounting
conservatism; a higher value of β3 corresponds to higher level of accounting
conservatism.
In the spirit of Lara et al. (2009), this study includes interactive terms in equation
(4.4) and establishes the following model:
Accri,t= θ0+ θ1DCFOi,t+ θ 2CFOi,t+ θ 3CFOi,t*DCFOi,t+ θ4Mutuali,t
+ θ5Mutuali,t*CFOi,t + θ6Mutuali,t*DCFOi,t+ θ7Mutuali,t*CFOi,t*DCFOi,t
+ θ8QFIIi,t+ θ9QFIIi,t*CFOi,t + θ10QFIIi,t*DCFOi,t
+ θ11QFIIi,t*CFOi,t*DCFOi,t+µi,t

(4.5)

where all the variables have the same definitions as those in previous equations. θ7 and
θ11 reflect the effects of mutual funds and QFIIs on accounting conservatism,
respectively. According to H1, θ7 is expected to be significantly negative, while θ11 is
expected to be significantly positive.
The results of estimating equation (4.5) are reported in Table 4.5. Column (1)
shows results of focusing on ownership level of institutional investors and column (2) to
(4) show results of focusing on the difference of ownership by institutional investors to
the controlling shareholders. This chapter is mainly concerned with the coefficients of
interactive terms that reflect the effects of domestic mutual funds and QFIIs on firm
accounting conservatism. In column (1), it is observed that the coefficient of
Mutual*CFO*DCFO (-12.858) is negative and significant at the 10% level (t-value is
1.87). The coefficient of QFII*CFO*DCFO (40.813) is positive and significant at the
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Table 4.5 Results of using accrual and cash flows-based measurement for conservatism
Dependent variable: Accr ( annual total accruals)
Ownership level
(1)
Mutual
1.194***
(7.40)
Mutual* CFO *DCFO
-12.858*
(-1.87)
QFII
0.649
(0.76)
QFII* CFO *DCFO
40.813*
(1.90)
Mutualdiff
Mutualdiff * CFO *DCFO
QFIIdiff
QFIIdiff* CFO *DCFO
Mutualratio
Mutualratio* CFO *DCFO
QFIIratio
QFIIratio* CFO *DCFO

(2)

Ownership difference
(3)

(4)

-1.089***
(-6.83)
12.832**
(2.47)
1.425***
(7.70)
-16.702***
(-2.75)
0.210***
(5.28)
-2.849**
(-2.26)
0.181
(0.95)
16.543***
(2.77)

Mutualdisp

-0.098
(-0.79)
Mutualdisp* CFO *DCFO
11.687***
(3.71)
QFIIdisp
-0.204
(-0.86)
QFIIdisp* CFO *DCFO
-17.293***
(-2.65)
Constant and other controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
16,507
16,507
16,507
16,507
R-squared
0.082
0.089
0.078
0.081
This table reports the results of institutional investors’ ownership on firm accounting conservatism using
accrual and cash flows based measurement. The estimation method is firm fixed effects model.
Dependent variable is annual total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary items minus cash
flow from operations. Mutual refers to domestic mutual funds’ ownership. CFO is operating cash flow.
DCFO is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise. Accr and CFO are both
scaled by average total assets. Constant and the control variables (other less concerned variables in
equation (4.4)) are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error
clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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10% level (t-value is 1.90). These results provide evidence consistent with Table 4.3,
that domestic mutual funds have negative effects on firm accounting conservatism,
while QFIIs have positive effects on accounting conservatism. With similar analysis, the
results of the interactive terms in columns (2) to (4) suggest that domestic mutual funds
have increased incentive to lower the accounting conservatism level when their
ownership level is relatively close to that of the controlling shareholder, while QFIIs
have a stronger demand for accounting conservatism when their ownership level is
closer to that of the controlling shareholder. Overall, the previous findings are robust
when using accrual and cash flows-based measurement for conservatism.
4.4.4 Endogeneity concern
The previous results using a firm fixed effects model can address endogeneity
issues caused by the omitted unobservable firm-level variables. However, there is still
an endogeneity issue: sample selection bias because institutional investors may tend to
invest in those firms that implement a particular accounting conservatism policy.
Therefore, to address this endogeneity issue and check the robustness of the previous
results, this study employs the propensity score matching (PSM) method and the
Heckman two-stage model to re-estimate the parameters of the empirical models.
First, previous regressions are re-estimated using a PSM sample. A sample is
constructed in which the treatment sample and control sample are matched by some
similar firm characteristics. In this matching process, for each firm-year observation in
the treatment sample (i.e., observations with both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs as
shareholders), this chapter identifies an observation in the control sample (i.e.,
observations with neither domestic mutual funds nor QFIIs as shareholders) which has
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Table 4.6 Results of addressing endogeneity issues using PSM matching sample
Panel A: Comparison of firm characteristics between treatment firms and control firms
(1)
(2)
Treatment firms
Control firms
Asset
22.455
22.474
ROA
0.061
0.059
Board
2.329
2.337
Independent
0.365
0.364
Leverage
0.453
0.459
SOE
0.633
0.648
Others
0.020
0.019
Panel B: Results of using PSM matching sample
Dependent variable: C_Score
Ownership level
Ownership difference
(1)
(2)
(3)
Mutual
-0.388*
(-1.93)
QFII
1.263*
(1.72)
Mutualdiff
0.307*
(1.76)
QFIIdiff
-0.349*
(-1.69)
Mutualratio
-0.080*
(-1.79)
QFIIratio
0.276*
(1.77)
Mutualdisp
QFIIdisp

(3)
Difference
-0.019(-0.40)
0.002(0.84)
-0.008(-1.10)
0.001(0.29)
-0.006(-0.91)
-0.015(-0.85)
0.001(0.40)

(4)

0.220**
(2.14)
-0.380*
(-1.95)
Yes

Constant
and
Yes
Yes
Yes
controls
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
3,174
3,174
3,174
3,174
R-squared
0.317
0.303
0.311
0.310
This table shows the results of addressing endogeneity issues using PSM matching sample. Specifically,
Panel A shows the comparison of firm characteristics between firms which have mutual funds and QFIIs
as shareholders and control firms. T-tests are conducted to test for differences in mean values between
firms which have mutual funds and QFIIs as shareholders and control firms. The t-statistics are reported
in parentheses in Column (3). Panel B shows the regressions results of using PSM matching sample.
Constant and all the control variables in equation (4.3) are included in each regression and all the other
variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) in other regressions are
computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

the same/nearest propensity score of firm characteristics including firm size, ROA,
board size, proportion of independent directors, leverage ratio, the type of ultimate
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controlling shareholder and ownership of other institutional investors. Second, the
matching sample obtained from PSM method is used to re-estimate the equations. The
results of using the PSM method are reported in Table 4.6. Panel A compares firm
characteristics between the treatment sample and the control sample. It is suggested that
these characteristics are unlikely to drive the difference of accounting conservatism in
firms with and without domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders. This validates
the construction of matching sample. Panel B shows the regression results using this
matching sample. All the results for the key variables are consistent with those in Table
4.3, which confirms that the main results are robust.
In addition, this chapter also uses the Heckman two-stage method to address any
potential sample selection bias issue. The first stage of the procedure involves an
analysis where the ownership of domestic mutual funds and QFIIs are separately
regressed against the control variables from equation (4.3). To meet the exclusion
restrictions, instrumental variables are included in each regression that are not included
in the second-stage regression. The regression regarding domestic mutual funds
includes an index-inclusion dummy variable (Indexdom). Indexdom is equal to one if
the firm is included in the Shanghai 180 Index or the Shenzhen Component Index, and 0
otherwise. In the regression regarding QFIIs, this method follows Luong et al. (2017)
and includes an international index inclusion, the MSCI China A inclusion index. A
dummy variable (MSCI) is constructed which equals to 1 if a firm is included in the
MSCI China A inclusion index, and 0 otherwise. The inverse mills ratio (LambdaMutual
and LambdaQFII) is obtained from the first stage and is included as an independent
variable in the second stage regression analysis of accounting conservatism. First stage
results are given in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.7 and the variables of interest of the
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Table 4.7 Results of addressing endogeneity issues using Heckman two-stage method
Dependent variable
Indexdom
MSCI
Mutual
QFII

First stage
Mutual
QFII
(1)
(2)
0.008***
(2.66)
0.001**
(2.27)

(3)

Second stage
C_Score
(4)
(5)

-0.283***
(-4.62)
1.260***
(3.53)

Mutualdiff

0.216***
(4.01)
-0.672**
(-2.40)

QFIIdiff
Mutualratio

-0.041***
(-3.04)
0.241***
(2.59)

QFIIratio
Mutualdisp
QFIIdisp
LambdaMutual
LambdaQFII

(6)

3.592**
(2.52)
-2.718***
(-3.17)
Yes
Yes
Yes
17,890

20.966
(1.39)
13.736***
(11.88)
Yes
Yes
Yes
17,890

-3.714**
(-2.44)
1.383***
(12.08)
Yes
Yes
Yes
17,890

0.176***
(2.92)
-0.287**
(-2.44)
-3.696*
(-1.90)
1.382
(1.26)
Yes
Yes
Yes
17,890

Constant and controls
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
17,890
17,890
F-value
28.88
5.89
R-squared
0.154
0.009
0.356
0.353
0.353
0.353
This table shows the results of addressing endogeneity issues using Heckman two stage method.
Specifically, column (1) and column (2) are the results of the first stage. Column (3) and column (4) are
results of the second stage. Indexdom is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm is included in
Shanghai 180 Index or Shenzhen Component Index, and 0 otherwise. MSCI is a dummy variable which
equals to 1 if a firm is included in MSCI China A Inclusion Index, and 0 otherwise. Constant and all the
control variables in equation (4.3) are included in each regression and all the other variables’ definitions
are the same as in Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) in other regressions are computed using
robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.

second stage are given in columns (3) to (6) of Table 4.7. From the first stage, it is
found that domestic mutual funds are more likely to invest in firms which are included
in the Shanghai 180 Index or the Shenzhen Component Index, and QFIIs are more
138

likely to invest in firms which are included in the MSCI China A inclusion index. Then,
in the second-stage results, it is observed that most of the coefficients for LambdaMutual
and LambdaQFII are significant, indicating that sample selection bias and the
endogeneity issue might exist in the previous analysis. After correcting for these
endogeneity issues, the ownership level of domestic mutual funds still has negative
effects on accounting conservatism, while QFIIs’ ownership level has positive effects.
Both the negative effects of domestic mutual funds and the positive effects of QFIIs are
stronger when their ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholders.
4.5 Additional analysis and further evidence
4.5.1 The effects of state ownership
China’s firms can be classified into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-stateowned enterprises (non-SOEs) based on the identity of the controlling shareholders.
SOEs are firms ultimately controlled by the government, and non-SOEs are firms which
are controlled by non-government entities. It is expected that the influence of
institutional investors on accounting conservatism would be weaker in SOEs than in
non-SOEs for the following reasons: Under the current Chinese political system, the
appointment of managers in SOEs is usually decided by administrative authorities (Fan
et al., 2013), so managers are more likely to make decisions following government
policies. Therefore, managers’ behaviour is less likely to be monitored or affected by
other non-controlling shareholders. Consequently, the direct monitoring by institutional
investors would be less efficient in SOEs. Therefore, the negative effects of domestic
mutual funds on accounting conservatism may become weaker in SOEs. In addition,
SOEs are under severe control from the government, which makes them more like
government institutions that have multiple objectives such as maintaining social
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stability plus political objectives, rather than maximizing shareholder value. In this case,
firm policies, including the adoption of conservative accounting are less likely to be
influenced by other shareholders. Thus, in this section it is proposed that the effects of
both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs on firm accounting conservatism would be
weaker in SOEs than in non-SOEs.

Table 4.8 Effects of state ownership
Dependent variable: C_Score
Sample
(1)
Mutualdiff
0.019
(0.20)
QFIIdiff
-0.070
(-0.61)
Mutualratio
QFIIratio
Mutualdisp
QFIIdisp

SOEs
(2)

(3)

0.016
(0.71)
0.238*
(1.81)

(4)
0.337***
(4.14)
-0.443***
(-4.81)

Non-SOEs
(5)

(6)

-0.062***
(-2.78)
0.429**
(2.01)
0.116
(1.48)
-0.264*
(-1.73)
Yes

0.333***
(3.03)
-0.573***
(-2.63)
Yes

Constant
and
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
controls
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
9,183
9,183
9,183
8,707
8,707
8,707
R-squared
0.334
0.334
0.334
0.406
0.405
0.405
This table shows the results of examining the effects of state ownership. The estimation method is firm
fixed effects model. Dependent variable is C_score. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) are results of testing
SOEs. Columns (4) to (6) are results of testing non-SOEs. Constant and all the control variables in
equation (4.3) are included in each regression and all the other variables’ definitions are the same as in
Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

To provide evidence of this, the baseline regressions are repeated among SOEs and
non-SOEs. The results of key variables are reported in Table 4.8. Columns (1) to (3) are
results using the SOE subsample, and columns (4) to (6) are results using the non-SOE
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subsample. It is observed that all the coefficients of key variables are significant in the
non-SOEs subsample; while in the SOE subsample the ratio and dispersion proxies are
significant only at the marginal level, which suggests that both the negative effects of
domestic mutual funds and the positive effects of QFIIs are more pronounced in nonSOEs. These results support the main argument of this chapter that the requirement of
institutional investors for conservative accounting is subject to the identities of the
controlling shareholders, and is also dependent on the efficiency of direct monitoring.
Another possible reason for the weaker effects of institutional investors on accounting
conservatism may be that SOEs are favoured by the government with soft credit
constraints and government funding support, so creditors have less concern about the
default risk of SOEs (Chen et al., 2010). As the monitoring initiative from creditors is
weaker, the incentives for domestic mutual funds to require accounting conservatism
become stronger. Overall, the results are in line with the literature about the weakening
effects of state ownership on institutional investors’ impact in China (Firth et al., 2010;
Huang and Zhu, 2015).
4.5.2 The effects of ownership concentration
Based on the main argument and previous evidence, the effects of institutional
investors on accounting conservatism are subject to their ability to directly monitor the
behaviour of managers, and more importantly are also influenced by their contestability
of the controlling shareholders. It is thus expected that the influence of institutional
investors would be more significant when there is a higher level of ownership
concentration. Therefore, this chapter primarily proposes that the main results regarding
the influence of institutional investors would be more significant in firms with a higher
level of ownership concentration. To provide evidence of this, the sample is divided into
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two groups: one group includes firms with higher level of ownership concentration, and
the other group includes firms with lower level of ownership concentration. A firm is
identified as with higher level of ownership concentration if the controlling
shareholder’s ownership is larger than the mean value of the full sample, and a firm is
identified as with lower level of ownership concentration if the controlling
shareholder’s ownership is less than the mean value.

Table 4.9 Effects of ownership concentration
Dependent variable: C_Score
Sample
Firms where ownership is more
concentrated
(1)
(2)
(3)
Mutualdiff
0.269***
(2.70)
QFIIdiff
-0.428***
(-3.25)
Mutualratio
-0.087**
(-1.98)
QFIIratio
0.540*
(1.94)
Mutualdisp
0.359**
(2.33)
QFIIdisp
-0.610**
(-2.01)
Constant and controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
8,948
8,948
8,948
R-squared
0.329
0.329
0.329
This table shows the results of examining the effects of ownership

Firms where ownership is less
concentrated
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.147*
(1.68)
-0.156
(-1.19)
-0.027
(-1.52)
0.139
(0.99)
0.078
(1.02)
-0.120
(-0.79)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
8,942
8,942
8,942
0.374
0.374
0.374
concentration. The estimation method

is firm fixed effects model. Dependent variable is C_score. Columns (1) to (3) are the results of using
firms where ownership is more concentrated as the sample. Columns (4) to (5) are the results of using
firms where ownership is less concentrated as the sample. Constant and all the control variables in
equation (4.3) are included in each regression and all the other variables’ definitions are the same as in
Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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The baseline regressions are repeated for the firms with the higher and lower levels
of ownership concentration. The results are presented in Table 4.9. The structure is
consistent with that of Table 4.8. Columns (1) to (3) are the results of using firms where
ownership is more concentrated. Columns (4) to (6) are the results of using firms where
ownership is less concentrated. It is observed that all the results for key variables are
significant in firms with the higher level of ownership concentration, while almost all of
the coefficients in firms with lower level of ownership concentration are not significant,
except that the coefficient of Mutualdiff is just marginally significant (t-value is 1.68).
These results indicate that the negative effects of domestic mutual funds on accounting
conservatism are more significant when ownership is more concentrated. These results
support the previous argument and further verify that the demand by mutual funds in
China for accounting conservatism differs from that in developed countries.
4.5.3 The effects of firm information asymmetry
Based on the argument above, the effects of institutional investors on firm
accounting conservatism are subject to their direct monitoring capacity and
effectiveness. It is difficult for institutional investors to monitor managers’ behaviour
directly when information asymmetry is severe (Prendergast, 2002). Consequently,
institutional investors may rely more on financial numbers for monitoring. It is
proposed that the negative effects of domestic mutual funds on conservatism would be
less significant in firms where there is more severe information asymmetry. Because the
presence of analysts could improve the information environment (Healy and Palepu,
2001), analyst coverage is used here as the measurement of information asymmetry.
Firms covered by more stock analysts are believed to be more informationally
transparent.
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To provide evidence, the sample firms are divided into two groups: one group
includes firms that have less severe information asymmetry, and the other group
includes firms that have more severe information asymmetry. Firms of which the
analyst number is more than the mean value of the sample are identified as having lower
level of information asymmetry. Firms of which the analyst number is less than the
mean value are identified as having higher level of information asymmetry. The
baseline regressions are then repeated among these two groups. The results are reported
in Table 4.10. Consistent with the structure of Table 4.8, columns (1) to (3) are results

Table 4.10 Effects of information asymmetry
Dependent variable: C_Score
Sample
Firms with more analyst coverage
Firms with less analyst coverage
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutualdiff
0.316***
0.051
(4.26)
(0.34)
QFIIdiff
-0.433***
-0.081
(-3.74)
(-0.52)
Mutualratio
-0.056***
-0.010
(-2.61)
(-0.30)
QFIIratio
0.181
0.451*
(1.35)
(1.77)
Mutualdisp
0.203***
0.200
(3.03)
(1.51)
QFIIdisp
-0.309**
-0.393
(-2.33)
(-1.51)
Constant and controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
8,843
8,843
8,843
8,705
8,705
8,705
R-squared
0.469
0.468
0.468
0.312
0.313
0.312
This table shows the results of examining the effects of firm information asymmetry. The estimation
method is firm fixed effects model. Dependent variable is C_score. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) are
results of testing firms which have more analyst coverage. Columns (4) to (6) are results of testing firms
which have less analyst coverage. Constant and all the control variables in equation (4.3) are included in
each regression and all the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in
parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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for firms with lower of information asymmetry, and columns (4) to (6) are results for
firms with higher information asymmetry. It is observed that all the coefficients of
domestic mutual funds measures are significant at the 1% level in firms with more
analyst coverage, while they are not significant in firms with less analyst coverage. This
indicates that the negative effects of domestic mutual funds’ ownership on accounting
conservatism are stronger when there is a lower level of information asymmetry. In
addition, the more significant results of QFIIs in firms with more analyst coverage
reflect that decreased information asymmetry also facilitates QFIIs in positively
promoting accounting conservatism.
Overall, these results are consistent with the primary argument that as there is a
lower level of information asymmetry in firms where there is more stock analyst
tracking, and hence the direct monitoring of domestic mutual funds is more efficient.
Thus, domestic mutual funds are more likely to rely on direct monitoring over managers’
behaviour than on financial numbers, thus their negative influence on conservatism
becomes stronger.
4.5.4 Alternative explanation of domestic mutual funds’ effects
Based on the results above, this chapter argues that domestic mutual funds have
negative effects on accounting conservatism. The reason is that domestic mutual funds
are able to improve the corporate governance level by directly monitoring managers’
behaviours, hence they are less dependent on financial numbers. However, there could
be an alternative explanation of domestic mutual funds’ negative effects on accounting
conservatism in that domestic mutual funds may collude with the controlling
shareholders in lowering the conservatism level for their private benefit. To test this
alternative explanation, this chapter examines the effects of domestic mutual funds on
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stock price crash risk. If domestic mutual funds collude with the controlling
shareholders to not adopt conservative accounting, then bad news will be less likely to
be recognized in a timely manner, leading to a higher probability of crash risk (Jin and
Myers, 2006). Therefore, the presence of domestic mutual funds could increase the level
of stock price crash risk. Empirically, this chapter employs a skewness-based measure
of crash risk (NSKEW) proposed by Chen et al. (2001). Specifically, for each firm j, in
year t, NSKEW is calculated by taking the negative of the third moment of firm-specific
weekly returns for each sample year and dividing it by the standard deviation of firmspecific weekly returns raised to the third power, the higher the value of NSKEW, the
higher possibility of stock price crash risk:

NSKEW  [n  n  1

3/2

w

3
i ,t

] / [ n  1 n  2    w2 j ,t  ]
3/2

(4.6)

The baseline regressions are then repeated by replacing C_Score with NSKEW. The
results are reported in Table 4.11. The coefficient of Mutual is negative (-3.585) and
statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is -17.52), which suggests that the
presence of domestic mutual funds in a firm could significantly reduce the crash risk of
stock price. In addition, the significant positive coefficients of Mutualdiff and
Mutualdisp, and the significant negative coefficient of Mutualratio indicate that when
domestic mutual funds hold closer ownership to that of the controlling shareholder, the
stock price crash risk turns lower. The result is contradictory to the proposed alternative
explanation that mutual funds lower accounting conservatism by colluding with the
controlling shareholder in impeding information disclosure. Thus, the presence of large
controlling shareholders and efficient direct monitoring reduces the requirement of
mutual funds for conservatism.
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Table 4.11 Effects of institutional investors on stock price crash risk
Dependent variable: NCSKEW
Mutual
QFII
Mutualdiff
QFIIdiff

(1)
-3.585***
(-17.52)
0.106
(0.10)

(2)

(3)

(4)

3.712***
(17.48)
-4.062***
(-16.48)

Mutualratio
QFIIratio

-0.666***
(-11.26)
0.373
(1.12)

Mutualdisp

0.979***
(4.65)
QFIIdisp
-0.621
(-1.52)
Constant and controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
17,801
17,801
17,801
17,801
R-squared
0.099
0.100
0.092
0.095
This table reports the results of institutional investors’ ownership on firm stock price crash risk. The
estimation method is firm fixed effects model. Dependent variable is NCSKEW. Constant and all the other
variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in
parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

4.6 Conclusion
Firm accounting conservatism has plenty of benefits such as reducing agency
problems and mitigating information asymmetry. The increasingly important role that
institutional investors play in capital markets motivates this investigation of their effects
on firm accounting conservatism in the emerging market of China.
Using China’s listed firms from 2003 to 2015 as a sample and employing the
C_Score, developed by Khan and Watts (2009) as the proxy for accounting
conservatism, this chapter compares the effects that domestic mutual funds and QFIIs
have on firm accounting conservatism. The main findings are as follows: First, unlike
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the US market, domestic mutual funds negatively influence the degree of accounting
conservatism, while QFIIs positively influence the degree of accounting conservatism.
The reason is that compared with QFIIs, domestic mutual funds are more able to
monitor managers’ actions through other direct monitoring mechanisms such as site
visits, so they are less dependent on accounting conservatism and their ownership could
lower the level of conservatism. Second, when institutional investors’ ownership is
close to that of the controlling shareholder, domestic mutual funds’ negative effects on
conservatism become stronger. However, when QFIIs’ ownership is close to the
controlling shareholders their positive effects are stronger. Third, the negative effects of
domestic mutual funds and positive effects of QFIIs on accounting conservatism
become weaker in: state-owned enterprises, firms that have a lower level of ownership
concentration, and firms with higher information. The results are robust when using
alternative measurement of accounting conservatism and after addressing endogeneity
issues.
Overall, the main results support the view that institutional investors’ demands for
accounting conservatism are subject to their identities as well as their ownership
difference from the controlling shareholders’ ownership.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions
This thesis is motivated by the substantial development of institutional investors in
the Chinese capital market during the last two decades. Since the ownership in China’s
firms is highly concentrated and controlling shareholders usually play a dominant role
in deciding a firm’s policies, this thesis aims to examine whether institutional investors
could play an effective monitoring role in China’s listed firms, and whether their role
could be influenced by the large controlling shareholders’ level of ownership. To
achieve these objectives, this thesis first investigates the effects of institutional investors
on CEO pay-performance relationship. Secondly, this thesis examines how institutional
investors’ contestability of controlling shareholders influences firm innovation and
gives a better understanding of the role of institutional investors in monitoring managers’
long-term investment decisions. Finally, this thesis examines whether institutional
investors require a high level of accounting conservatism. The findings from this thesis
are as follows:
5.1 Effects of institutional investors on CEO pay-performance relationship
In chapter 2, this thesis examines the effects of institutional investors on the CEO
pay-performance relationship. A strong CEO pay-performance relationship is believed
to be a good way to mitigate the agency problem between managers and shareholders.
As one of the most important types of shareholders, institutional investors are
sophisticated and professional in processing information, so they may be able to
monitor managers’ behaviours by strengthening the relationship between CEO pay and
performance.
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Since the behaviours of institutional investors are subject to their identities, this
thesis is interested in the different effects that domestic mutual funds and QFIIs have on
the CEO pay-performance relationship. This thesis provides empirical evidence that
domestic mutual funds and QFIIs have different effects on the CEO pay-performance
relationship. Specifically, since domestic mutual funds are professional in processing
information and are more informed about the investee firms, they are able to exert
effective monitoring on managers and thereby have positive effects on the CEO payperformance relationship. However, the effects of QFIIs on the CEO pay-performance
relationship are insignificant. The reason is that QFIIs are faced with more information
asymmetry due to cultural and language barriers, which makes it less straightforward
for QFIIs to monitor managers effectively.
By considering the difference between the ownership of institutional investors and
the controlling shareholders, this thesis further finds that the positive effects that
domestic mutual funds have on CEO pay-performance are stronger when their
ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholders. This finding implies that
under the high level of ownership concentration in emerging markets, the behaviours of
institutional investors are not only determined by their ownership level, but more
importantly, are determined by the difference between their ownership and that of the
controlling shareholders. When mutual funds’ ownership level is getting closer to that
of the controlling shareholders, they are able to contend with the controlling
shareholders and improve corporate governance by uniting other minority shareholders.
In addition, this thesis further finds that the effects of domestic mutual funds vary
across firms. The positive effects of domestic mutual funds on CEO pay-performance
relationship are more significant in non-SOEs than SOEs, reflecting that severe
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government control restrains the monitoring role of other shareholders. , This thesis also
finds that since corporate governance is weak when a firm has weak industry
tournament, domestic mutual funds have more incentives to strengthen the CEO payperformance relationship. In more developed regions the monitoring effects of domestic
mutual funds are more significant due to the better investor protection and reduced
information asymmetry.
Overall, this thesis finds that QFIIs and domestic mutual funds have heterogeneous
effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship. The effective monitoring of domestic
mutual funds is not only relevant to their ownership level but also to the difference of
their ownership to that of the controlling shareholder. The effectiveness of domestic
mutual funds’ monitoring role is subject to the institutional background including the
severity of government intervention and weak investor protection.
5.2 Effects of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation
Chapter 3 examines how institutional investors’ contestability of the controlling
shareholders influences firm innovation. In the past decade, China’s economy has been
growing substantially and innovation has been and remains a crucial driver. During the
same period, institutional investors have also developed significantly. As an important
type of shareholder, institutional investors usually hold diversified portfolios, so they
have incentives to encourage investment in innovative projects which are risky but with
possibility of high returns. Therefore, institutional investors have positive effects on
firm innovation performance. However, the ownership is highly concentrated in China’s
firms and the controlling shareholders’ dominant role in deciding firm policies may
influence institutional investors’ behaviours. Thus, the impact of institutional investors
may be subject to their ability to contest with the controlling shareholders.
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The main conclusion drawn from the empirical results is that when domestic mutual
funds’ ownership level is closer to that of the controlling shareholders, domestic mutual
funds’ contestability of the controlling shareholders is strengthened and firm innovation
can be improved. However, QFIIs do not have such contestability effects. This can be
attributed to the more severe information asymmetry faced by QFIIs due to the cultural
and language barriers, which make it difficult and costly for QFIIs to contest with the
controlling shareholders. By contrast, domestic mutual funds are able to contend with
the controlling shareholders in improving firm innovation when their ownership is close
to that of the controlling shareholders.
Furthermore, this thesis provides evidence that the influence of domestic mutual
funds’ contestability on firm innovation is weaker in SOEs. The reason is that the
appointment of CEOs in SOEs is under the control of the government, so they tend to
make decisions following government instructions, rather than on the benefits of
shareholders. In addition, the effects of mutual funds’ contestability on innovation are
also stronger in firms with non-politically connected CEOs, firms facing more
competitive markets, and firms with less analyst coverage. These results are consistent
with the view that domestic mutual funds’ contestability affects firm innovation by
alleviating managers’ career concerns.
To conclude, the influence of institutional investors on firm innovation is not only
determined by their ownership level, but is also subject to the difference in their
ownership level to that of the controlling shareholders, i.e. contestability. Moreover, the
effects of contestability are also heterogeneous across different types of institutional
investors. Mutual funds’ contestability has positive effects on firm innovation while
QFIIs have no such contestability effects.
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5.3 Demand of institutional investors for accounting conservatism
Accounting conservatism is believed to be a good governance device for
shareholders. It is found in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that the monitoring of domestic
mutual funds on managers is more effective than QFIIs in terms of improving CEO payperformance sensitivity and improving firm innovation performance, therefore it is
interesting to further look into their effects on accounting conservatism. In Chapter 4,
this thesis discusses the effects of domestic mutual funds and QFIIs on firm accounting
conservatism.
This thesis finds that since domestic mutual funds are able to monitor managers’
behaviours through direct ways such as strengthening the CEO pay-performance
relationship and improving firm innovative investment, their dependence on financial
numbers is weak. Consequently, domestic mutual funds require less conservative
accounting of the investee. Another important reason for domestic mutual funds’
reduced demand for conservatism is that the main agency problem in China exists
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders rather than between
managers and shareholders. By contrast, QFIIs are more reliant on financial numbers to
conduct monitoring, so they require a higher level of accounting conservatism. Using
the same method, testing the influence of the controlling shareholders finds that the
negative effects of domestic mutual funds and the positive effects of QFIIs on
accounting conservatism are both stronger when their ownership is closer to that of the
controlling shareholders. In addition, further evidence indicates that the demand of
institutional investors for accounting conservatism is stronger in firms where the
controlling shareholders are non-state entities, there is a higher level of ownership
concentration and less severe information asymmetry.
153

To summarise, institutional investors’ demand for accounting conservatism is
subject to their identities. Domestic mutual funds do not require conservative
accounting while QFIIs do. The negative effects of domestic mutual funds on
accounting conservatism vary across firms with different types of controlling
shareholders, different levels of ownership concentration and information asymmetry.
5.4 Summary and implications
In summary, the role that domestic and foreign institutional investors play is
heterogeneous in China. Domestic mutual funds have information advantages, are more
informed of the local investee firms and are sophisticated in processing information.
These factors facilitate their monitoring on managers, including a significantly positive
impact on the CEO pay-performance relationship, and are able to contest with the
controlling shareholders by improving firm innovation output. As a result of the
efficient and significant direct monitoring, domestic mutual funds are less dependent on
financial numbers to overlook managers’ self-interest behaviours. However, QFIIs are
faced with more severe information asymmetry, caused by cultural and language
disadvantages, which constrains their monitoring role in the investee firms.
Consequently, QFIIs are not able to significantly improve CEO pay-performance
sensitivity, and they do not have contestability effects in terms of improving firm
innovation output. Therefore, they have more incentive to demand conservative
accounting to monitor/ discipline the behaviour of managers.
The high ownership concentration in China’s firms has an impact on the monitoring
role of institutional investors. To be specific, the behaviours of institutional investors
are not only determined by their ownership level, but more importantly, are determined
by the difference in ownership between them and the controlling shareholders. When
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institutional investors are close in ownership to the controlling shareholders, domestic
mutual funds tend to contend with the controlling shareholders and hence improve
corporate governance, while QFIIs’ behaviours are more likely to be captured by the
controlling shareholders. The role of institutional investors in the investee firms is
subject to institutional characteristics, particularly the level of ownership concentration,
which is higher in emerging markets.
An important implication of this thesis is that in China, due to the unique culture
and the existence of various dialects, foreign institutional investors and domestic
institutional investors have different incentives and behaviours. Foreign institutional
investors’ effects are constrained in terms of improving corporate governance level and
improving firm policies for the following four reasons: First, QFIIs hold a relatively
lower level of ownership compared with domestic mutual funds. Therefore, it is very
hard for QFIIs to monitor managers’ behaviours or compete with the controlling
shareholders. Second, as discussed in Chapter 1, QFIIs are faced with strict regulations
from the government on ownership level and the overall investment quota. The
ownership held by a single QFII in a listed firm is not allowed to exceed 10%, and the
total ownership of all the QFIIs in a listed firm is not allowed to exceed 30%. Therefore,
QFIIs have very limited ability to influence the decision makings of a firm. Third, QFIIs
are owned by foreigners who usually have a different culture from the local culture in
China, such as the uncommon used language and relationship-based economy, which
increase the information asymmetry level faced by QFIIs (Chakravarty et al., 1998;
Kang and Kim, 2010; Liu et al., 2014; Ferreira et al., 2017). This further makes it
difficult for QFIIs to monitor managers. Fourth, QFII portfolios are more diversified so
that they are able to move their capital from China to another market when they feel
risky, while domestic mutual funds are less likely to do so. Therefore, QFIIs may not
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exert direct monitoring on managers or have no significant effects on firm overall
corporate governance or firm innovation. Thus, QFIIs are more likely to be captured by
the controlling shareholders and thereby comply with the controlling shareholders’
decisions. Overall, due to the lack of ability of QFIIs to monitor managers or compete
with the controlling shareholders, it is hard for QFIIs to have significant effects on
corporate governance or firm policies. Practically, these findings provide a reference for
regulators to make policies, in particular the insignificant monitoring role of foreign
institutional investors calls for the further release of restrictions over their investment in
China. In addition, this thesis also provides information to help individual investors
make appropriate investment decisions.
5.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research
It is acknowledged that this research has some limitations. One limitation is sample
selection. The sample used in this thesis includes all China’s A-share listed firms. The
case is unclear for unlisted firms due to the limited data available. Future research in
this area can provide further insights into unlisted firms by conducting surveys to collect
the required information. In addition, as domestic mutual funds do not have investment
in China’s B-share firms, the sample does not cover these firms. However, QFIIs do
have a level of ownership of China’s B-share firms, so future research on QFIIs’ effects
can include B-share firms.
The other limitation is the measurement of CEO compensation in Chapter 2, where
CEO pay only includes cash pay (including salary, bonus and other cash compensation).
Some existing literature measures CEO compensation as all components of CEO wealth
including stock options, grants and restricted stocks grants. However, the conclusions
may not be influenced since there are very few listed firms in China (127 firms in the
156

sample) using stock options and restricted stocks incentives. Future research on
institutional investors and CEO incentives can focus on CEO total wealth including
stock options and restricted stocks.
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